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Abstract 
 
This thesis will address two questions: Does philosophy contribute to the ‘public 
understanding of science’ (PUoS), and if so, how?   
The popular public image of science is one of methodology. Science is a means for 
making true statements about the world, where we compare hypothesis with 
observation against the evidence. This then allows for a body of knowledge that 
guides further advancements and progress. Philosophy, however, seems to be 
antithetical to this. A popular notion is that philosophy is either what science was, or 
it deals with objects and ideas so intangible, that they have no real effect in the world. 
Either it is an outmoded way of doing science, or it is the preserve of armchair 
academics. In both cases the average person would be forgiven for thinking it had no 
relevance to them, and especially their ability to understand science. This thesis will 
look to challenge this relationship. Using hermeneutics, discourse-textual analysis and 
deconstruction, I present two interpretations of science and philosophy. These two 
interpretations I will call the ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ approach. The 
‘methodological’ approach is to understand science as a collection of principles or 
rules that, if followed, will produce true statements about the world. An example of 
such a principle that intersected both philosophy and science is ‘falsification’ as 
understood through the ‘problem of demarcation’ (PoD). The irrelevance of 
philosophy to science is fortified by the constant failure to produce fixed rules for 
what makes one thing scientific and another not. The ‘historical’ approach is to 
understand the actions of scientists as historical events. So rather than ask ‘what is 
science?’ we might ask, ‘what does it mean to act scientifically?’ I will argue 
philosophy can be of use in overcoming the antagonism between understanding a 
methodological question historically and a historical question methodologically. 
 
Firstly, I give an uncontroversial reading of the PoD, as argued by Karl Popper, who 
represents the ‘methodological’ view and oppose this to the ‘historical’ approach of 
Paul Feyerabend. Due to the dominance of the interpretation of science as a 
methodology, I argue that historical critiques, like Feyerabend’s, become nonsensical 
when understood as methodological substitutes. This is what I call the ‘received view’ 
  
of what both Popper and Feyerabend had to say on science. Here, Popper fails to 
solve the PoD and Feyerabend appears to deny the method, objectivity or rationality 
of science. Next, using ideas inspired by Heidegger, I reverse those roles by 
presenting a ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ reading of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. I develop two types of language, which I call ‘about’ 
and ‘of’ language that map on to the methodological and historical distinctions. Using 
this method I construct two contradictory readings of the text, but unlike the Popper-
Feyerabend antagonism, we see how the historical approach is the more fertile 
interpretation. One version, which I call the ‘strong’ reading, has Kuhn as a relativist, 
irrationalist or anti-science, which is important if this is the ‘received view’ of Kuhn. 
This reading carries political weight with ‘interest groups’ who may wish to 
undermine the epistemic authority of science. That same reading can be used to 
discredit Kuhn/ philosophy of science, and by extension philosophy as a worthwhile 
instrument for understanding science. The other version, which I call the ‘weak’ 
reading, has Kuhn as a supporter and defender of science, but it also resolves old 
philosophical disputes by framing the problem in a different way. This will not only 
problematize any notion of a dominant interpretation, but it gives good grounds why 
one cannot be relativist or irrationalist about ‘truth’. Thus it defends the epistemic 
authority of science, and also gives philosophy a valuable role in public thinking 
about science.  
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1  
Chapter One 
 
Introduction: Science, Philosophy and Society 
 
1.1 – Introduction 
 
This thesis places itself at a point of convergence between several issues, emanating 
from sociology, education, politics, history and philosophy of science. My main 
concern is with the dialogue between science as a practice and what is necessary for a 
person to know in order to have a fair understanding of that practice. What concerns 
me with this dialogue is the apparent irrelevance philosophy has in contributing to this 
debate in the public sphere. Public understanding of science and much of science 
education tend to promote science as a ‘method’, where we can say uncontroversial 
things like ‘knowledge and understanding in science are rooted in evidence’.1 There is 
absolutely no denying that science is successful at what it does and it does so because 
of its methods. On the other hand ‘philosophy’ appears to make little contribution, 
since it tirelessly fails to make progress in its subject areas, and worse it has led to all 
sorts of confused thinking about ideas such as ‘truth’, ‘reason’, ‘reality’, or even 
‘science’. 
Since the fallout of the ‘Science Wars’ a whole new raft of terms and ideas have filled 
the public space on what science may or may not be. This normally is attacked under 
the umbrella term of ‘postmodernism’ which prima-facie seems to dismiss the central 
ideas of the Enlightenment from which the scientific attitude came.  The core ideas of 
‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘reason’ have been spread too thin or too thick in recent 
years. From the ‘postmodern’ mash-ups of New Age mysticism with quantum physics 
in Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of Physics, to the ultra empiricism of Hawking and 
Mlodinow’s The Grand Design.2 Whilst these would appear to be at different ends of 
the ‘objectivity’ spectrum they share a common metaphysical commitment. For what 
Capra and those other purveyors of ‘postmodern’ critiques of science want, is to 
overcome those positivistic-imperialist views of orthodox science which talk in a 
language of ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth’. Taking this as a sample of the work 
                                                 
1
 DfES, Science: Programme of Study for Key Stage 3 and Attainment Targets (London: Department 
for Education and Skills, 2007), p.208 
2  
‘philosophers’ and ‘cultural theorists’ put out about science gives rise to a kind of 
‘anti-philosophy’ by those more immediately connected with science. This can lead 
someone like Hawking, without irony, to sub-title his book New Answers to the 
Ultimate Questions of Life, where we are led to page-one where it is claimed, 
‘philosophy is dead’.3 The view that Hawking represents is the other end of this 
‘objectivity’ spectrum, where rather than argue that ‘objectivity’ or ‘truth’ is a 
language game, hegemonic structure, or social construct, it is only the scientific way 
of disclosing the world that counts as true. Thus the only meaningful way to describe 
reality is objectively. 
     
Part of the originality of this thesis is to argue that these two perspectives share a 
common source in viewing science as only a method. One view claims there can be 
no objectivity and the other that there is only objectivity. It is then from this common 
source that apparently contrary positions can be taken from which philosophy 
becomes the victim. For we either get the kind of ‘anti-philosophy’ from the likes of 
Hawking or we suffer the fallout of the ‘postmodernist’ abuses of philosophy in 
science by claiming that due to something like Kuhnian paradigms there can be no 
objective scientific position.  What makes this situation more confusing for a member 
of the public is that not only can we find specialists who are willing to disagree with 
the scientific community, but also history shows us that this is how science 
progresses.
4
 For every highly corroborated theory or ‘scientific’ position we can find 
a scientist who has ‘evidence’ to the contrary. This would seem to exceed our maxim 
of ‘knowledge and understanding in science are rooted in evidence’ as we have highly 
trained professionals who seem to disagree over what the evidence is or what it 
means. Analytical philosophers have tried to contribute to this debate by either 
working out a formalized account of whatever this method might be or how language, 
thought, experience and reality all hang together. This acute level of detachment and 
abstraction has not won many followers from the scientific community who rest 
assured that their highly abstract problems are at least ‘real’ or in some proper sense 
‘scientific’.  
                                                                                                                                            
2 Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern Physics and 
Eastern Mysticism, 3
rd
 edn. (London: Flamingo, 1983); Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The 
Grand Design: New Answers to the Ultimate Questions of Life (New York: Bantam Press, 2010) 
3
 Ibid., p.1 
3  
My thesis is to argue for a role for philosophy in the public understanding of science 
(PUoS). I am not arguing for a positive theory of what science is or that people should 
follow philosophy x, but the practice of philosophizing itself is a public discourse 
worth having. Part of this thesis will be to argue that before we can ask ‘what is 
science?’ (a particular theory), which leads to philosophical problems such as that of 
‘demarcation’, we have to understand the grounds for asking such a question. What I 
identify as symptomatic of the problems of demarcation is the treating of an 
essentially historical question as if it were a methodological one. I argue that this is 
accomplished due to the dominant interpretation of science as method. So any critique 
of science from a philosophical basis appears to be usurping the methodology of 
science, as if philosophy could improve on it. 
 
Science necessarily has a philosophical component, but if it is understood as only a 
methodology, it then covers over the presence of philosophy. Or, in order to become 
scientific the presence of philosophy has to be diminished until it is not even a 
question. What do I mean by this? Well first, why would we want someone to know 
about science? The general idea is that if people understood the scientific method, a 
number of things might follow: society would improve as people employed evidence-
based reasoning in their everyday lives; science could progress as people would 
understand the need for certain research programmes; and society would progress off 
the back of those new innovations. This all sounds like a good idea, so how would we 
achieve this? Taking just the first claim, how would someone follow the methodology 
of science so their life was enhanced? A core premise to the scientific perspective 
and, what seems to put it in opposition to the religious perspective, is that, what we 
believe is true and what is actually true are two totally different things. Most of us 
would agree with this statement to the point that it seems trivial.
5
 To get to this 
position most, if not all, scientists take up methodological naturalism and empirical-
realism. This would require the average member of the public to accept that reality is 
explainable using only natural forces and that this reality is a real, external, mind 
independent entity that is knowable. The claim and apparent strength of science is that 
it is just an extension of commonsense. It should be self-evident that we do not need 
                                                                                                                                            
4
 For an example see bio-chemist and creationist Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The 
Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998) 
4  
supernatural forces or that wishful thinking has no bearing on the proceedings of 
reality. Bronowski writes, ‘the mastery and the greatness of science rests in the end on 
this, that here the rational and the empirical are knotted together. Science is fact’.6  
Now philosophers get in there and muddy the water by saying stuff like scientists are 
actually methodological realists, or methodological pluralists, or normative naturalists 
and so on.
7
 Other philosophers deny that there is even a scientific method.
8
 
Seemingly, if given their day, most philosophers would die of hunger, like Buridan’s 
ass never being able to make a decision.
9
 The ‘over-thinking’ of science by the 
humanities has led to a range of hostile reactions. There is the ‘sloppy thinking’ in 
Alan Sokal’s Beyond the Hoax, where fashionable discourses within the humanities 
are argued to act as barriers to valid ‘leftist’ social action – (Sokal writes that empty 
intellectual fashions promote ‘subjectivist and relativist philosophies that in my view 
are inconsistent with producing a realistic analysis of society’). 10 Or there is Norman 
Edmund’s provocatively titled End the Biggest Educational and Intellectual Blunder 
in History.
11
 The ‘blunder’ being, ‘the false claim of the non-existence of the 
scientific method by the Harvard/Conant group’.12 The ‘Harvard/ Conant group’ 
consisted of thinkers like James B. Conant, W.V.O. Quine and more importantly for 
this thesis, Thomas Kuhn. 
 
It would seem that the greatest testament to the efficacy of science is not some 
philosophical argument, but the fact that stuff works. We have planes, computers, 
medicine and so on. Connecting the dots, it would seem that from relatively few 
sensible premises we can derive a world that is ‘out there’ in reality, knowable and 
explainable without recourse to magic or mystics. Relaxing in the fact that thoughts 
do not influence reality, we see science continue to work regardless of what people 
think about it. Yet the perceived influence of metaphysics at work in ‘wishful 
                                                                                                                                            
5
 Christopher Norris, Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy (London & New York: Continuum, 
2005), pp.20-22 
6
 Jacob Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science (London: Heinemann, 1951), p.99 
7
 Howard Sankey, ‘Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aims of Science’, 
in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method, ed. by Robert 
Nola and Howard Sankey (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp.211-229 (p.212) 
8
 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, 3
rd
 edn. (London: Verso, 2002), p.1 
9
 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004), p.229 
10
 Alan Sokal, Beyond the Hoax,: Science Philosophy and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp.107-108 
11
 Norman H. Edmund, End the Biggest Educational and Intellectual Blunder in History: A $100,000 
to Our Top Educational Leaders (Fort Lauderdale, FL.: Scientific Method Publishing Company, 2005) 
5  
thinking’ in how mind might influence reality is equally at work in understanding 
reality as independent of mind. Now I am not arguing that science could be successful 
with any arbitrary metaphysics, but that its non-recognition is used as an excuse to 
demote the role of philosophy to a merely linguistic or psychological entity.   
Where I step into the debate is on behalf of the general public, not the people 
practising science, but those charged with the task of understanding it. It will be 
understood throughout this thesis that those involved with science, as a daily activity, 
will acquire a tacit understanding of that practice. Whereas, those who do not do 
science but have to learn about it will have to acquire an explicit form of whatever 
this tacit element is. The difference between learning about a subject in its explicit 
form as ‘knowledge’ (i.e., facts) and its tacit form of ‘understanding’ (i.e., practised 
based) is something we do not ask the public to consider. What-is-more, I think most 
scientists and educators do not consider this difference, as they are either unaware or 
believe it not to be relevant. This is what I mean by absence of philosophy in science. 
One of my concerns and reasons for writing this thesis is that due to philosophy 
becoming an increasingly marginalized practice I see a number of things happening. It 
is either viewed as a lofty subject ripe only for academia, to which the 
institutionalization and professionalization of the subject have not helped. Here it 
grows old and stale, a remnant of what classical education use to be, a vocation, 
benign but valuable like relicts in a museum. Or it is viewed as a shorthand term for 
anything non-scientific, that alternative medicines and complementary therapies are 
based on Ancient Eastern wisdom or philosophical, holistic approaches to mind, spirit 
and body. Here it is viewed as less benign, acting as an agent of deception guiding 
people into sloppy thinking. Surely, it is only philosophy that could allow one to deny 
that the scientific method exists, that truth is relative, that science does not progress, 
or that scientific debates are settled irrationally? 
 
As a rational member of the public, only one option seems sensible, that I side with 
‘science’ and have to concede that any other worldview would be irrational to hold. 
Here ‘philosophy’ is just what some Oxbridge dons do or people who mistrust 
                                                                                                                                            
12
 Ibid., p.xi 
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conventional science.
13
 This position seems even more reasonable considering those 
who actually are involved with communicating science have adopted philosophical 
domains and questions as their subject matter. Here, we can explain why people are 
religious, moral, or why there is something rather than nothing and so on without ever 
picking up a single book of Aristotle, Spinoza, Kierkegaard or Leibniz.
14
 With the 
ever-increasing explanatory domain of science, I see not only religion but also 
philosophy being pushed into the margins, and like so many social practices it could 
one day disappear altogether. 
 
1.2 - The Thesis 
 
I will argue that philosophy is a means not only to protecting the epistemic authority 
of science but also as a way of combating Sokal’s ‘sloppy thinking’. I will argue that 
what has been packaged as science, is an abstracted, metaphysical notion of science as 
a pure methodology. What people like the ‘Harvard/Conant’ group have done is pick 
up on historical inaccuracies in the story of science as only a method. I will argue that 
in order to understand science as only a methodology, it is necessary to take on a lot 
of philosophical baggage. This either goes unnoticed or is subtly registered, but due to 
lack of philosophical ability, it gets subsumed by other discourses that use it for their 
own socio-political ends. Both of these outcomes I see as anathema to an ‘open 
society’ and democracy. We, at the same time, promote ‘unthinking’ in asking people 
to accept an idea without scrutinising it and by the same means we supply 
ammunition to those who wish to combat science as a mode for revealing facts about 
the world. What I see as the greatest strength of philosophy can also be perceived as 
its greatest weakness; that is, it can complicate the very simple. As has already been 
mentioned, philosophers argue over whether science is ‘really’ a naturalist, realist, or 
materialist endeavour. This is philosophy and science as represented by a particular 
group. Philosophy in the sense that I mean it, would try to understand how we could 
get to a point that we can say a phrase like ‘really is’ in the first place. This presumes 
a mind, world, language, and knowledge model of reality that allows scientific and 
                                                 
13
 Later it will be argued that it is a narrow conception of philosophy that is being targeted. On the one 
side we have science as empirical-realist or methodological naturalism and on the other hand ‘abstract 
philosophy’ as belonging to ancient wisdom or alternative/ complementary medicines. See pp.15-16 
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philosophical debates to take place. The questioning or even denial of this model is 
not to advocate an ‘anything goes’ free-for-all, but it would actually help explain how 
science has come to the position it has and why it is so good at what it does. Not only 
would it help the public confront inherent problems within the ‘science as only 
method’ conception, but it would also be an antidote to the sloppy thinking of other 
discourses, including science and philosophy itself. It is only recently that I have 
come round to this ‘deconstructive’ tendency, and unintentionally have been writing 
about philosophy as type of deconstruction all the way through my thesis. This is not 
philosophy as a subject but as a means to understanding how subjects, including 
philosophy, are established. Norris writes, ‘deconstruction begins with the same 
gesture of turning reason against itself to bring out its tacit dependence on another, 
repressed or unrecognized, level of meaning.’15 If one thinks of philosophy as a 
subject, it becomes a two and half thousand-year endeavour. Do I look for the answers 
in Plato, Senaca, St Augustine, Locke, or Hume? When viewed like this, philosophy 
seems like a detached antiquated substitute for science, if what they were all looking 
for were ‘facts’ about the world. Rather, if we view philosophy as an activity that they 
were all engaged in, limited by their socio-historical conditions, we can also view 
science and philosophy as expressions of that limit. When philosophy becomes 
absent, we start to think that that limit no longer applies, that any thinking about 
‘truth’ is either scientific or what we mean by truth is some wishy-washy metaphor. 
Understanding what philosophy does and how one does it is not made any easier by 
viewing it as a benign purely vocational subject. Philosophy is an every day activity 
not just of thinking, but a way of acting. People act on behalf of philosophical and 
metaphysical ideas everyday, but it is because it is so ‘everyday’ that we fail to 
recognize it. Here, I see philosophy like art at its best when it makes the ‘everyday’ 
seem special, new or unfamiliar, so that we are forced to look at it again.             
 
There can be no scientific argument for why a particular philosophical doctrine should 
not be advocated over another, and even more so for ethical terms like ‘should’. Even 
though some philosophers and scientists would disagree with that last statement, I 
                                                                                                                                            
14
 For examples of these and popular science writing see, Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion 
(London: Transworld Publishers, 2006); see also chapters 5 and 6 in Lawrence M. Krauss, A Universe 
from Nothing: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing (New York: Free Press, 2012) 
15
 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, Revised edition (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1999), p.64 
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think this is an example of ‘sloppy thinking’.16 To begin with, I will look at the recent 
history of this debate and how pro-science advocates have represented philosophy, 
with particular focus on the ‘Science Wars’. I will argue that part of the confusion that 
resulted from the ‘Science Wars’ was due to a type of incommensurate thinking or 
dialogue. Whilst some were speaking about science as a historical activity others were 
discussing science as a pure methodology.
17
 This situation becomes even more 
confusing when one understands a historical critique as a substitute for methodology. 
So within this thesis, I will outline two ‘understandings’ or ‘readings’ of science, one 
that is methodological and one that is historical.
18
 I will argue that not only has the 
methodological understanding been pushed forward as the ‘real’ representation of 
science, but that it is also a philosophical notion which will take philosophy to 
unpack.
19
 One of the conclusions of the methodological reading, or what I will also 
call the ‘strong’ reading of science, is something like ‘scientism,’ which I take 
metaphysically to be the same or at least parasitic on the fundamentalist religious 
positions. In contrast to this, I will offer the historical or ‘weak’ reading of science 
which is geared to what ‘fixes’ interpretations of phenomena including the 
methodological interpretation of science. The role of philosophy in this instance is to 
show how if we challenge the methodological or strong reading of science that will 
include things like ‘Objectivity’, ‘Truth’ and ‘Reason’, we are not left with nothing. 
Thus, the very fact we might think we would be left with ‘nothing’ is to highlight 
what is absent in the understanding of science and philosophy. Here, we end up with 
endless debates about relativism verses absolutism or realism against anti-realism 
because all we have to deal with is the strong reading. If all we understand science to 
be is through the strong reading then when someone challenges it, they appear more 
radical than they actually are.
20
 Their ‘radicalism’ is then either something absurd, 
                                                 
16
 Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (London: 
Transworld Publishers, 2012) 
17
 Kitcher has recently discussed this divison in his vision for a pragmatist philosophy of science. Philip 
Kitcher, ‘Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of Science’, Theoria, 77 (2013), 185-231 (p.189) 
18
 Rorty gave his own version of two types of readings between ‘ironists’ and ‘metaphysicians’, where 
our prior beliefs and philosophy guide what we take to be as acceptable as questions, conclusions and 
arguments. Richard Rorty, ‘Ironists and Metaphysicians’, in The Truth About Truth: De-confusing and 
Re-constructing the Postmodern World, ed. by Walter Truett Anderson (New York: Penguin Putnam, 
1995), pp.100 -106    
19
 Pp.146 -153 in thesis. 
20 Steffano Gattei, Thomas Kuhn’s “Linguistic Turn” and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: 
Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2008), p.93 
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devaluing the role of philosophy, or it is politically desirable to ‘interest groups’ who 
may wish to challenge the authority of orthodox science. 
 
As I think historical context is important, I will also be looking at the history of the 
‘PUoS’ movement in the UK and the debates it has raised. It is here that I will pick up 
on an ‘anti-philosophy’ motif, but at the same time look at ways philosophy might be 
relevant. The question ‘what is science?’ will be crucial to my story, as implicit within 
it, is part of the methodological narrative that has pushed philosophy ‘out of the 
picture’. For in order to understand what science is, we also have to understand what 
science is not. Within the philosophy of science this is known as the ‘problem of 
demarcation’ (PoD). I will present two orthodox readings of science and philosophy 
surrounding the PoD. The first will be of Karl Popper and his attempt to answer this 
question through his principle of falsification. It will look at how the scientific 
community regarded his contribution and what exactly they thought he was 
contributing to. In contrast to Popper, I will present one of his students, Paul 
Feyerabend, his claims against a scientific method and his views on falsification. I 
will argue that, if you come to these thinkers and ideas through a prior ‘strong’ 
understanding, Popper will appear as the heroic de-bunker of superstition through his 
criteria of testability and Feyerabend comes off as a ‘radical’.   
 
Next I reverse this claim by completing a close-text analysis and deconstruction of 
Thomas Kuhn’s ideas in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.21 Given the 
importance that Kuhn and Structure have had for the development of philosophy of 
science and the social sciences, I feel that it makes an apt target. I will then offer both 
a ‘strong/ methodological’ and ‘weak/ historical’ reading that are in contradiction 
with one another. I will also use original concepts inspired from another apparent 
radical Martin Heidegger. Both of these actions are deliberate. Firstly, what I hope to 
show with the contradictory readings of Kuhn is that in order to derive either, one 
must already be reading Kuhn with that understanding of science and philosophy in 
mind. Secondly, one of those readings creates a useless impotent conception of 
science made only possible by the presence of a more useless philosophy. Here we are 
left with a choice if we are to conclude that science does not make progress, is not 
10  
objective, or operates irrationally. The choices being either give up science for some 
other cultural narrative with which to explain the world or give up philosophy as a 
worthwhile endeavour. There is, however, another reading that will make Kuhn and 
philosophy useful in understanding the question ‘what is science?’ I do not, however, 
offer this up as a ‘turn’ towards pragmatism, as this has been one of the consequences 
of reading Kuhn in a certain way.
22
 Here neo-pragmatists, postmodernists and ‘strong’ 
sociologists have appropriated Kuhn to their own ends. Rather, I employ the utility in 
their reading as an act of philosophy, in not only understanding the arguments but the 
possibilities for the very position one is arguing from. There is a political-ethical 
component to this that one reading closes off interpretation, and so comes to define 
science and philosophy for us. The other opens up ways of reading Kuhn, and at the 
same time allows us to challenge dominant interpretations. One of the original 
contributions I will be making is developing my two readings in line with two types 
of languages, which I have called ‘about’ and ‘of’ languages. These have their 
analogue in the ‘strong/methodological’ and ‘weak/historical’ readings. An ‘about’ 
language is a discourse, or proposition based. It is simply what something is about. 
Mathematics is about numbers, quantities and their relationships, bike riding is about 
a leisure activity, the Highway Code, bio-mechanical processes and so on. An ‘of’ 
language is non-propositional and is what allows an ‘about’ language to form. It is the 
‘doing’ of what an ‘about’ language refers to. So the language of mathematics is 
proofing, completing operations, and so on, the language of bike riding is riding a 
bike. What is unique to the ‘of’ language is, it is something only humans can do as 
ultimately it has to do with a tacit understanding of our world and practices. One of 
the conceptual problems this way of thinking may help us with, is whether one 
understands if an ‘about’ language precedes an ‘of’ language or vice-versa. 
 
The purpose of Heidegger, like Kuhn, is rather than to dismiss a person as radical or 
nonsensical (strong Kuhn), we should engage with what these people wrote and 
thought and try to make their work relevant to modern problems. As Heidegger is 
seen as a radical, irrationalist or someone we might not associate with Kuhn let alone 
the PUoS, it is again the work of the philosopher to show why these things matter. In 
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doing so, they show why philosophy matters. I suspect that for the same reasons that 
we might understand Kuhn a certain way, due to a prior understanding, is also true of 
‘mainstream’ Heidegger. This is not to say that we can let people get away with 
saying whatever they want and blame the lack of sense on our inability to grasp their 
level of analysis. If a claim is meant methodologically as it is with the pseudo-
sciences or something like ‘Intelligent Design’, we are at liberty, or even morally 
obliged to scrutinize those claims. In the last instance, it is not about what Heidegger 
or Kuhn ‘actually’ meant, but using the process of philosophy as a means to interpret 
the problems of the modern world. Hence this thesis is not about Kuhn, Heidegger or 
another theory/philosophy of science, but is about the role philosophy can play in 
helping the public understand science and where we might reach absurd conclusions 
working out why. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I will be drawing on the work of the scientist Richard 
Feynman.
23
 I do so for a number of reasons. Firstly, the ‘received view’ of Feynman 
is a no-nonsense scientist and hater of philosophy.
24
 I hope to show that the 
‘philosophy’ Feynman disliked was a rather narrow conception of philosophy, and in 
his pronouncements on science was actually very philosophical. Just as we can relax 
and not think about what Kuhn wrote as it has been interpreted for us, many scientists 
adopted Feynman’s views without considering what he said or what views he was 
actually attacking. Here, I take sympathy with the work of Pierre Hadot where 
philosophy is not just a subject but a ‘way of life’.25 That it is up to us to identify 
previous thinkers and schools of thoughts as ‘models of life’ to which we then have to 
think though for ourselves in line with the tradition of philosophy as a whole.
26
 That is 
‘to take account of all the concrete conditions in which they wrote […] the framework 
of the school, the very nature of philosophia, literary genres, rhetorical rules, 
dogmatic imperatives, and traditional modes of reasoning.’27 This is then not to place 
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any one ideal of wisdom above any other, but as ‘a way of living’, making it relevant 
to our lives and the problems we face. My fear is that if philosophy ceases to be part 
of public discourse, it fossilizes. We then end up with an understanding of philosophy 
that it is what people did before the scientific method, and now we can let science 
interpret the world for us. Philosophical themes can then be subsumed by other 
discourses that would not be recognized as metaphysical or transcendental. At best, it 
will just be an endless back and forth about the scientific proof for God, morality, or 
beauty. At worst, we lose what is human about us, the ability to self-interpret, and 
instead found our meanings in science that it is some how exterior to us. 
 
1.3 - Is to be Scientific to be Anti-Philosophy of Science? 
 
The context surrounding the relationship between science, philosophy, and the general 
public, which I am concerned with, is a reaction to the period of academic exchange 
called the ‘Science Wars’. It was here that the Enlightenment ideals of ‘truth’, 
‘objectivity’, and ‘reason’ appeared to be challenged by ‘postmodern’ critics.28 
Indeed, whom we take as our ‘postmodernist’ is worthy of a thesis in itself. The 
analytic-pragmatist end (e.g., Searle or Rorty) would have someone like Derrida as 
the protagonist, whereas, from the deconstuctivist position (e.g., Derrida or Norris), 
someone like Rorty is the perpetrator.
29
  The response from ‘science’ can be 
summarized by E. O. Wilson’s take on this exchange: 
 
The ongoing fragmentation of knowledge and resulting chaos in 
philosophy are not reflections of the real world but artefacts of 
scholarship. The propositions of the original Enlightenment are 
increasingly favoured by objective evidence, especially from the 
natural sciences […] Postmodernism is the ultimate polar antithesis of 
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 Barringer labels the ‘sides’ in the science wars as conflict between modernist and post-modernists. 
Philip S. Barringer, ‘Introduction: The “Science Wars”’, in After the Science Wars, ed. by Keith M. 
Ashman and Philip S. Barringer (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.1-12 (p.4)  
29
 I would side with the Derridean analysis of Rorty or Searle as being closer to the ‘postmodernism’ 
that I am trying to address. It is not that we can not say ‘true’ things but that it is necessary to have a 
more sophisticated understanding of ‘truth’ if one is to critique it.  
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the Enlightenment […] Enlightenment thinkers believe we can know 
everything, and radical postmodernists believe we can know nothing.
30
     
 
This ‘fragmentation of knowledge’ and perceived ‘chaos in philosophy’, are indeed 
artefacts of scholarship, but have their basis in real world practices. The fragmentation 
and chaos I would like to draw attention to, are the confusions one can arrive at if 
insufficient understanding is given to the philosophical issues at stake. My main 
argument in this thesis will centre on the conclusions one can reach about science, if 
we conflate or confuse the use of philosophy as a ‘methodological’ or ‘historical’ 
approach. Is science an abstract canon of precepts that are universal and true, which 
one can derive merely by reason alone, or is science only ever what people do and is 
subject to a time and place? Fuller and Collier blame philosophers for this confusion, 
but I argue that it is by dismissing philosophy as merely misguided positivism that we 
by-pass a potent source of this confusion.
31
 A philosophical problem at the heart of 
PUoS is the PoD, for if we ask people to understand what science is, we are also 
teaching them what science is not. As a commonsense question, this appears to be 
intelligible, but as a philosophical project, it has failed to distinguish science from 
non-science. I will argue that depending on how one thinks about this problem, we 
may find the source of many of the tensions that became apparent in the ‘Science 
Wars’. We have to ask ourselves, is the PoD a problem of methodology (is it 
deductive, inductive, verifiable, falsifiable and so on) or is it a historical problem 
(science is what scientists do at a particular time)? The tensions that I refer to have 
already been alluded to in what weight of legitimacy we give to ideas such as ‘truth’ 
over ‘Truth’ or ‘rationality’ over ‘Reason’. Philosophy will hopefully show us where 
metaphysical ideas have come to substitute for the concrete actions of people. 
 
Another tension, between philosophy and science, is the majority of philosophers who 
appear to be pro-science, and the publicly active scientists who appear to be anti-
philosophy.
32
 As philosophers are free to comment on science, so too do scientists 
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feel free and qualified to comment on philosophy. At the top of most short lists of 
quotes from scientists and mathematicians that have appeared to speak out publicly 
against philosophy as means to understanding science is Richard Feynman who said, 
‘philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.’33 One 
can take this statement a number of ways, but what is significant about Feynman 
saying it, is that he is regarded by most scientists (especially physicists) as the 
embodiment of the scientific enterprise. He not only won the Nobel-Prize, made 
fundamental contributions to science, apparently started the nano-technology 
revolution, but also solved the Challenger space shuttle disaster.
34
 Another Nobel-
Prize winner, Steven Weinberg, also wrote a chapter simply titled ‘Against 
Philosophy’.35 Weinberg intentionally contrasts his view with that of one of the 
‘Conant/Harvard’ group, Thomas Kuhn. Here, he concludes that because paradigms 
cannot be compared to any objective criteria, then one worldview cannot be 
privileged over another putting shamanism, astrology, and creationism on an equal 
footing with ‘science’.36 Weinberg does not hesitate to say that science and he are in 
the business of getting ‘closer and closer to objective truth’.37 Saulson notes that 
‘Weinberg goes out of his way to contrast his point of view with Thomas Kuhn’s 
position that it was nonsensical to talk about scientific progress taking us ‘closer to 
the truth’.38 Moving away from Nobel-Prize winners, Stephen Hawking not only 
diagnoses the death of philosophy, but in A Brief History of Time, portrays early 
attempts at understanding reality as proto-scientific. He calls Kant’s the Critique of 
Pure Reason ‘very obscure’ and reduces the difference between Aristotle, Galileo, 
and Newton to ideas about inertia.
39
 He also gets factual claims about Aristotle’s 
philosophy wrong.
40
 Sokal has written extensively about how misguided the 
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humanities can be, and the constant threat of relativism from ‘sloppy thinking’ which 
act as a barrier to social progression.
41
 Physicist and honoured educator, Lawrence 
Krauss, received the National Science Board’s ‘Public Service Award’ for ‘his 
extensive, broad outreach to the public that bridges the chasm between science and 
popular culture as well as science and public policy.’42 After a heated exchange with 
philosopher, David Albert, Krauss spoke publicly deriding philosophy of science as 
the useless cousin of science. In an interview with The Atlantic, he said, ‘people in 
philosophy feel threatened, and they have every right to feel threatened, because 
science progresses and philosophy doesn't.’43 He, like Hawking, sees philosophy as a 
reactive process to new discoveries in science, and one that adds nothing to the 
scientist’s work. Lastly, the current heir to Sir David Attenborough’s throne as the 
communicator of popular science in the UK is Brian Cox. He has publicly expressed 
his dislike of philosophy on more than one occasion. Early on in the ‘Huw Wheldon 
Memorial Lecture’ in 2010, Cox tries to define science for his audience, repeating yet 
again Feynman’s famous statement, 
 
First to define what science is. Now, this is not easy in a historical 
context, because, to put it bluntly, vast amounts of drivel have been 
written about the subject by armies of postmodernist philosophers and 
journalists. But, I’m going to ignore all this, because I concur 
absolutely with the quote attributed to the Nobel-Prize winning 
physicist, Richard Feynman. He said that the philosophy of science is 
about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.
44
  
 
This quote neatly takes us back to E. O. Wilson’s worries on the postmodernist threat 
to knowledge and Feynman’s place in the science pantheon.  
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1.4 - Philosophy in the Public Understanding of Science 
 
At first glance, it would seem the public are encouraged by people like Brian Cox, 
Lawrence Krauss, and Stephen Hawking to ignore what philosophers might have to 
say about science. Indeed philosophy seems to just get in the way of learning about 
science and so is an unnecessary hurdle. The first large-scale Governmental reports 
into the PUoS in the UK reveal in their entirety two uses of the word ‘philosophy’. In 
The Public Understanding of Science and Science and Technology reports, the word 
‘philosophy’ is used as a synonym for ‘theory’.45 The second use of the word 
‘philosophy’ is in the Science and Technology - Sixth Report, where it is discussed in 
association with ‘complementary and alternative medicines’.46 ‘Many conventional 
medical scientists, while accepting the validity of accumulative empirical observation, 
believe that those therapeutic disciplines that are based principally on abstract 
philosophy and not on scientific reasoning and experiment have little place in 
medicine.’47 This reasoning appears to be deaf to the idea that ‘empiricism’ or even 
‘reason’ are actually philosophical ideas. They are as ‘abstract’ as the therapeutic 
disciplines they accuse. The failure to include any philosophical aspect of science in 
both reports and philosophy’s alignment with esoteric practices is, I argue, a symptom 
of a wider confused understanding of philosophy and science. The opening paragraph 
of chapter 3 from the Science and Technology - Third Report says:   
 
‘Public understanding of science’ means the understanding of scientific 
matters by non-experts. This cannot of course mean a comprehensive 
knowledge of all branches of science. It may however include 
understanding of the nature of scientific methods, including the testing 
of hypotheses by experiment. It may also include awareness of current 
scientific advances and their implications.
48
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For The Public Understanding of Science report, ‘understanding includes not just the 
facts of science, but also the method and its limitations as well as an appreciation of 
the practical and social implications.’49 If there is a use for philosophy, I think it is 
most effectively deployed in and around such statements. What is a scientific fact? Is 
there a single, universal scientific method? How do we regard limitations – are they 
the result of inadequate knowledge, limited cognition or part of a fundamental 
intractability in nature? How do barriers to scientific research in the past differ from 
conceptual barriers today? The scope of philosophy of science is as broad as it is 
deep, but if one is not aware of such issues, ‘some understanding of science, its 
accomplishments and its limitations’ hardly seems to be appropriate for informing a 
general public and creating a genuine understanding of science.
50
 Similarly, an over 
appreciation of the historic-socio-political aspect of science would imply that 
scientific knowledge could be replaced with sociology of science, which has been a 
source of antagonism between the natural and social sciences.
51
  
 
Continuing with the social sciences, there are two primary models for understanding 
how information is communicated within the PUoS, the ‘contextual’ and ‘deficit’ 
models.
52
 The contextualist approach suggests that people ‘use’ knowledge rather 
than ‘have’ knowledge as per the ‘deficit’ model. ‘People will pick up the knowledge 
they need for the task at hand, use it as required, and then put it down again […] it 
will not be ready to hand when the survey interviewer next asks them if, for example, 
an electron is bigger than an atom.’53 Knowing a fact about whether an electron is 
bigger than an atom is part of what is called the ‘deficit’ model. Miller argues that 
there has been a shift from the ‘deficit’ model, a passive form of transmitting 
knowledge, to the ‘contextual’ approach, which is an active mode of meaning 
generation. Here, the public displays ‘local knowledge and an understanding of, and 
personal interest in, the problems to be solved which are of direct relevance to the 
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individual or community.’54 The development of these two models is an artefact of the 
developing field of science communication studies, which will be looked at in more 
detail further on.
55
  
 
What seems to unite the ‘deficit’ and ‘contextual’ models is a kind of ethical concern 
over the usefulness of knowledge. The deficit model says knowing x amount of facts 
equates to scientific understanding, and so your life and society will improve by 
proxy. The ‘contextual’ model says people will only use scientific knowledge that is 
relevant to their everyday lives, and it is by this that we should measure 
understanding. Either way, ‘scientific understanding’ is a means-ends driven 
relationship. Much of what the UK went through in the 1980-90’s, as a part of the 
development of science education and communication studies, was anticipated in 
America in the 1940-50’s. Where this ties into my narrative is that the philosophy and 
approaches to studying science, that grew out of what Edmund called the 
‘Harvard/Conant group’, is responsible for one of the central figures of this thesis, 
Thomas Kuhn.
56
 It was from the work that came out of the ‘Harvard/Conant’ group 
that the perceived threat to science’s epistemic authority grew. I believe there is a 
present threat, but it stems as much from a naïve reading of science as it does from the 
antagonists of the defenders of ‘Reason’, such as Gross and Levitt.57 They argue that 
intellectual fashions amongst the academic left have discouraged critical thinking 
about a ‘slender body of work’.58 I will argue that this problem of a lack of critical 
thinking is endemic to science education, as it does not seek to uncover the very 
grounds for formulating the rational-critical position it has assumed in order to 
understand science as only a method. That is, what does it take to understand science 
unproblematically as only a method?  
 
1.5 - The Harvard/Conant Group   
 
James B. Conanat was Harvard President who developed the General Education in 
Science curriculum. His work on the Manhattan Project convinced him that the public 
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needed a better understanding of science, that public education was the driving force 
behind democracy, and that his approach to understanding science was, in part, 
historical. This ‘Harvard’ connection is relevant because not only was Conant mentor to 
Thomas Kuhn, but Willard Van Orman Quine was also a fellow colleague.
59
 All of 
which had an impact on Kuhn’s philosophy of science.60 Conant envisaged a more 
‘hands on’ approach to the public’s understanding of science. This was in order to 
remove any fear of the practice of scientists, to view them as ordinary workmen doing 
their job. However, the analogy with the ‘tradesmen’ tends to breakdown when ‘Big 
Science’ gets involved. We trust a mechanic with our car because they should be able to 
do things we cannot or know things we do not, but on the whole it is on the expectation 
that the car will work better than it did before. Can the same be said of Big Science? 
Fuller states that Conant himself made this point, that ‘the need to identify science with 
the craft of doing science, which is portrayed as something quite distinct from simply 
being “well-informed” about the results of science, a state of mind that Conant 
denigrates as instilling a “merely” critical, outcomes-oriented attitude’.61  
 
This division between science as ‘knowing facts’ and science as ‘process’ seems to 
reappear in the UK in the 1970’s. The Rothschild Report introduced the ‘customer-
contractor’ principle.62 This basically stated that ‘basic research was the province of the 
universities and research councils […] while applied R & D has ‘a practical application 
as its objective.’63 It urged the Government to ‘resist the view that there is no logical 
division between pure and applied research, a view that maybe intended to protect the 
Research Councils from the imaginary ravages of applied R. & D. users.’64 It was treated 
as consultative document, where ‘almost immediately the government formally accepted 
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the idea of the customer-contractor principle’.65 This was an organizing principle that 
made a sharp distinction between pure and applied scientific research. The ‘customer-
contractor’ principle regarded pure science as knowledge for knowledge’s sake that is 
aimed at no one individual. Applied science was seen as a response to a specific 
problem, customer A wants X, the contractor makes X possible, customer A pays 
contractor. Here, the autonomy of scientists was tethered to market forces. Just as Conant 
wanted to mark science as a craft (practice) out from simply being ‘well informed’ 
(knowledge), the ‘customer-contractor’ principle argued for a division between pure 
abstract science and the concrete problems of applied science. 
 
1.6 - Scientific Literacy 
 
One of the metaphors deployed in the PUoS and science education is that of ‘literacy’. 
One could equally use phrases such as ‘competency’, ‘proficiency’, or ‘fluency’. Even 
though I will refer to ‘literacy’ throughout this thesis, I do not think the metaphor is 
appropriate. The implication is that if one is literate you know enough to do 
something well. The role I wish philosophy to play, conversely, is not aimed at a 
specific subject matter, but how subjects come to be. The PUoS may be about science 
but philosophy as an activity is not about a subject but about how we ground 
knowledge and reason which, if done well, takes in the process of ‘grounding’ itself. 
Here, philosophy is not a meta-language that trumps science, but is a supplement to it. 
The sort of reality that is presupposed in a metaphor like ‘literacy’ will not escape 
analysis, so this is another reason why ‘literacy’ may not be the best choice. John 
Durant describes scientific literacy as ‘knowing how science really works’. 66 What 
people like Durant and Miller mean by this is that we do not abstract knowledge to a 
collection of objective statements, or rely on ‘methodology-based definitions’ of 
science, but see science as a messy public affair.
67
 The ‘facts’ have to be argued for, 
not simply observed, since which ‘facts’ get investigated are a product of social 
pressures, and what ‘facts’ get accepted as current knowledge are subject to change. 
This, however, belies a deeper problem about how one understands such statements 
with regard to the methodology-based definitions as favoured by science educators. 
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For example, the current Key Stage 3 curriculum for science in England states that 
‘Pupils learn how knowledge and understanding in science are rooted in evidence.’68 
Evidence is always evidence for some theory, which can only be a ‘scientific’ theory 
if it is part of some wider worldview. This is only part of a definition that includes, 
among other things, ‘scientific thinking’ which uses ‘scientific ideas and models to 
explain phenomena’.69 This was also the same Key Stage 3 strategy that included 
‘scientific literacy’ as a goal.70 
 
Where the ‘literacy’ metaphor also comes unstuck is in its implication for 
competence. If one is grammatically literate, one has learnt the rules of grammar, 
sounding phonics, syntax structure and so on. We are then free to read any amount of 
literature we like and even pass comment on the literacy of others. When we say 
public understanding should be a form of literacy, is the same true for science? The 
implication is that ‘understanding’ is as uniform as learning the rules of grammar or 
sounding phonemes. What one scientist understands as scientific so does another, and 
by following the simple rules of scientific method we can converse and understand 
the world scientifically. We might forgive those who are ill-educated (illiterate) and 
understand the world in terms of mystical forces or phenomena that defy current 
scientific consensus. Yet, without too much effort we can find Cambridge professors 
of physics who do not say that elementary particle physics are fundamental to 
understanding reality, but theology. Theology is the ‘deepest level of 
understanding’.71 There are biochemists who, on the ‘evidence’, hold the Earth to be 
around five thousand years old and evolution is a myth.
72
 Moving away from a 
‘religious’ orientation, we can find Nobel-Prize winners of physics who argue for 
telepathy and ‘memory’ in water.73 Can we say these people do not know the ‘rules’ 
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of science or its grammar? We cannot accuse them of being illiterate, and yet we have 
this nagging feeling that what they say is not scientific. Or is it? What this should 
demonstrate is that understanding, unlike literacy, is not an either/or. Literacy is 
linked to the things one is supposed to be literate of, but understanding and science 
are linked to the world and our place in it. Hence, we can find scientists who are 
technically literate but do not hold the scientific ‘worldview’. The place I have for 
philosophy is aimed at this worldview and how we come to hold it. A worldview 
comes from somewhere, as do our own understandings, but it is our prior 
understanding of the world that gets in the way of seeing how philosophy might be 
relevant.   
 
1.7 - Rationale and Methodology of Thesis 
 
In this thesis, I am not arguing for another philosophy of science, I do not make the 
case for a better abstraction of the scientific method or prescribe how science should 
be done.
74
 Rather, I am arguing that philosophy as a method or approach needs to be 
included to help make our worldviews present to us. This would also be to reflect on 
what one holds as a philosophical doctrine as well, be it the empirical-positivistic 
position or transcendental idealism. What I hope to achieve is echoed by Rudolf 
Carnap’s Wissenschaftslogik, where he was not concerned with explaining or 
justifying scientific knowledge by exhibiting some ultimate basis for it. Rather, he 
was concerned with developing a new role for philosophy (via the empirical 
sciences), that would contribute to scientific progress, whilst at the same time, 
avoiding all the traditional philosophical disputes which, for the logical positivists, 
were a serious obstacle to progress in both science and scientific philosophy.
75
 My 
purpose is not to advance science or scientific philosophy but improve public 
comprehension of scientific issues. I will argue how the ‘methodological’ conception 
of science and all its associated philosophical content have come to dominate how we 
think about science, no matter whether it is internal or external to scientific discourse. 
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I will offer instead an alternative interpretation of science as ‘historical’, which also 
interprets terms such as ‘truth’, ‘reason’, and ‘knowledge’ as historical objects. My 
point will not be to show one is true and the other false, as this would still be dealing 
in a methodological framework, but to merely show the errors that occur if we were to 
view one interpretation through another. That is, what happens if we treat an 
ostensibly historical question as if it were a methodological one. Here I will argue not 
only that this is the source of a lot of philosophical problems, but that this entire 
exercise of thinking in ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ modes is to be philosophical, 
which is what I want the PUoS to address. That is, with the changes in emphasis in 
what our investigation is trying to achieve changes the investigation itself. So, I would 
not just want ‘science’ to be thought about as a ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ 
practice, but philosophy itself.  
This is why I would not want to say that one particular ‘philosophy’ is a priori correct, 
but rather to have the ability to turn a subject against itself and to see where the faults 
lie. Just as with PUoS, I do not want people to accept a second-hand account of what 
science is. Similarly, I do not want people to accept a second-hand account of what 
philosophy is either. This, I will demonstrate through the PoD as traditionally 
understood as a methodological problem, but also what can happen if we understand it 
as a historical problem. I will then attempt to invert this trajectory by developing two 
contradictory readings of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure. Through ‘methodological’ and 
‘historical’ readings, I will illustrate the problems and solutions one can derive. As I 
must practice what I preach, I have decided to include as part of my methodology 
conceptual tools, inspired from a notoriously obscure philosopher who has been 
marginalized as one of those purveyors of ‘sloppy thinking’, Martin Heidegger. For 
good measure, I also include another exponent of deconstruction and widely 
understood ‘peddler’ of ‘postmoderist drivel’, Jacques Derrida. By using the tools 
they helped develop, I hope to show that we do not just ‘read’ or ‘understand’ a text 
as the PUoS would wish us to do, but we always ‘read’ or ‘understand’ something ‘as’ 
something. A very good example of this is in the introduction to Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, where he writes, 
  
In the following, I am largely trying to present Wittgenstein’s 
argument, or, more accurately, that set of problems and arguments 
which I personally have gotten out of reading Wittgenstein […] so the 
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present paper should be thought of as expounding neither 
‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument nor Kripke’s: rather Wittgenstein’s 
argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him.
76
  
 
What this shows is that the problems we are struck by are not latent in the text, as we 
would all come away with the same problems or understanding, but we carry a set of 
a priori beliefs about how things are or should be. For Kripke, it was the genuine 
paradox of rule following and what this meant for language that was important, even 
though he knew Wittgenstein would probably disagree.  
 
By deconstructing and reconstructing two versions of Kuhn’s influential Structure, I 
will present two contradictory readings and the problems the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
reader will be ‘struck’ by. By showing that a certain interpretation is not inevitable 
and indeed may even be undesirable, this will be an illustration of the role I would 
want philosophy to have in PUoS.
77
 As this thesis is not about Heidegger or Kuhn but 
how we can use philosophers to clarify problems or dissolve them, there will only be 
a surface engagement with Heideggerian themes. Where relevant, I take up a 
Feyerabendian position on the role of philosophy as an ethical-political concern in 
education. I do not want to argue over what they ‘really’ meant as might be done in a 
typical philosophical academic thesis, but how can we make them useful for a modern 
age that is sadly lacking philosophers. 
 
Next I am going to elaborate on the themes mentioned above with a closer look at the 
history of the PUoS, the social scientific work surrounding science communication 
and the central question to PUoS ‘what is science?’ We will see how this has 
informed decisions from governmental policy to how public scientific literacy is 
measured. It also harbours the implicit notion that once we are deemed to know what 
science is, we can then tell what science is not. This becomes problematic when 
repeated attempts to define science through methodological criteria have failed. This 
failure is then levelled at the discipline where we see philosophy being particularly 
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inept at solving its own problems rather than any inherent problem with the way we 
think about science. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Public Understanding of Science 
 
2.1 - A Brief History of the Public Understanding of Science (PUoS) 
 
The relationship the public has to science is not new, but as a part of social policy it is 
relatively recent. With ‘interest groups’ raising doubts over climate change or 
pressure to reform science curriculums it has been noted there is, even within 
developed countries such as the USA, a ‘growing anti-science streak on the American 
right.’1 In 2011, the Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK government, John 
Beddington, declared that we should be ‘grossly intolerant of pseudo-science, the 
building up of what purports to be science by the cherry-picking of the facts and the 
failure to use scientific evidence and the failure to use scientific method.’2 Whilst I 
agree that pseudo-science masquerading as science proper should not be tolerated, I 
think Beddington’s criticism is misplaced. Beddington is forwarding what I will later 
be discussing as the methodological conception of science. This version of science 
has no need of philosophy as it works off very simple principles, such as facts, 
evidence, and method. The stance that I will contrast this with is the historical 
approach which tells us how we come to see something ‘as’ evidence, what sort of 
metaphysics must be presumed in order to have ‘facts’, and where the idea of 
‘method’ as distinct from its history has come from. 
 
I will argue that the methodological view is open to abuse because it does not 
acknowledge the philosophical content of its own ideas. So one may be able to induce 
inductive pessimism over scientific progress or the available evidence because we 
have this detached view of how science works. To this end, unwarranted shadows can 
be cast over issues such as climate change that can use philosophical ‘sleights of 
hand’ to forward such causes.3 With the advent of the Internet, information, as well as 
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misinformation, is easy to propagate with special interest groups lobbying 
governments and big corporations for change.
4
 Now, it is as important as ever to make 
sure the public do not just know some science but understand it, which for me, means 
understanding what is at risk if we only know the methodological interpretation of 
science. To get at the centrality of this problem, I will next look at the recent 
developments in the PUoS movements at academic and governmental levels within 
the UK. The distinction between science as a method (something abstract) and science 
as a practice (lived activity) will be highlighted by the debates being had over science 
as pure or applied research.   
 
In order to see where the PUoS schemes came from and what they were designed to 
address, it is important to spend some time looking at the pre-PUoS landscape of 
1970’s Britain. Governmental science policy and history of science have generally 
gone hand-in-hand, with this field of study opening up during the 1970’s. Historians 
such as Roy MacLeod, followed shortly by the establishment of the ‘Science Policy 
Research Unit’ (SPRU) at Sussex University, were at the forefront of developing this 
dialogue.
5
 The historical links between science and cultural attitudes towards 
development and innovation in science were what dominated the political landscape 
on science, funding and public engagement around this time. The activities of 
scientists and how funds were allocated were thought to be protected by the ‘Haldane 
Principle’. The idea was to keep the machinations of politicians and the autonomy of 
scientists in research councils separate.
6
 Here, scientists dictated what directions their 
research should take rather than social or political pressures. This has received varied 
criticisms in later years, in so far as advancing technologies, greater social 
dependence on scientific innovation and the creation of new fields of research have 
eroded the old distinctions between applied, basic and pure science.
7
 In 1971, two 
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reports were issued on the links between the nature of scientific activity and 
organization of funding. Both started from very different positions on the relationship 
between fundamental and applied research, which unsurprisingly, and came to two 
very different conclusions. The Dainton Report ‘rejected a distinction between pure 
and applied research because of the interdependence of the two for progress’.8 The 
Rothschild Report urged that the ‘Government resist the view that there is no logical 
division between pure and applied research’ suggesting that this view is ‘intended to 
protect the Research Councils from the imaginary ravages of applied R. & D. users.’9 
Both reports were treated as consultative documents where ‘almost immediately the 
government formally accepted the idea of the customer-contractor principle’ as laid 
out in The Rothschild Report.
10
 This new approach to organizing scientific activity 
provoked significant opposition from scientists within academia.
11
 The main 
complaint, as highlighted by The Dainton Report, was that applied and fundamental 
research could not be separated as activities. There were many perceived weaknesses 
with The Rothschild Report, such as unforeseen areas of policy development outside 
of governmental settings; or how fragile scientific institutions actually were, whilst 
being valid questions, will not concern us.
12
 Even though there is a historical and 
political dimension to how these divisions have been made, my concern is with the 
possible division between pure/basic/theoretical science on the one hand and 
applied/R&D/practical science on the other, and how this has been played out in 
PUoS schemes.
13
 For it is also within this simple division there is an implied form of 
the PoD in how we tell one type of science from another. 
 
Pure science we might characterize as intrigue or wonder, the simple desire to know 
or do something for its own sake, regardless of its ramifications or practical worth. 
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Applied science is the application of an already pre-existing science. Here, knowledge 
is certain enough that it can be applied to research problems. Application is always for 
something and normally aimed at developing effectiveness, efficiency or productivity. 
This divide between pure and applied science in pre-PUoS Britain is an attempt at 
demarcation between types of science. These distinctions are not new and go all the 
way back to Ancient Greece in the differences between ‘praxis’ and ‘theoria’. Theory 
was never an end in itself but always in the service of practice.
14
 Whilst this was a 
meditative exercise for the Ancient Greeks, the dichotomy between theory and 
practice has never left us.  
 
It was in 1980 that the ‘Royal Society for the Arts’ published their manifesto 
Education for Capability.
15
 The ‘manifesto stated that the education and training 
process gives too much emphasis to analysis, criticism and the acquisition of 
knowledge and not enough to problem-solving, doing, making and organising.’16 The 
Royal Society did not become involved with the PUoS until 1982, where it grew out 
of a committee report on the state of science education in England and Wales for the 
11-18’s.17 From this, the recommendation was taken up that a small working group be 
established to investigate the ways in which the public understanding of science might 
be enhanced. This resulted in the 1985 Royal Society Report titled ‘The Public 
Understanding of Science’. This was the beginning in a surge of interest in the PUoS 
in Britain.
18
 That project highlighted these concerns in its opening paragraph: 
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Science and technology play a major role in most aspects of our daily 
lives both at home and at work. Our industry and thus our national 
prosperity depend on them. Almost all public policy issues have 
scientific or technological implications. Everybody, therefore, needs 
some understanding of science, its accomplishments and its limitations. 
Many personal decisions, for example about diet, vaccination, personal 
hygiene or safety at home and at work, would be helped by some 
understanding of the underlying science. Understanding includes not 
just the facts of science, but also the method and its limitations as well 
as an appreciation of the practical and social implications.
19
 
 
‘Public’ was given a five level definition, ranging from the everyday individual to 
those in charge of policy formation. ‘Understanding’ meant ‘comprehension of the 
nature of scientific activity and enquiry, and not just knowledge of some facts.’20 
Finally, ‘science’ was given a broad definition to include technology, engineering, 
mathematics and all aspects of applied science. From this report, it was concluded that 
scientists need to learn how to communicate with the public more effectively. From 
this initial mobilization towards a PUoS, the ‘Committee for the Public Understanding 
of Science’ (COPUS) was established. Their role was to promote research on and 
engagement with science and the public. In 1988, a nation-wide survey was conducted 
to establish how scientifically ‘literate’ the British public were. The results suggested 
that the levels of scientific literacy between the UK and United States were similar. 
‘10 percent or less of those questioned were scientifically literate, depending on the 
exact definition used’.21 The importance of definitions in social surveys is paramount, 
which really should tell us more about the research method than the intelligence of 
people. On other criteria such as ‘civic scientific literacy’, Sturgis and Allum state 
that ‘not more than one-quarter of the European and US public qualify as 
scientifically literate.’22 The term ‘scientific literacy’ came out of the same era as 
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James B. Conant’s educational reforms in America, the phrase being coined by Paul 
DeHart Hurd.
23
 The metaphor of ‘literacy’ has been interpreted in many ways, John 
Durant defines scientific literacy as ‘what the general public ought to know about 
science’.24 Yet that ‘ought’ does not come from a scientific standpoint, but could be 
considered ethical, political or philosophical.
25
 In 1993, another white paper entitled 
‘Realizing Our Potential’ re-emphasized the role and importance of science, 
engineering and technology for a prosperous country.
26
 The implication of ‘literacy’ 
was that the more one is scientifically literate the more in favour of ‘science’ one will 
be. The rationale seems reasonable enough. Bodmer stated that a better PUoS was not 
desirable because it would produce the ‘right’ decision but because ‘decisions made in 
the light of adequate understanding of the issues are likely to be better than decisions 
made in the absence of such understanding.’27 However, it is quickly passed over both 
what  ‘understanding’ and ‘science’ are. It would seem that given ‘adequate 
understanding’, whatever this maybe, social progress would follow.28 Yet as already 
mentioned, we can find well-respected scientists in positions of high expertise, who 
by the standards of their communities or from a strict methodological point of view, 
do not arrive at the ‘right’ decision. There are two points here: firstly, that social 
progress is not necessarily the same as scientific progress, and secondly, that ‘literacy’ 
as a guiding metaphor for ‘understanding’ appears flawed.29 
 
In 1996 the ‘British Social Attitudes Survey’ was conducted to establish how well the 
PUoS scheme had performed in raising the British public’s understanding of science. 
The ‘survey indicated little change in scientific literacy, other than increased 
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recognition of the initials DNA.’30 This apparent continued scientific illiteracy, plus a 
sceptical attitudes towards scientific progress equating to social progress, motivated 
the House of Lords Select Committee’s Report on ‘Science and Technology’.31 This 
report highlighted the general unease with which the public treated scientific issues, 
and not without due reasons; from the destructiveness of nuclear energy, to the pre-
clinical trialed administration of thalidomide, to agricultural use of DDT. Some may 
argue that the knee-jerk reaction to scientific controversy is to err on the side of 
caution, which more recently saw parents willingly withdraw their children from 
taking the MMR vaccine. Yet, would it be illiterate to question the judgement of 
experts who have been wrong in the past? 
 
What is implicit in the literacy metaphor is the ability or competency to do something. 
As science is portrayed as a methodology that distills knowledge into facts, to 
‘understand’ science is to grasp both what that methodology is and the factual 
knowledge it generates. One also implies the other. To know something is to also to 
why we know it. This is part of what is called the ‘deficit’ model of communication. It 
refers to a deficit in information on any subject, and it is an assumption that this 
deficit shapes public reaction and attitudes. Another assumption is that in the absence 
of scientific understanding people intuit folk knowledge, unfounded beliefs and 
superstition about how things are. It is said that this ignorance leads to a state of 
scepticism, hostility or fear of the unknown, which is politically powerful enough to 
block certain research programs. In contrast to this model is the ‘contextual’ model, 
which has been favoured by the humanities due to its inclusion of surrounding socio-
historical factors as a means to evaluating scientific understanding.  Popular thinking 
about science, including philosophy, tends to fall into one of these camps. Knowing 
how one thinks about a problem is halfway to understanding why it is a problem, and 
so I will spend some time unpacking both these models and their relevance. 
 
2.2 - The Deficit Model   
 
The general structure of the deficit model is that it is a top-down process where the 
informed scientific community passes on information about science. Firstly, it is 
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assumed that scientific knowledge is sufficient for scientific understanding, and 
secondly, that this will result in a positive attitude towards science. The implication 
being that if one is mistrustful of science then one has failed to understand it. Sturgis 
and Allum say the research indicates a ‘robust but not especially strong positive 
correlation between “textbook” scientific knowledge and favourability of attitude 
towards science’.32 This kind of top-down feeding of information and resultant 
increase in positive attitude towards science share some similarities with a model of 
mind and knowledge transfer that Karl Popper criticized. The ‘Bucket Theory of 
Mind’ was his attempt to illustrate why inductivist models of our experience of nature 
could not lead to scientific knowledge.
33
 More recently, Gross has picked up on the 
asymmetry of this model with the public as passive knowledge receivers and the 
scientific community as active and inherently valuable. He also raises the point that 
the ‘contextual’ model is symmetrical in the interaction between science and the 
public. Here, a public has to be persuaded of the value of science and has to be 
reconstructed in terms of social, ethical, and political agendas, so scientific 
understanding is co-created, as it is the integration of personal experience and 
scientific knowledge.
34
 Other research from social studies of science has shown that 
the underlying communication models that predicate the deficit model between 
experts and the public are often incompatible or are determined to a large extent by 
context.
35
 
 
An assumption within the deficit model is that it presupposes that, given ‘some 
understanding’ of science, we will all arrive at the same conclusions. This quest for 
some ideal language where, all things being equal, we would all arrive at the same 
conclusions, or at least agree which was the best conclusion, is an idealized outcome 
of the methodological approach. As Bodmer wrote ‘decisions made in the light of 
adequate understanding of the issues are likely to be better than decisions made in the 
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absence of such understanding.’36 This idea seems to bear a resemblance to 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action, where human action, understanding and 
rationality are grounded in linguistic structure.
37
 For Habermas, communicative 
rationality is communication that is ‘oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing 
consensus – and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of 
criticisable validity claims.’38 It is essentially an ideal language where given that 
everyone will share the same goals, such as, believing true statements, we would all 
arrive at satisfactory consensual conclusions about the world. Thus, the deficit model 
and the purpose of public scientific literacy seem to be geared towards the same 
model of world, language and knowledge. What then do we say to those scientists 
who are well aware of bias, false inferences and the like, but do not come to the same 
consensual agreement as the rest of their community? Indeed, where those scientists 
have turned out to be correct, it would seem to challenge this idea that science has 
some privileged access to the structure of reality. The ability to understand science in 
this way, along with the consequences of its denial, are rooted in a particular way of 
understanding the world and science, which is where I see philosophy being of use. 
Here, we are being asked to suppress our everyday notions, which are already fraught 
with bias, to invert our worldview for whole new set of biases. For some, this plays 
out as ‘scientism’, where given the methods and assumptions of science we can be 
taught how to experience the world.
39
 Feynman had a problem with this conception of 
science, in that what science teaches (methodological) is somehow separable from 
how we experience the world (historical). He said, if ‘someone says science teaches 
such and such, he is using the word incorrectly. Science doesn’t teach it; experience 
teaches it.’40 It is this experience we are being asked to give over to an underlying 
metaphysical notion of science.  
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The significant problems that the deficit model had faced, led to an alternative 
approach that claimed, 
 
[S]cientific facts and their public assimilation were not as 
unproblematic as the deficit model had assumed. Studies by Wynne 
and Irwin showed the importance of social context and lay knowledge 
as playing a significant part in how science was used by members of 
the public interpretation was not an unambiguous process.
41
  
 
The search for an unambiguous language with which to describe nature or reality was 
a central tenet of the logical positivists, but this idea that we simply read off objective 
statements from nature, is challenged by the history and development of science itself. 
This will have some significance for us as I will hold this view in opposition to the 
‘methodological’ perspective that has been discussed so far. 
 
2.3 - The Contextualist Model 
 
Under this model, knowledge of science is not a list of ‘facts’ but types of 
understanding within varying practical and social contexts. Wynne states that ‘three 
elements of public understanding have to be expressly related: the formal contents of 
scientific knowledge; the methods and processes of science; and its forms of 
institutional embedding, patronage, organization, and control.’42 We may bring in 
‘expertise’ as part of institutional embedding, in that, the public’s trust in experts is 
‘mediated by knowledge of the institutional arrangements under which expertise is 
authorized.’43 This raises questions about what grounds one can legitimately claim 
expertise? Within PUoS studies, however, this rift between the deficit and 
contextualist models for assessing public understanding appears to be as binary as the 
difference between quantitative and qualitative research. Ironically, the very debate 
about whether scientific understanding can be measured by qualitative or quantitative 
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means appears to be a reflexive comment on what it is to be a science and the 
maturity of the science performing it.
44
   
 
A context that shall not be taken up in this thesis, but does contribute to the public 
understanding and attitude towards science, is the role the media play in presenting 
‘scientific’ stories and representing the image of science. It tends to be only ‘news 
worthy’ stories about science that make it into the popular press, either some great 
achievement, disastrous outcome or conflicting information that is socially 
important.
45
 Very rarely does the hum-drum of scientific practice make it into the 
headlines, unless that practice is something that goes against the popular public 
image, such as publishing fraudulent research. With media reports on apparent 
controversies within science, conflicting interpretations of data and the heroic 
achievements of science, along with popular science writing, and mind, body and 
spirituality publications, all make for very conflicting messages about science. 
However, even within the contextual models, there seems to be a need for a reduction 
to a particular cause. Goldacre, on the issues of good and bad science, apportions 
some blame to ‘humanities graduates for dumbing-down science in the popular media, 
[where] those journalists create a parody of science that they then write about’.46 This 
appears to be echoing C. P. Snow’s division in The Two Cultures between science and 
the humanities. Goldacre also points out a number of known cognitive biases that 
influence how we reason. However, looking through the history of science, we could 
equally accuse past scientists of believing silly things, but during the time they lived, 
they would have been justified in their beliefs. So this begs the question that we 
cannot appeal to studies of cognitive biases to know what is scientific or rational, as 
we use those very terms to arrive at our conclusions. That is, we work out what is 
rational using reason, and what is reasonable is set by historical context. Most of us 
are, however, not asked to work out what reason or science is. We are instead 
bombarded with images, textbooks, documentaries, and so on as examples of what 
science does or cannot do. From this mixture of messages, Erickson says a state of 
‘ambivalence can be identified in almost all public representations of science in 
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contemporary society.’47 One image of science we are asked to adopt is of the lone 
genius, advancing knowledge, going from great discovery to great discovery in an 
endless upward trajectory of progress. Yet, at the same time, the public meets with 
tales and images of scientific failure, false predictions and disastrous applications of 
science to nature. This cycle of expectation and disappointment, it is argued, brings 
about a state of ambivalence, if not hostility towards science. What was realized in the 
contextualist model was that science and the public do not exist in separate vacuums, 
but are involved in a dialogue that feedback on one another. Scientific knowledge 
does not just pour from the laboratories into the lives of individuals, but ‘science’ is 
represented in many forms in many places.
48
 The realization of the social aspect of 
science and this two-way dialogue became the main agenda of the House of Lords 
Science and Technology Report. In this report, unlike the Royal Society’s 1985 
version, the arguments about public ignorance and media distortion of science are 
‘almost totally absent’ if not repudiated.49 It was noted that the implied deficit model 
at the heart of the 1985 report was ‘condescending’ in tone and ‘outmoded and 
potentially disastrous.’50   
 
The contextualist model does not escape criticism though. Aside from being too 
reliant on qualitative methods, Gross also argues that ‘rhetoric and rhetorical analysis 
play major roles’.51 He says that the root metaphor of the deficit model is ‘scientific 
sufficiency and public deficiency’, whereas in the contextualist model it is 
‘interaction’.52 Whilst in the deficit model, ‘understanding’ is a wholly cognitive act, 
in the contextualist model it is partly social, ethical and political. Here, we might start 
getting into murky waters if by the above we think that science is rhetoric, or 
rhetorical analysis does the same thing as scientific analysis. If science as a practice is 
open to rhetorical analysis and we understand science as only a text, it is only a short 
step to be in the field of literary criticism or cultural studies. My objection would be 
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that the paradoxes one might arrive at by poor philosophical analysis could be 
construed as desirable. We see this with applications of modern science to religious 
discourse ‘as if’ they were about the same thing. This leads someone like Tipler to 
treat Christianity as a ‘possibly true theory of physical reality’.53  Moreover, we may 
only be able to treat ‘truth’ ‘through a language of paradox’ or ‘philosophy’ as ‘a pre-
text for critics to indulge any kind of whimsical, free-wheeling or ‘creative’ 
commentary that happens to take their fancy.’54 Paradoxically, I argue, philosophical 
ideas are present where they appear to be most absent. By this, I mean when we have 
given over to a single interpretation, where no other version or way of thinking seems 
meaningful. Here is where I see philosophy as desirable as a part of the PUoS that 
forces us to look again at commonsense notions. Given this, there is a sense that we 
are not being asked to think about science but a version of science, a particular 
methodological interpretation. To instruct or teach what science is is also to give some 
indication of what science is not by omission, inference or implication. Even those 
who will never touch a philosophy book cannot escape this logic. As with the 
scientific method, we can only really offer a positive account, for saying what 
something is not is a much longer list than saying what something is. Also, by calling 
something ‘science’ we pick up on the negative space that there must be something 
that is not-science or non-science.  
 
This general tension at the heart of PUoS is called the ‘problem of demarcation’ 
(PoD). This will be our route into philosophy as a useful component of science 
education. Not as a means of devising some universal criteria for telling science from 
non-science, but by deconstructing the very problem of defining science itself. We 
may intuitively feel that there must be something called science as people study, teach 
it, and above all, it makes the modern world possible. Yet, the constant failure to 
resolve the PoD has highlighted a deficiency, in either our problem or our method. I 
will argue that because the PoD is classically framed in a methodological manner, it 
ends up deconstructing itself with only one outlet, which many scientists have picked 
up on, that philosophy is useless, especially to science. Yet, even those who have 
attempted the PoD and failed have by virtue of how they approached the problem 
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have remained in high regard by the scientific community. Whilst those who 
attempted to illustrate the naivety of this problem have been marginalized by those 
‘anti-philosophy’ or ‘philosophy as postmodern’ scientists.55 I think this is the case 
because the methodological approach, whilst incomplete or insufficient, due to it 
mirroring in form the subject it looks to preserve it is thus deemed worthy. On the 
other hand, the historical approach does not mirror its subject in form (however 
possibly more rigorous), but still looks to preserve science by showing how a 
methodological interpretation is inconsistent with the actual practices of scientists. 
These attempts, however, have been construed as ‘attacks’ on the authority of science 
and so must be avoided, if not derided, as much as possible.  
 
2.4 - Problems with the Problem of Demarcation 
 
Put bluntly, the PoD is ‘how do we tell science from non-science?’ In part, it is what the 
PUoS sought to address, as by knowing what science is, it might prevent people from 
using ‘alternative’ modes of reasoning in their everyday lives. It is no secret that all 
attempts at answering this question by formulating the scientific method as a set of 
abstract principles have failed. We can conclude either this project failed because the 
problem is too complex or the methodology was incorrect. The alternative is too 
unthinkable, that the truths of science are contingent upon social factors or ultimately the 
logic and structure of science is unknowable. I will argue that the project failed and the 
unthinkable alternatives become present because we are treating a historical question in a 
methodological way. We always see reality ‘as’ something, which is historical and never 
just pure reality, which is the methodological abstraction. Just as evidence is always for 
something and never just ‘evidence’. It is uncovering what allows us to see something 
‘as’ something that is the hallmark of scientific innovation and revolution, which is to 
say ontological. ‘Ontological’ here means the study of what there is or can be said to 
exist, but just how one comes to these questions is open to philosophical analysis of the 
methodological/ historical kind. So, when we see the Sun are we looking at the same Sun 
as the ancients? Do we see the Sun as a fiery sky God or as a burning star? It is the 
covering-over of this ‘as’ that is the hallmark of efficient modern science. For example, 
Aristotle saw a falling object ‘as’ an expression of its nature, Newton saw it ‘as’ an 
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expression of mechanical forces, and Einstein saw it ‘as’ an expression of curved space-
time. Once we have settled on a confident explanation, the ‘as’ disappears and we just 
see a falling object. So, for me the question ‘what is science’ is about ontology. Yet, if 
we treat it as a methodological question, we look to epistemology or linguistics to derive 
its ‘what-ness’ as an object. In doing so, we hit an impasse as the discipline fails to 
account for itself, in that, what does it mean for something to be scientific is itself a non-
scientific question. Fuller and Collier say that ‘the demarcation project’s failure only 
shows that attempts to study science scientifically, as the philosophers have wanted to 
do, often result in science deconstructing its identity.’56 It is when scientists are forced to 
question the meaning of the objects they are studying, measuring, and quantifying that 
science begins to move forward. Indeed, are those same objects real? This questioning of 
the reality of objects or methods by which science studies the world is part of a ‘crisis’ 
science undergoes, where it will depart from what it traditionally held to be ‘scientific’.  
 
Why is this important? I am arguing that the PUoS, which also includes education 
curriculums, presents science through the methodological interpretation, and in doing so, 
I think that people are being asked to understand a metaphysical conception of science. 
The other interpretation that I will offer is the ‘historical’ notion of science. The problem 
for me is that, whilst people are being asked to understand a metaphysical version of 
science so we can meaningfully say things like know the ‘mind of God’ or treat 
Christianity as a theory of physical reality, it is this interpretation that comes to dominate 
the discussion.
57
 The problem is not that religion should be exempt from scientific 
analysis but that it is all too easy to arrive at the dichotomous outcome of science as only 
objective and religion/ belief as only subjective, if we can only understand either as 
methodological statements about reality.  What is more, because the public, unlike 
scientists, are not involved with science on an everyday level, when they do run into a 
problem with this representation of science, there may be less intellectually honest 
people waiting to offer an answer. For instance, it is very easy to arrive at meta-inductive 
pessimism or scepticism about the scientific process if we take it as only a method. So, 
for example, one might think that because what we have believed in the past was false so 
too the likelihood is the things we believe now are false. If I was even more dishonest I 
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could present research papers on why you should not believe research papers.
58
 For 
some, this is enough to understand that science does not have all the answers and that 
‘alternative’ ways-of-knowing might just have access to truths regular science does not. 
Here I am referring to what is known as a pseudo-science, be it crystal healing, 
homeopathy, anti-vaccination programs, Creationist science and so on. What is wrong 
with this is that these ‘alternative’ ways-of-knowing are basing their claims on a model 
of reality that also includes ‘Truth’ as a part of its methodological content. As they are 
seeking to replicate science, they set up a practice that is metaphysically parasitic on the 
methodological conception of science, which also includes its notion of ‘Truth’.59 This is 
one form of demarcation. However, as it requires some heavy philosophical lifting we 
would rather accept notions of ‘Truth’ and ‘Reason’ as defined by the popular image of 
science. What this does is leave a gap for ‘nonsense’ or ‘uncritical thinking’, which is in 
danger of not being addressed. For not only can the methodological conception of 
science not answer it (failure of demarcation criteria), but the very mode of analysis that 
will show it up as being nonsense (philosophy) is itself be derided as nonsense.
60
 This is 
the lumping together of all alternative discourses that deal in paradoxes or that 
complicate commonsense notions as unnecessary.   
 
Next, I will briefly consider the ‘other’ that science has been and often is defined against. 
Within the literature this has been called, ‘fringe science’, ‘non-science’, ‘cargo-cult 
science’, ‘proto-science’, ‘junk science’, ‘pathological science’, ‘voodoo science’, and 
‘pseudoscience’.61  All have slightly different uses and meanings, but all are seen in 
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opposition to science proper.
62
 I will be using the terms ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘non-
science’ as representatives of the ‘other’. The question is how can something like non-
science persist in the modern world? We have already seen the purpose of the PUoS 
which is to limit the effect pseudo-science has on the general populace, but we have also 
seen that it takes scientific understanding to be a matter of ‘literacy’. So, how come we 
find scientists who are experts in their fields but hold ‘scientific’ views contrary to that 
of the scientific community? For example, Arthur Ernest Wilder-Smith was a Professor 
of Pharmacology and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Chemistry. He gained three 
doctorates in organic chemistry and pharmacology and published more than seventy 
scientific papers. Yet, he believed that dinosaurs and humans co-existed due to a ‘literal’ 
understanding of Genesis. In reference to the alleged human footprints found alongside 
dinosaur footprints in Glen Rose Texas, he said, ‘if these footprints are really human – 
and there exists no experimental reasons to question this assumption […] then we have 
struck upon yet another considerable difficulty with dating methods’.63 Can it simply be 
that in that one instance Wilder-Smith, for all his doctorates, training and tenured 
professorship, ceased being scientific? Surely there are lots of things that we have no 
experimental reasons to question, but does that make them likely?  
What makes me more qualified than Wilder-Smith to say that he is wrong or at least 
engaged in poor scientific reasoning?
64
 An original distinction I will develop in this 
thesis is that philosophy along with all other commentating subjects are involved in a 
language ‘about’ science. But when scientists actually do science, they are no longer 
limited to this ‘about’ language but are involved in creating the language ‘of’ science. It 
is when they stop and reflect on what they are doing, which has to relate to other 
disparate subjects, that they then take up this third-person perspective to talk about 
science. I will develop this distinction more fully later on.
65
 This distinction, however, is 
a tricky one as it breaks with the methodological conception of science in that, the 
activity is non-propositional, pre-linguistic and pre-epistemological. It is prior to 
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knowledge. Through a methodological conception such statements appear non-sensical, 
and so we feel obliged to dismiss them and the practices that give rise to them, which we 
are free to do, but the problem of telling science from non-science or expert from crank 
still remains. This problem goes back to at least Ancient Greece, as illustrated in the 
Platonic dialogue Charmides. In this dialogue, Socrates is discussing the virtue of 
temperance and its associated virtue sophrosyne. Socrates makes the point that in order 
to judge a real physician from a quack, one has to be qualified to tell the difference. If 
wisdom is the difference between knowing what you do know and knowing what you do 
not know, as mediated by temperance and sophrosyne, then no one would ever make a 
mistake. But, as people do make mistakes, Socrates concluded that the science (of 
determining who knows what) is impossible.
66
 In keeping with our intuitive binaries, 
Socrates has knowledge and non-knowledge, knowing what we know and what we do 
not know.
 67
  This is similar to the form of science and non-science, which like non-
knowledge, is potentially an infinite category. By ‘infinite’, I mean what remains 
unknown or yet to be scientific is an indeterminate amount.   
 
‘Infinity’ like ‘knowledge’ is one of those nebulous, philosophical words. The ultimate 
form of both we see rooted in mathematics. To know something as concrete and certain 
as the outcome of 2 + 2, or the non-outcome of the series N + 1, is what we aspire to 
when we use those words. Yet, we forget that those practices came from somewhere, 
with a beginning, that meant something different than it does today. Mathematics is the 
methodological interpretation writ large and because of these metaphysical overlaps with 
knowledge, truth and even beauty, it finds deep parallels in fields such as theology. 
Polkinghorne uses the conclusions of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem to state that, 
‘truth always exceeds what can be proved’ (‘Truth’, here being used 
unproblematically).
68
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It is this prioritizing of one interpretation into the domain of another (methodological 
over historical) I take to be the sustaining power of many of the problems in philosophy 
of science. Possibly, the greatest enemy of Enlightenment ideals is the relativism of 
truth. In this thesis, this will come from the conflation of a historical interpretation as a 
substitute for a methodological approach. For my purposes, I do not wish to say that 
history can play the part of methodology. It is in keeping this historical-methodological 
division in mind that we will be able to open up a text in interpretation, by which we 
may get a more productive notion of science. This is only done, however, by rigorously 
holding to the text itself in logical consistency, conceptual rigour, modes of truth 
conditions, and so on.
69
 Fuller and Collier have described this distinction between 
methodology and the historical approach as the ‘divergence between the words and 
deeds of scientists.’70 ‘Words’ being the realm of discourse based philosophy and 
‘deeds’ as the historical acts of people. For Fuller and Collier, the inability to articulate 
this distinction in research methods ‘absent an explicit normative stance [that] have 
resulted in the much ballyhooed “relativism” of STS research.’71 ‘Truth’ may be too 
grand a place to start, but my worry is that if we dismiss philosophy as an antiquated 
practice, it does not cease to be but simply disappears. By this, I mean, the philosophical 
component (whatever that might be) of thought and language is simply absorbed by 
other discourses. Normally, we see this in political or religious discourses. To have 
philosophy out in the open not only makes our thinking more rigorous, but it would 
ultimately defend science against alternative discourses that exploit the methodological 
gap between what the textbooks say science is and what scientists actually do. Yet, if a 
certain proportion of the analytical schools get their way, the methodological 
interpretation will dominate PUoS where philosophy is regarded as a hindrance: 
 
It [philosophy] may be a handicap when one turns to scientific texts […] 
One can learn physics without ever reading Galileo, Newton or Einstein, 
and study biology without reading a line of Darwin. What matters are the 
factual and theoretical arguments these authors offer, not the words they 
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used. Besides, their ideas may have been radically modified or even 
overturned by subsequent developments in their disciplines. Furthermore, 
scientists’ personal qualities and extra-scientific beliefs are irrelevant for 
the evaluation of their theories.
72
 
 
However, for the above statement to make sense, we already have to be schooled in a 
way of thinking that allows the truth of facts to be separate from their origins. 
Philosophy, as I understand it however, is not trying to do the job of science but open up 
ways of thinking about it. Next, I will be outlining two attempts at the PoD, but as 
philosophically presented from the inverse of my view. In that, I will treat Karl Popper’s 
attempt and ultimate failure to give a methodological account of science as heroic. I will 
argue that as Karl Popper’s own metaphysical view of science resonated with most 
scientists and analytical philosophers that he was seen as justified in his attempt. I will 
contrast this with one of Popper’s protégés, the ‘radical’ Paul Feyerabend, and his 
anarchistic view, which argues for the lack of any unified scientific method. As he drew 
mainly from historical accounts and made comparisons to the scientific world from 
religion and myth, his project can be perceived to be at odds with the Enlightenment 
ideals it appears to challenge.
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Chapter Three 
 
Karl Popper and Falsification 
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3.1 - Karl Popper 
  
Hopefully it should be clear that, even before we get to discuss better ways of 
communicating science to the public, we have to know what it is we are discussing. 
The ‘received view’ that science is a method grounded in evidence and observation is 
uncontroversial. The inference being there are practices not based in evidence or 
observation, which would make them non-science. The standard account of the 
difference between these two positions is whether the claim can be ‘tested’ or 
‘falsified’. Karl Popper was one of the originators of this position, but I will argue that 
because his attempt was 1) intellectually appealing, 2) methodology driven and, 3) 
Popper himself was a contributor to science (theoretical physics) that his attempt is 
still looked upon favourably by science educators and scientists.    
Before I give a standard account of Karl Popper’s ‘falsificationism’, I would first like 
to give a brief background to the history and context of how the criterion of 
falsification came about. I will then discuss the possible reasons why Popper is 
regarded as the ‘scientist’s philosopher’, in that he is aligned more with scientists than 
he is with philosophers.   
 
Karl Popper’s attempt at a methodological principle, by which one could demarcate 
science from non-science, was preceded as a project by logical positivism and the 
‘Vienna Circle’. Their main aim was to formulate a criterion of meaning based on 
verifiability by which an unambiguous language could be constructed. The hope was 
that, after weeding all the metaphysical statements out of language, what remained 
could be reduced to protocol statements, which then could be subject to logical 
analysis. The logical positivists were an amalgamation of two ‘circles’ of thinkers, 
made up of philosophers, mathematicians, logicians and scientists. The ‘Vienna 
Circle’, and the later ‘Berlin Circle’, were groups of thinkers who shared a common 
ideology about the purpose and role of philosophy and science.
1
 These shared ideals 
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came about from events such as, the rise of National Socialism or the lack of progress 
from Hegelian or Kantian philosophy when compared to the ‘new physics’. Their 
commitment to the elimination of metaphysics and the propagation of empiricism was 
a challenge to the German romantic idealism and Christian worldview that dominated 
much of Europe at that time.
2
  There was an aspiration amongst the logical positivists 
to a logical-empirical description of reality that came from science but was seemingly 
marred by the traditions of philosophy. After the disbandment of the Vienna and 
Berlin ‘Circles’ a third ‘Circle’ was established, called the ‘Kraft Circle’, amongst 
whose founding members was Paul Feyerabend.
3
   
 
The elimination of metaphysics from science was the first of the Circle’s aims as set 
out in The Scientific Conception of the World View; this was to be achieved by the 
method of protocol statements. Protocol statements are ‘statements needing no further 
justification and serving as foundation for all the remaining statements of science’ or 
which ‘refer to the given, and describe directly given experience and phenomena, i.e. 
the simplest states of which knowledge can be had.’4 From these protocol statements 
it was thought that the whole of science could be unified in its methods and 
descriptions of reality, and there would be a foundation of certain knowledge from 
which all other scientific knowledge could be assembled. The unity of science project 
was led by Otto Neurath and its vision for science was that the ‘meaning of every 
scientific statement and every scientific concept, of whatever branch of science, must 
be analysable step by step to concepts of a common basic type, ‘referring to the given 
itself’’.5 Neurath proposed a 26-volume encyclopaedia, later to be called Foundations 
of the Unity of Science, which would deal with various aspects of the philosophy of 
science, ideally leading to a consensus and unity on science and the scientific 
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method.
6
 This idea was discussed at the ‘First International Congress for the Unity of 
Science’ held in Paris in 1935, in which the congress voted on its approval. One of 
those who attended the Paris congress, but opposed Neurath’s idea for such a project, 
was Karl Popper. Described by Neurath as ‘the Official Opposition’ of the Vienna 
Circle, Popper was a member but had radically different ideas as to how science 
operated and proceeded.
7
  
 
3.2 - Popper and the Logical Positivists 
 
A central problem that the logical positivists faced was how facts related to theories. 
It was Hume who first showed the problems of basing knowledge on inductive 
reasoning. Universal laws of science require the future to be the same as the past, but 
we cannot arrive at this conclusion by experience alone. Just because we have always 
experienced something to be the case does not mean the same has to be true of future 
events. An assumption that was being worked with is that we start with pure 
experience and then extrapolate to theories about reality. If knowledge, however, 
cannot be grounded in experience, what is the basis of scientific knowledge? Russell 
stated the severity of this problem when he wrote, ‘induction is an independent logical 
principle, incapable of being inferred either from experience or from other logical 
principles, and that without this principle science is impossible.’8 Hume’s problem 
challenged the doctrine of empiricism, where we cannot simply observe ‘facts’ from 
nature and invent theories that explain them. This objection tested the empirical basis 
of science. Modern science still retains some notions of inductivism but these have 
moved into statistical and probabilistic analysis.
9
 
 
The idea that a statement which could not be verified (or verified in principle) was 
meaningless, or that all metaphysics should be exorcised from scientific language, 
was not what concerned Popper. For the logical positivists a statement such as, ‘God 
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exists’, is a meaningless metaphysical claim. Popper, however, said this was a 
meaningful statement (which could potentially be true), but because there is no 
possible way to prove or disprove such a claim, it was not a scientific statement. 
Moreover, Popper believed metaphysical statements to be necessary to the scientific 
programme, 
 
In using this term [metaphysical research programme] I wish to draw 
attention to the fact that in almost every phase of the development of 
science we are under the sway of metaphysical - that is, untestable - 
ideas; ideas which not only determine what problems of explanation 
we shall choose to attack, but also what kinds of answers we shall 
consider as fitting or satisfactory or acceptable, and as improvements 
of, or advances on, earlier answers.
10
 
 
Another major difference between Popper and the logical positivists was that he never 
offered a criterion of meaning, such as the ‘verification principle’. Popper argued that 
it was a major philosophical error to start with terms and their definitions.
11
 The 
notion that we must define all our terms before we can have a coherent discussion is 
itself demonstrably incoherent, since every time one defines a term one has to 
introduce a new term and so on. For the physicist Richard Feynman, the learning of 
scientific terms and their uses was ‘not science’.12 For him it only told you about what 
people called things, the limits of human imagination and nothing about nature. This 
is where the idea of a protocol-language floundered, as its proponants became tied up 
in establishing the meaning of a statement, who said it, or what mode of language the 
statement is expressed in.  For Popper, discussion had to make use of weakly defined 
vague terms. For we have an everyday notion of something like ‘energy’, but it also 
has a technical meaning which is more precise, even though the term ‘energy’ itself 
has no one single definition. Feynman explained that, for a physicist when they make 
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a calculation about ‘energy’ they are not describing a mechanism or something 
concrete, but are in fact invoking a mathematical principle.
13
  
 
Popper, unlike the logical positivists, who sought ostensive definitions, wanted to 
substitute the importance of meaning in science with that of description. If a student 
were to ask, ‘what is a gene?’ a biologist might say a gene is a ‘locatable region of 
genomic sequence, corresponding to a unit of inheritance.’14 But Popper would say 
that the real answer to the question, ‘what is a gene?’ is the name scientists give to a 
locatable region of genomic sequence that corresponds to a unit of inheritance. The 
term ‘gene’ is shorthand for a long description given meaning by the surrounding 
theoretical context. Popper is not saying one should never define the terms under use, 
for there are instances in which more detailed definitions are required. This would be 
true of the less precise sciences, where words tend to inculcate their meaning, such as 
‘dysfunctional’ or ‘excessive’, as used in neurology or psychiatry. What Popper did, 
by challenging induction as a logical basis for method, is to show that ‘facts’ or 
‘observations’ cannot precede the theories that make those things facts or an 
observation relevant. We always come to observation with some theory, which means 
‘that observations, and even more so observation statements and statements of 
experimental results, are always interpretations of the facts observed; that they are 
interpretations in the light of theories.’15  
  
In the place of the ‘verification principle’, Popper offered an alternative 
methodological basis, that of the criterion of falsification. Popper acknowledged that 
falsification comes in several types. At the level of logic, Popper was a weak or naive 
falsificationist, in that he did not think we should give up on a theory if we find a 
falsifying instance. But, at the level of methodology, he was a strong falsificationsist, 
in that, if a theory made highly novel, bold, complex and precise predictions, which 
turned out to be true, then we should accept that theory over one that does not. How 
Popper overcame the problem of induction was to place theories first prior to facts 
and argue that, we deduce from theories what is to be expected and then use those 
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predictions as objective tests of the theory. The scientific method for Popper was 
deductive not inductive.   
 
3.3 - Logical and Methodological Falsification 
 
Falsification is the idea that a theory can be shown to be false by an appeal to the 
results and observations of an experiment. There is a simple logical relationship that 
seems to give falsification commonsense appeal. Even if we assume we have access 
to ‘true’ statements about reality, how can we arrive at a universal law from a limited 
set of observations? How do we get ‘all swans are white’ from ‘every swan I have 
seen is white’? Luckily, by using singular observation statements we can logically 
deduce the falsity of a universal law or principle. So all we have to do is observe one 
non-white swan, to show that the universal claim ‘all swans are white’ is false. No 
amount of positive, supporting observations can prove the universality of a general 
statement, but all it takes is one counter observation to conclusively disprove it. The 
logic is simple, a theory or hypothesis counts as genuinely scientific ‘if there exists a 
logically possible observation statement or set of observation statements that are 
inconsistent with it, that is, which, if established as true, it would falsify the 
hypothesis.’16 Methodology, is however, prone to error so we may not take falsifying 
instances as being totally conclusive. For instance, what I thought was a black swan 
might have been a Canadian goose. As a conclusion, falsification then, is not possible 
at the methodological level and we should not seek it, for if we did, and then kept 
modifying our theory to fit the observation, Popper believes we would have stopped 
being scientific. Rather, we should seek refuting instances and anomalies of 
observation, but not any falsifiable hypothesis will do. Popper argued, that the means 
of falsification must be by the inability to make novel, bold and detailed predictions. 
A general falsifiable statement is not as good as a precise one. The logical positivists 
struggled with the term ‘verification’ because what it meant to be a verifying 
statement in the absence of a theory was hard to say. Also, when a strict logical rule 
was applied, its logical consequences seem to run counter to our intuitions about what 
should count as a verifying instance. A demonstration of this was Hempel’s ‘raven 
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paradox’.17 Another problem with the term ‘verify’ was that to verify something was 
to remove doubt about its truth value, but in what sense does it mean to talk about 
verifying something that cannot be doubted?
18
 On this score Popper is persuaded that 
the term to ‘falsify’ is less problematic that the term to ‘verify’. 
 
For Popper scientific knowledge is a set of provisional hypotheses that are offered in 
an attempt to describe or account for the behaviour of some aspect of reality. It was 
‘the permanent right to challenge this authority [dominant theory] being one of the 
things which […] marks off an intellectual procedure as being ‘scientific’ at all’.19 If 
there is no logically possible observation one could make in order to disprove a claim 
then for Popper it is not science, but may still be meaningful. Conversely, if a 
statement is true by definition, then this is no longer a theory as it cannot be falsified. 
Popper demanded that scientific propositions be falsifiable because without the 
logical possibility of ruling certain options out, one can never learn anything new 
about the world.  
Unfalsifiable statements do not conflict with any states of affairs, so we cannot 
determine whether they are true or not – where as a statement that can be tested and 
shown to be false means there is one less statement we have to consider about the 
world. The claim that ‘all mammals have hair’ is not only falsifiable, but also 
potentially gives us more information about mammals. Where as ‘all triangles have 
three sides’ is true because of the term ‘triangle’, and so tells us nothing new. Popper 
argued that there were theories that superficially appeared to have all the features of 
scientific hypotheses but were in fact impostors, for they are unfalsifiable and so 
should be rejected as explanations. Popper singled out the Marxist theory of 
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historicism as an example of pseudo-science, but would later also target 
psychoanalysis.
20
 He attacked what he saw as pseudoscientific theories, especially in 
the light of the rise of National Socialism, which for Popper used Platonic and 
Hegelian ideas as justification for human rights atrocities.
21
 The idea that one could 
predict the future of society by looking at ‘patterns’ from history, and that what 
happens could not have happened any other way, was unconvincing to Popper. 
Popper, motivated by the rise of fascism, places a weight of blame at the feet of Plato 
and then Hegel for the neglect of reason. Here, he is in complete sympathy with the 
logical positivists and as a philosopher starts to add to the growing scepticism and 
cynicism over philosophy as a form of natural scientific enquiry. He accuses Hegel of 
bringing about a ‘renaissance of tribalism’ and calls his teachings a ‘bombastic and 
hysterical Platonism’ that has led to the totalitarian dictatorships of the twentieth 
century.
22
 It was not just Marxist and Hegelian ideas that came under Popperian fire, 
he also objected to the theories of psychoanalysis by Freud and Adler. For example, 
there was no observation of human behaviour that could be made that would be in 
conflict with Adler’s theory of ‘inferiority complex’.23 
 
3.4 - Degrees of Falsifiability   
 
As a maxim, Popper stated theories that are easier to falsify by reason of their 
increased content and predictive power should be preferred to less falsifiable ones. 
For we can reduce the falsifying content of a theory until we either reach mundane 
observations, pleonasms or tautologies. Popper himself thought that the scientist 
should be imaginative in their conjectures when trying to solve a problem: 
 
I can therefore gladly admit that falsificationists like myself much 
prefer an attempt to solve an interesting problem by a bold conjecture, 
even (and especially) if it soon turns out to be false, to any recital of a 
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sequence of irrelevant truisms. We prefer this because we believe that 
this is the way in which we can learn from our mistakes; and that in 
finding that our conjecture was false we shall have learnt much about 
the truth, and shall have got nearer the truth.
24
 
 
This emphasis on picking out the mistakes is a part of a wider epistemic position 
called ‘evolutionary epistemology’. Deduction and falsification are powerful weapons 
for ‘killing-off’ redundant ideas. Here the scientific method is akin to the natural 
selection process, which would eventually leave us with only the ‘fittest’ theories and 
explanations for phenomena. Popper argued that part of good scientific practice was 
that theories should be daring and imaginative. Not only to make them more 
falsifiable, but if they withstood the test of falsifiability, it made them more likely to 
be true. As long as the ideas were rejected after falsification, scientific knowledge 
could progress, because otherwise there would be no reason to accept one idea over 
another. It was this methodological claim that underpins falsificationism, but in the 
spirit of falsification, this is not what we see when we look to the history of science. 
Here, we might find non-scientific reasons for why a scientist might continue to 
support a theory, even after the weight of evidence is against it. For example, 
cosmologist Fred Hoyle continued to back the ‘steady state’ model of the universe, 
even when evidence mounted in favour of the ‘Big Bang’ explanation because a 
universe with a beginning was philosophically troubling, as beginnings imply causes. 
To accommodate the growing number of observations that supported the Big Bang 
model, Hoyle invented a theoretical field that could create matter in line with the laws 
of energy conservation (C-Fields) this model being called ‘quasi steady state’ (QSS) 
cosmology.
25
 If an expanding universe was philosophically troubling for Hoyle, there 
appears to be even more cause for concern today with most of the Universe and the 
means for its accelerated expansion unaccounted for. In their place we have ad-hoc 
explanations in ‘dark matter’ and ‘dark energy’. As NASA says, ‘theorists still don't 
know what the correct explanation is, but they have given the solution a name.’26 
Whilst Popper seem to dislike the sophistry of philosophers, his explorations in 
scientific reasoning brought him into contact with one of philosophy’s most slippery 
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concepts, ‘truth’. Popper was wary about claiming ‘truth’ as this led to philosophical 
problems about essentialism, so he thought it was better to remain agnostic on the 
‘truth’ of a statement and at best say it was ‘truth-like’, or had ‘verisimilitude’. He 
wrote, ‘we are seekers for truth but we are not its possessors.’ 27 This I take to mean 
we can look for truth and recognise it but we can never have definite acquisition of it. 
The great scientific breakthroughs came about by jumping beyond the known 
observations and facts to the deeper structures of nature. Here, for Popper, there was 
no ‘method’ of discovery, but ‘justification’ of discovery was subject to highly 
rigorous procedures.
28
 
 
Popper holds that falsification is the main principle by which scientists work and that 
highly predictive, bold conjectures, are the currency of good theories. Scientists, 
‘whether they realize it or not, this [falsification] is the rationale of what they do, and 
accounts for the way human knowledge develops.’29 Yet if we look to history for 
examples we see this may not be so. Fred Hoyle said, ‘a theory that is too predictive 
has a high risk of being prematurely and unjustly invalidated, since the exceptions that 
prove the rule are always the ones discovered first.’30 In this case, Hoyle’s theory 
could not be tested, and the predictions it did make were part of a newly developing 
field that was still not well understood. Since it is hard to know what one is falsifying 
in a new science, and falsifying instances are so hard to come by in cosmology, it 
would not seem to be the best criterion to operate by.
31
 A Popperian may then say I 
am not giving a falsifying example, but merely illustrating the psychological 
dispositions of scientists. This would be the same as saying, we describe what 
scientists think they are doing, instead of what they are actually doing. How is one 
then to falsify Popper’s theory of scientific knowledge? It would seem one might have 
to provide an alternative to inductive and deductive logic as a methodological basis 
for science. The catch here is that what have been offered as alternative accounts for 
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thinking about science’s development, have been taken to be substitutes for these 
methodological procedures.       
 
3.5 - Falsification of What? 
 
Once theory X has been posited, the fallibility of X can be logically deduced by 
observations Y. Yet, as Popper argued, all observations are theory-ladened and hence 
fallible. Consequently, the clash between X and Y does not logically demand that X is 
always at fault. All that logically follows from this situation is that we know either 
one or both are wrong. When observation and experimental evidence challenge the 
predictions of some established theory, it can conceivably be that the evidence is in 
error and not the theory. The observation that I saw a man levitate would confound 
the known scientific laws about humans and gravity. It is such a well-confirmed 
theory that humans cannot levitate, it invariably passes as fact. Every so often there 
are claims that humans have been observed to levitate. Do these claims falsify all that 
has been scientifically established in the past? What is more likely, given the evidence 
in favour of the theory that humans cannot levitate? In this situation we are in luck, as 
there is a massive weight of corroborated evidence in favour of one theory that helps 
us determine which is the more likely. In a situation, however, where both competing 
theories share equally compelling evidence or disharmonious claims between the facts 
and theory, the logic of the situation cannot help us decide. Observation alone cannot 
lead to the falsification of the theory. Here, Lakatos says that that there are only 
theories. We do not possess facts only ‘factual propositions’, which means, any clash 
between theory and factual propositions are actually inconsistencies not 
falsifications.
32
 Feyerabend wrote, ‘the right method must not contain any rules that 
make us choose between theories on the basis of falsification. Rather, its rules must 
enable us to choose between theories which we have already tested and which are 
falsified.’33 Feyerabend offered instead a principle of ‘counter-induction’ as a way of 
thinking about the scientific method, in that, if what one thinks is probably the case 
then they should consider the opposite to be true. By use of historical examples, 
Feyerabend showed how an appeal to any neat principle, that conveniently explained 
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a lot of scientific phenomena, did so because it is presented that way and so we should 
be suspicious of it. This for Feyerabend was a way of challenging the everyday link 
between observation and language.
34
  
 
The situation of determining the universality of the colour of swans is seen as rather 
simplistic, when one considers that the majority of modern science deals with 
unobservable entities. A simple universal statement is easy to falsify in a singular 
instance, but this is very rarely the case with modern scientific claims. Furthermore, 
as technology progresses and becomes evermore advanced, a theory under 
experimental tests will need to be augmented by additional assumptions about the 
theories behind the instruments being used. So not only is the theory under scrutiny, 
but also the experimental conditions of the test. It is conceivable that a prediction that 
is met with negative observations does not necessarily mean the theory is at fault. It is 
conceivable that this error has its origins in the equipment, the setting up of the 
experiment, a faulty analysis of initial conditions, and so on. An intricate theory 
cannot be conclusively falsified, as some part of the complex web that makes up the 
‘confirmation’ of the theory could be in error and not the theory itself. It only 
becomes conclusively falsified if we assume every other part of the experiment; its 
auxiliary theories and assumptions are true and accurate. This criticism is also known 
as underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence or the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’, 
which plays on the unknown variables or the uncertainty of a situation. It states that, 
we cannot know which assumptions to hold as true given that some of those 
assumptions will determine what we take as evidence for them in the first place.
35
 
Similarly for any given set of observations there are potentially an infinite amount of 
theories that are compatible with what is observed.
36
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Strong falsificationism cannot be how science proceeds either, as there are many 
instances of observation not meeting theory. This may be summed up as provisional 
falsification not equating to conclusive falsification. The understanding that Popper’s 
falsificationism meant chucking away any theory, as long as it has been falsified, is a 
caricature of his position. Even Popper claims his own students misunderstood him on 
this point.
37
  Popper, in stressing the importance of falsification as a criterion of 
demarcation, has also been portrayed as elevating certain features that make claims 
falsifiable over others. Popper seems to advocate boldness, daring and imagination in 
theory formulation over conservative, safe estimates, because banal observations such 
as ‘water boils’ are not as informative or as falsifiable as the claim, ‘pure water boils 
at 100°C in an open vessel at sea-level atmospheric pressure’. Yet boldness, daring, 
and imagination, as a feature of falsifiability, are not useful in and of themselves for 
the growth of scientific knowledge. The imaginative and highly falsifiable claim that 
‘all stars are made of yoghurt’, whilst eliminating one claim from the set of 
observations about ‘stars’ and ‘yoghurt’, does not do us any favours as there are lots 
of things stars are not made of. Instead, Popper thought we should be looking at the 
falsification of established, safe conjectures as a route to genuine scientific 
advancement, whilst remaining agnostic on the yet-to-be falsified nature of other, 
more daring speculations. The wild claim that ‘I am immortal’, whilst easy to falsify, 
will have nowhere near the same impact on the scientific landscape as the falsification 
of the law of energy conservation, even though my immortality would imply its 
contravention.  
 
Popper was also aware that falsificationism could be used to eliminate very healthy 
theories simply because all observations did not match all the theory’s predictions. 
Currently there is a huge discrepancy between the theories of general relativity and 
quantum mechanics, since the theories work at two very different levels. Whilst the 
two theories by themselves are hugely successful, they seem to contradict each other 
when either is scaled up or down. This would imply that either one or both of them is 
wrong and so we must look for a better explanation. But should we scrap two of 
science’s most successful theories just because they do not fit absolutely with reality? 
A more considered approach is to say, that because we know the theory is not 
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completely correct it then compels us to find a better, more comprehensive theory. 
Popper argues that a strong metaphysical notion of truth or adherence to first-order 
logic is one of the problems that verificationism suffers from. Where something either 
is or is not the case. Popper argues that this type of justification cannot be applied to 
theory selection and testing when trying to allocate the best description of reality. 
Popper thinks it is not useful to regard a theory as either true or false, but to think in 
terms of degrees of truth, or better or worse approximations to the truth.
38
 Because of 
the everyday and metaphysical association with the word ‘true’, Popper wanted to use 
the word ‘verisimilitude’ instead.39 Popper has ‘verisimilitude’ on a continuum; at one 
end we have ‘true’, but as we can never be certain or prove anything beyond doubt (as 
it must be falsifiable and open to doubt) it is unobtainable. At the other end we have 
‘false’ and as we can never have conclusive falsification, as there must be room for 
doubt, so is equally unobtainable. On this continuum of verisimilitude some 
statements are truer than others. As Popper believes he is expressing verisimilitude, 
and not truth, it has its analogue in ‘fuzzy logic’. Here certainty comes in degrees of 
probability, but in substituting a term like ‘truth’ with ‘verisimilitude’, 
metaphysically, does nothing for what that term expresses. What is it that gives 
‘verisimilitude’ verisimilitude? Here we can search for ‘truth’ as a satisfactory 
explanation of the aims of science, if by ‘truth’ we mean the set of all true 
propositions. Even though, in principle this is unobtainable, we are allowed to admit 
false statements as approximations, as long as they are not too false or that their 
falsity content is greater than their truth content. Here the ‘falsificationist settles for 
progress rather than truth.’40 So we see that Popper’s falsificationism allows us to 
hold theories that are false, but as long as they are not too false.
41
 This was seen as a 
retreat from falsification as a hard methodological principle to it being a normative 
prescription of what scientist should do, rather than what they do do. This would 
appear to deviate from the Popperian philosophy of providing a description of what 
scientists were ‘really’ doing rather than a psychological account of what scientists 
believe they were doing. We seem to have reduced falsification to a heuristic rather 
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than a criterion of science.
42
 We intuitively think that scientific statements should be 
falsifiable, but in reality some of them are not. Here we seem to be getting at an 
‘ethics’ of science, where we argue what science ‘ought’ to be rather than what it ‘is’.  
 
The sophistication and complexity of Popper’s philosophy tends to be overlooked in 
favour of a mainstream account of falsification. We may find that because he 
apparently offered a methodological account of the scientific method, one that is 
intellectually seductive (too easy to understand), and seem to rally against the pseudo-
intellectual claims of philosophers, psychoanalysts and Marxists, Popper tends to be 
lauded as the scientists’ philosopher. As Susan Haack says, 
 
It should come as no great surprise that some of Popper’s most famous 
admirers seem not to have fully understood the philosophy of science 
they so enthusiastically endorsed […] what they found most attractive 
about Popper’s ideas was, I suspect, his romantic picture of the 
scientist as a dedicated seeker after truth, making bold, imaginative 
conjectures, fearlessly testing them, frankly acknowledging when they 
are falsified, and heroically starting over.
43
 
 
It is almost irrelevant to ask what Popper actually meant as this in itself implies 
metaphysics of language, world and mind. But the influence of Popper is undeniable 
as we can see a definite role played by Popper as the ‘scientist’s philosopher’. I will 
argue that he gets more of a voice as a ‘philosopher of science’, because scientists 
understood Popper through their own worldview of science, as being a purely 
methodological endeavour. I will not attempt to point out all the complexities of 
Popper’s philosophy, but just show that science for scientists, or a general 
understanding of science, tends to be equated with methodology. Philosophical 
accounts that give validity to that claim tend to be looked upon more favourably, than 
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those that do not. In opposition to this view, I place the historical account. I will be 
looking at the reception and attitudes towards Feyerabend in the next chapter as an 
example of this.  
 
3.6 - Popper, Idol 
 
The online Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy says,  
 
[I]n the modern technological and highly-specialised world scientists 
are rarely aware of the work of philosophers; it is virtually 
unprecedented to find them queuing up, as they have done in Popper’s 
case, to testify to the enormously practical beneficial impact which 
that philosophical work has had upon their own.
44
  
 
The Nobel-Prize winner for medicine, Sir Peter Medawar, has publicly declared 
Popper to be ‘incomparably the greatest philosopher of science there has ever been.’45 
Jacques Monod, also a Nobel-Prize winner for medicine, wrote the foreword to the 
French version of The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
46
 Sir John Eccles, another Nobel-
Prize winner, wrote, ‘my own scientific life since 1945 owes much to my 
conversation (if I may call it so) to Popper’s teaching’.47 The cosmologist Hermann 
Bondi was a great advocate of Popper’s works. Even the anti-philosopher Hawking 
references Popper in A Brief History of Time as an upholder of good scientific 
reasoning.
48
 There may be an elevated sense of scientific kudos for Popper as his 
forays into science were not only as part of developing an abstract methodological 
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account of science, but he also contributed to the ‘new’ physics.49 Revered physicists 
such as Bohr, Einstein, and Schrödinger attended his lectures and entered into 
extended debate with him.
50
 It is not just amongst scientists that Popper has cemented 
his reputation, ‘Popper towered above circle [Vienna Circle] philosophers – old and 
young alike. He had Schlick’s erudition, and was acquiring his lucidity. He has 
Carnap’s logical precision, and intellectual agility to add. He had Neurath’s 
imagination, and ingeniously translated it into methodology.’51 For Victor Kraft, 
Popper came to replace Wittgenstein as the Circle’s major influence and it was by his 
opposition that the Vienna Circle progressed.
52
 It was his attacks on the positivist’s 
ideology that he forced Circle scholars to advance their own arguments. 
 
Popper’s influence did not just end after the collapse of logical positivism. His 
accounts of the scientific method are still with us, almost naturalized within scientific 
education. The hypothetico-deductive model of forming hypothesis, constructing an 
experiment, making observations, and testing the hypothesis, is now common practice 
as a representation of the ‘scientific method’. The key assumption being that 
hypothesis is distinct from observation, which can be falsified.
53
 The Key Stage 3 
curriculum for science in the UK states that a key concept of science is that theories 
should be falsifiable or that they ‘at least in principle, be tested by observation and/or 
experiment.’54 For me the PUoS should contain an explicit acknowledgement and 
understanding of the philosophical issues at stake, which may be one of the barriers to 
understanding science. Science textbooks and curriculums, however, tend to be 
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written or at least advised on by scientists. This would be unproblematic if science 
were straightforwardly methodological, but the failure of Popper and the logical 
positivists would imply that it is not. If those charged with writing educational texts 
on science have somehow demarcated philosophical from scientific thought, it is not 
done on a point of method. Yet we get scientists making statements about science, as 
if it were unproblematic. Astrophysicist, Sir Malcolm Longair, writes for Key Stage 3 
students of science that, ‘knowledge and understanding in science are rooted in 
evidence.’55 Yet we may ask, do we not need knowledge and understanding of the 
thing we are investigating in order to know what counts as evidence in the first place? 
On this view, evidence is rooted in scientific knowledge and understanding, which 
would be a circular argument if, we could only appeal to methodological accounts of 
how we come to know things in the first place. 
 
Karl Popper is often contrasted with the ‘Vienna Circle’, but in their dislike of 
‘pretentious wisdom’ was ‘very much at one with the Vienna Circle and with its 
spiritual father, Bertrand Russell.’56 There are very good cultural and historical 
reasons why Popper disliked ‘philosophy’. With the rise of belief in the destiny of 
nations as embodied by National Socialism, or the corrupting influence of political 
ideology on science as witnessed by the Lysenko affair, Popper felt none of these 
could be combated by appeals to traditional philosophy. In fact, it was with 
philosophical thinking that he thought the problem lay. On another point, Popper in 
contrast to Feyerabend, can be deemed ‘more rational’ in his rejection of Nazism. 
This in retrospect can be interpreted as moral and rational expediency, that one was 
seduced by ideology (Feyerabend) whereas the other saw right through it (Popper).  
This dislike of philosophy is one that is echoed by many contemporary scientists and 
is implied in the Government’s Science and Technology Sixth Report.57 I do not want 
to argue that all philosophical contributions are valid, but I think that the ‘philosophy’ 
Popper, the logical positivists, and certain scientists dislike, is a philosophy of a 
particular kind. Indeed, in order to show that some philosophical contributions are 
better than others, one has to know how philosophical activity is performed. In line 
with my thesis, Putnam in response to Popper stressed the importance of scientific 
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practice. He says, ‘what Popper consistently fails to see is that practice is primary: 
ideas are not just an end in themselves […] The primary importance of ideas is that 
they guide practice, that they structure whole forms of life.’58 This criticism, I think, 
can be made in terms of the historical-methodological distinction I will be making. 
Putnam also picks up Popper on his anti-philosophy streak. ‘[T]he failure to see the 
primacy of practice leads Popper to some rather reactionary political conclusions.’ 
Popper, thus, on the grounds of falsification a priori rules out Marxism or psycho-
analysis as being able to make ‘true’ statements. The irony being, Putnam notes, that 
this is done ‘in the name of an anti-a priori philosophy of knowledge!’59  
 
Popper makes it clear he has a particular idea of what metaphysics he dislikes; the 
features associated with philosophical theories, and not scientific ones. In 
Metaphysics and Criticizability he lists five theories that he believes exemplify 
philosophical doctrine, determinism, idealism, irrationalism, voluntarism and 
nihilism.
60
 He argues that whilst these theses are irrefutable, he believes them to be 
false. He first thinks we can distinguish between three types of theory: logical/ 
mathematical, empirical/ scientific, and philosophical/ metaphysical.
61
 He gives no 
criteria for how they should be grouped and thus assumes for the rest of the paper that 
those distinctions are unproblematic. Popper’s reasoning behind why he can state that 
those philosophical doctrines are irrefutable, but false, is because he can treat them as 
if they were designed to answer specific problems, as a scientific theory might. 
Popper says, ‘every rational theory, no matter whether scientific or philosophical, is 
rational in so far as it tries to solve certain problems.’62 The binary Popper establishes 
is; either a philosophical theory tries to answer something specific and to this end can 
be tested or it is irrational. Yet, if we start with Popper’s conclusion, can we ask what 
makes something a problem in the first place? Popper offers the idea that where belief 
and reality meet, there will be problems generated by the mismatch, and so the belief 
then has to be altered to accommodate for what is observed. The conclusion being that 
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philosophical theories generate philosophical problems. The hope was that science 
would slowly unpick the problems of philosophy, by having a greater correspondence 
with reality, and thus do away with great swathes of ‘pretentious wisdom’. What 
Popper does not consider is that this whole way of looking at reality, the relations 
between reality, truth, knowledge and science, even if all is provisional, is itself 
metaphysical. It was this tension that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus brought into view. But 
as Popper took the logical method to be central to Wittgenstein’s achievements, this 
then galvanized his views on ‘philosophy’. In response to Wittgenstein’s conclusions, 
such that the most meaningful propositions in language cannot be stated in any 
unambiguous way, Popper says, 
 
All the metaphysical nonsense against which Bacon, Hume, Kant, 
and Russell have fought for centuries may now comfortably settle 
down, and even frankly admit that it is nonsense. (Heidegger does 
so) For now we have a new kind of nonsense at our disposal, 
nonsense that communicates thoughts whose truth is unassailable 
and definitive; in other words, deeply significant nonsense […] the 
anti-metaphysical theory of meaning in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, far 
from helping to combat metaphysical dogmatism and ocular 
philosophy, represents a re-inforced dogmatism that opens wide the 
door to the enemy, deeply significant metaphysical nonsense, and 
throws out by the same door, the best friend, that is to say, scientific 
hypothesis.
63
  
 
As metaphysics is so pervasive in language and ideas, when we are tempted to 
dismiss ideas as ‘nonsense’ because they appear to clash with commonsense notions 
about reality, it may be because our metaphysics have gone wrong not the rationality 
of the person stating it. Yet, as the most belligerent metaphysics lie at the core of 
‘commonsense’ it is very hard not to take this as just how things are. I would think 
every person holds a view of ‘how things are’ and as Popper’s philosophy comes from 
a position of persuasive ‘commonsense’, I doubt many see their error. For example, 
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the scientist John Eccles thought there was much to Popper’s three-world view.64 
There is the first world of things, the second world of subjective experiences and the 
third world of objective knowledge. Once we take this to be true the problem is then, 
how do these three worlds communicate? How do we pass from dead symbols on a 
page to my interpretation and understanding of them, which result in objective 
knowledge?
65
 Eccles is not alone in supporting such a view. Physicist Roger Penrose, 
in his ‘objective reduction theory of consciousness’ uses Popper’s three worlds to 
structure the relationship of the internal mind, external world and objective truth.
66
 
Penrose, though, is stuck with the same problem as Eccles, as each of the three worlds 
appears to imply knowledge of the other. ‘There is a seemingly paradoxical aspect to 
these correspondences, where each world seems to ‘emerge’ from but a tiny part of 
the one which precedes it.’67 Again what is viewed as unproblematic is the 
metaphysical view of an internal mind, external world, and truth being a 
correspondence between the two, resulting in a repository of objective knowledge. 
Neither considers the philosophical basis for such a view by asking, what is it that 
enables us to speak meaningfully about reality like this?  
 
Whilst not directly related to Popper the project of establishing phenomena on 
methodological grounds is highly appealing to other subjects. The search for 
‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) began by an appeal to propositional logic and rule 
following, but soon found that ‘meaning’ is not reducible to either. Currently the 
some of the best attempts lie in ‘information theory’, that uses probability and 
statistical methods for trying to simulate intelligence. Whilst it has not succeeded in 
replicating ‘human intelligence’, it has had wider application in ‘intelligent’ search 
engines. The irony of this approach is that ‘information’, in its technical sense, is 
meaningless to humans. Such that a ‘search term’ can be broken down to bits and 
processed probabilistically, through certain sets of syntactical and grammatical rules, 
inference rules, and decision trees. Search-engines do not find search terms by 
understanding the meaning of the phrase typed, but by a series of heuristics and 
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algorithms, in an essentially statistical way. The project of replicating human 
intelligence has been criticised by Dreyfus and more recently by Chomsky, amongst 
others.
68
  However, while their critiques appear to be justified by the problems that AI 
theorists and scientists face, Marvin Minsky, a leading cognitive scientists in the field 
of AI accused philosophers, such as Dreyfus, for misunderstanding their work and 
that they ‘should be ignored.’69 Here again we see the meddling philosopher 
needlessly complicating serious scientific work. The sorts of problems I am raising 
here, in that the methodological is seen as superior to any other approach, I will 
develop later on with regard to ways of reading Kuhn.
70
 For now all I want to do is 
highlight the leeway methodological accounts of science and phenomena get by 
scientists, as it tends to fit with their worldview. A philosophical basis, such as 
Popper’s that reinforces this worldview receives far less criticism by scientists, than a 
historical account of the same thing. The sorts of solutions or criticisms that may be 
offered, as with Dreyfus, will seem quite unpalatable to the scientist as it will question 
the sorts of metaphysical foundations one has or is presuming in order to establish 
something like ‘human intelligence’. 
 
Next, I will offer in contrast to Popper’s methodological account of science, an 
explanation of his protégé Paul Feyerabend. I will loosely identify Feyerabend’s 
approach as ‘historical’, as not only does he argue against a methodological 
conception of science, but unlike Popper, he argues from historical examples and not 
abstract philosophical principles. As Feyerabend’s account challenges certain ideas 
about the methodological account of science, the correspondence notion of truth and 
the possibility of objective rational knowledge, ideas held sacred by the scientific 
community, he is treated with hostility. I will first offer a historical-biographical 
account of Feyerabend and then provide a reading of Feyerabend that is typical of 
some scientists and analytical philosophers. That is, it will be a fairly ‘literal’ reading 
of Feyerabend, treated with a minimal amount of charity.
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Chapter Four
 
Paul Feyerabend: Against Method 
 
4.1- Paul Feyerabend 
 
Before discussing Feyerabend’s ideas, and how they have been received, I would like 
to start with a small biography. The reason for this is that ‘philosophy’ does not occur 
in a vacuum, but tends to be a reaction to something. The Feyerabend that is read at 
face-value can be bracketed with the cultural relativists and postmodernists, who 
appear intent on denying the epistemic authority of science. Those who have placed 
Feyerabend in this camp have been described as the ‘anti anti-science’ movement.1  
Here, Feyerabend is interpreted as either not understanding the positivistic accounts 
of science, or denying that a methodology is possible. What is more, it would appear 
that the later Feyerabend recants his alignment with the relativists, deconstructionists 
and social constructivists, due to the explanatory power of the scientific method.
2
 A 
quick look, however, at his biography will show that to start from these assumptions 
is unfair. After the biographical account, I will attempt to render a reading of 
Feyerabend that is familiar to the ‘anti’ anti-science movement, which calls for a 
‘literal’ and uncharitable reading of his ideas.3  
 
Paul Feyerabend, like Wittgenstein, Popper, and many of the ‘Vienna Circle’, was 
Austrian but practised in the Anglo-American traditions. This movement of 
‘Continental’ philosophers out of Europe was no coincidence, but the result of Nazi 
activity. Yet there is a claim that the sort of ‘cultural relativism’ frequently levelled at 
Feyerabend, is an offshoot of post-Kantian, ‘Continental’ philosphy. Whilst we might 
be able to identify some of the features that earmark the ‘Continental’ tradition that 
the logical/empirical positivists disliked so much, there is equally an argument that 
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suggests that those very features can be found in the American pragmatic, Rortian, 
Quinean philosophies of the Anglo-American traditions.
4
 Whilst I could also add 
Wittgenstein or Kuhn to this list, this for me, is beside the point. For it is not useful to 
play a blame game on which tradition or philosophy is inferior. Rather, if we can find 
the source of this inferiority and what then could these two ‘traditions’ learn from 
each other? Apart from rehearsing the arguments about why cultural relativism 
cannot apply to scientific truths, it gives us a handy excuse not to ‘get-to-grips’ with 
Feyerabendian philosophy. Instead, if we can just use him as a shorthand term for 
‘postmoderism’ or ‘anti-science’ philosophy, everyone knows where they stand.   
 
Feyerabend studied physics and then philosophy, adhering to a highly conventional 
positivistic outlook, that science was the basis of all knowledge, and that non-
empirical claims were either illogical or meaningless.
5
 Feyerabend and Popper met at 
the Alpbach seminars. Feyerabend seemed to enjoy Popper’s disregard for authority 
and tradition, and his ability to clarify philosophical problems.
6
 Feyerabend claims 
that Popper’s views were not new to him, saying deductivism was being offered as an 
alternative to inductivism by his later supervisor Victor Kraft, a once member of the 
‘Vienna Circle’. Feyerabend also noticed similarities in thought between Popper and 
Wittgenstein, both being influences on him.
7
 The ‘Kraft Circle’ named after his 
supervisor Victor Kraft, of which Feyerabend was a founding member, was a meeting 
of scholars who wanted to discuss ‘philosophical problems in a non-metaphysical 
manner and with special reference to the findings of the sciences’.8 It was after one of 
Wittgenstein’s lectures that Feyerabend said, ‘when he left we still did not know 
whether or not there was an external world’.9 This one quote seems to dig at the heart 
of traditional philosophical problems and the unsatisfactory responses of positivism. 
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Whilst Feyerabend was studying physics at the University of Vienna he became 
interested in the work of physicist Felix Ehrenhaft.
10
 Indeed, Ehrenhaft’s professional 
life almost serves as a template for Feyerabend’s later thinking on science and 
scientific rationality. In 1910, Ehrenhaft was in a dispute with Robert Millikan 
concerning the explanation of the observed effects concerning the ‘oil drop’ 
experiment. Whilst the history of science has sided with Millikan, it is reported that it 
was Ehrenhaft who was doing the better science. ‘Hand-written notebooks show that 
Millikan discarded 59% of the drops, as they did not provide support for this 
hypothesis of the elementary electrical charge.’11 Instead of investigating results that 
failed to meet his theory, he simply discarded them as failures.
12
 Whilst this 
controversy was enough for Millikan to be over looked for the Nobel-Prize, it is 
claimed that the majority of chemistry textbooks in the USA do not contain reference 
to this episode in its history.
13
 
 
It was at the 1949 Alpbach meeting that Ehrenhaft, who was known for being a critic 
of orthodoxy, took part in a lively debate with the group, which had a lasting effect on 
Feyerabend. By using the results of physical experiments, Ehrenhaft was able to 
challenge the empiricist’s stance that we simply observe and do not interpret. Using 
the same oil-drop experiments Ehrenhaft demonstrated new phenomena, ‘which 
cannot be interpreted at all in the customary manner.’14 As Feyerabend and his 
colleague were not prepared to give up their orthodox explanations, persuasion had to 
come from elsewhere.  He realised, in retrospect, the strategies he and his fellow 
empiricists had to resort to in order to counter Ehrenhaft’s experimental results were 
themselves non-empirical. ‘Only much later did Ehrenhaft’s lesson sink in and our 
attitude at the time of the entire profession provided me then with an excellent 
illustration of the nature of scientific rationality.’15 Feyerabend swapped from physics 
to philosophy as his doctoral subject. The exact reasons for this are speculative, but 
part of the ‘uncharitable’ reading of Feyerabend in this section will suggest that 
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proper science was too difficult for Feyerabend and so he had to settle for 
philosophy.
16
 Moreover, Feyerabend had already shown greater interest in the later 
Wittgenstein, having published several papers after reading Philosophical 
Investigations in manuscript form.
17
 Whilst originally going to study with 
Wittgenstein at Cambridge, Feyerabend’s plans had to change after Wittgenstein died. 
From here, he then decided to study under Karl Popper. As Popper’s ideas were not 
too dissimilar to that of the ‘Kraft Circle’, Feyerabend easily assimilated the principle 
of falsification. He considered himself a weak falsificationist, in that, scientists should 
defend their theories in the face of falsifying instances and that scientific theories can 
start out as being untestable. However, as Popper developed his normative 
epistemology, working from reasoned principles to how science is done, Feyerabend 
thought this way of looking at things ‘may be out of touch with reality, [and] with 
scientific practice.’18  
 
Feyerabend increasingly looked towards the history of science as a source for 
understanding how science is conducted. His approach, becoming evermore 
historical, allowed him to challenge the ontological foundations of methodological 
claims. This was done by a number of routes, but it was this aspect that the concept of 
‘incommensurability’ drew out the most. He says, ‘a theory is incommensurable with 
another if its ontological consequences are incompatible with the ontological 
consequences of the latter.’19 This comes about by attempting to interpret 
fundamental theories through a strong realism, as if they described genuine aspects of 
reality. A prerequisite for Feyerabend’s incommensurability thesis to work is that ‘the 
interpretation of an observation language is determined by the theories which we use 
to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as these theories change.’20 So in 
this respect, a theory for Feyerabend is, ‘an ontological framework and thus 
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practically irrefutable within its own extent of empirical application.’21 Feyerabend 
tries to illustrate the ontological character of his argument when he states, ‘major 
discoveries, I said are not like the discovery of America, where the general nature of 
the discovered object is already known.’22 Instead, discoveries are inextricably linked 
with the overcoming of the old observation language, which is achieved by an 
‘anything goes’ ethic of practice.  With the movement away from a normative 
account of science to how the ontological foundations of science are revealed by 
historical changes in science, we see his departure from Popperian thought. We 
cannot start from reasoned principles to how science is done. We cannot provide a 
methodological account of what is, essentially, a historical act. Arguably 
Feyerabend’s most famous work, Against Method is in itself a model of Feyerabend’s 
argument. It is not a linear book or an extended essay, but a collage of thoughts, the 
culmination of a number of encounters.
23
 It is not even one book. In its four editions it 
shifts focus, theme and authorial position.
24
 From the discussions with physicist Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsäcker about the foundations of quantum mechanics, to 
conversations with Kuhn regarding the idea of incommensurability, to the increased 
cultural diversity of students accepted to Berkeley, all have acted on Feyerabend’s 
conception of science.
25
 This enabled Feyerabend to realize ‘the discrepancy between 
abstract normative thinking about science (including his own up until that point), and 
the actual, complex, and context-dependent practice of science.’26 Theory and 
experience emerge together rather than theoretical statements being tested against a 
separate reality. These divisions of methodology, history, epistemology and ontology 
will be central to developing the two versions of Kuhn later on. 
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4.2 - Against Method 
 
Next, I will give an outline of Feyerabend’s argument in Against Method, which will 
be followed by an analysis of the reception and reactions Feyerabend’s work has 
received. I will argue that some of the more radical criticisms of Feyerabend are a 
result of his historical account being treated as a methodological response to the 
progress of science. A common trend is that to derive the ‘radical’ Feyerabend he has 
to be read ‘literally’ and with minimal charity.27 For example, Sokal writes, ‘despite 
the title of one of his books, Farewell to Reason, he never became entirely and openly 
an irrationalist.’28 If Sokal thinks Feyerabend wants to ‘literally’ say farewell to the 
use of reasoned argument or rationality, he has almost completely missed the point of 
that book, which is to wave goodbye to a particular philosophical notion of ‘Reason’. 
Pigliucci pays Feyerabend even less respect with a heading, ‘Rebel with a Feeble 
Cause: The Ranting of Paul Feyerabend’.29 As Feyerabend’s writing lends itself more 
to European ‘Continental’ philosophy, it should come as no surprise that his work 
received a better reception in Europe than in the English speaking world. Hacking, in 
the introduction to the fourth edition of Against Method, quotes Largeault claiming 
his review to be ‘far more perceptive than most of the English-language reviews at 
the time.’30 This lack of charity or overly naïve interpretation I will call the ‘strong’ 
reading. This will be developed more fully with the work of Kuhn in chapter 7. The 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ readings are hermeneutic devices that make up part of the 
deconstructive process. That is, we do not just read a text but we interpret. The 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ readings reveal the basis for our interpretations or what meanings 
we pull from the text. Here, I hope to show that how we already come to the text will 
influence what reading we are likely to elicit. Equally, it is a caricature or ‘strong’ 
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reading of deconstructivism that suggests there are infinite meanings to a text and one 
interpretation cannot be privileged over another. Deconstructivism, however, actually 
looks to uncover the basis that make such claims intelligible. It is usually by the sheer 
force of rigour and logical coherence that either reveal such statements to be rooted in 
a particular metaphysics, which have not been accounted for in the original statement, 
or the statement ‘deconstructs’ itself under the weight of its own argument. So, for 
example, the inability to come up with a scientific method for telling science from 
non-science means we may have to look harder at what grounds a methdological 
statement or equally why in its absence we do not end up with ultra-relativism.   
 
Arguably the opposite or absence of ‘deconstructivism’ is in inheriting a ‘received 
view’. Here, people like Feyerabend or Kuhn have their work already interpreted for 
us and we are simply asked to build on to it. Segerstråle notes this with regard to the 
‘anti’ anti-science movements’ attitude towards Kuhn, ‘Gross and Levitt seem to 
believe that the meaning of Kuhn’s book was somehow fixed once and for all, and 
others did not have the right to “incorrectly” interpret it!’31 I take this as analogous to 
the task being asked of the public in PUoS, where science has been interpreted 
through a methodological worldview, that then limits further interpretation. The 
‘weak’ reading will not only aid in diagnosing ‘sloppy thinking’ but also defend the 
epistemic authority of science against pseudo-scientific claims. I use the terms ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong’ in reference to their commitments to ignoring philosophy and 
metaphysics.     
   
In Against Method, Feyerabend makes the case for there being no universal, 
ahistorical method of science, that contains the standards that all sciences should 
aspire to, if they wish to be considered scientific. It should be understood that 
Feyerabend is not providing a criterion of demarcation as such, but is offering an 
argument for why such a proposition is impossible in the first place. Feyerabend 
makes the case for science being of no particular authority or of any privileged 
position in knowledge acquisition, either in its logic or its methods. He claims that 
when one looks at the history of science and that of theory change, there can be found 
no singular method, principle or rule within the history of scientific practice which 
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has not been violated at some point in the advancing of scientific knowledge. 
Feyerabend is not critiquing science per se, but is critiquing the abstract rationalism 
and philosophy of science that supports such a worldview. Feyerabend describes his 
famous phrase ‘anything goes’ as ‘the terrified exclamation of a rationalist who takes 
a closer look at history.’32 This I take to mean, if one views science as a unified, 
systematic process, that adheres to strict methodological rules, then on historical 
reflection, we will have no explanation for how science proceeds. In absence of an 
explanation we may be forced to conclude that either, science does not progress or 
there is no such thing as ‘science’. Feyerabend uses the ‘Copernican Revolution’ as a 
case study of how there is no singular methodology within the advancement of 
scientific knowledge. Typically, in the scientific narrative of this period of 
controversy between Galileo and the Church, Galileo is portrayed as the hero and 
champion of Reason, and the Church the dogmatic holder of unscientific belief. The 
Galileo case is crucial for Feyerabend, since he is questioning a certain idea of 
scientific progress and of paradigmatic conceptual change. Feyerabend portrays 
Galileo as making full use of rhetoric, propaganda, and various epistemological 
slights-of-hand, in order to support a heliocentric cosmology. He also looked to 
diminish the importance of empirical argument by suggesting those non-scientific 
influences such as, aesthetics, personal bias and social factors, have a far more 
decisive role in the history of science than the rationalist or empiricists admit.
33
 As 
Feyerabend saw it, there is no scientific method, and if science has no method, then 
there is no particular way of investigating nature to attribute science’s success to. 
There is no reason to say ‘science’ is the best way of acquiring knowledge. The 
strong reader understands these claims as there being no difference between religion 
and science, where one can arbitrarily replace one tradition with another. It is this 
strong relativism that worries the defenders of science, but paradoxically, we also see 
it active in the beliefs of pseudo-scientists, who would be their real opponents and not 
a philosophy that is committed to the history of how science is actually practised. 
Refutation here though is not by way of empirical proof, as that is what Feyerabend is 
rejecting, but can be done by sound philosophical argumentation. When we do look to 
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the history of science we find that as Popper expressed, it is a negative process of 
conjecture and refutation. In that we know what is false, but not what is true. 
Feyerabend goes a step further and suggests that in the establishing of certain 
‘successful’ theories, rather than just appealing to logical deductivism, all sorts of 
non-scientific elements will be used to justify its superiority. So where Feyerabend 
suggests that, ‘the show has been rigged in its [science’s] favour’, rather than 
understand this as a statement about the methodological arbitrariness of science, we 
understand this as how the success of science has no fundamental basis in its 
methodologies.
34
 
 
Feyerabend’s campaign against the idea of science as a universal method was to 
produce the response that there is no method. Scientists should simply follow their 
own subjective wishes. Feyerabend summarises the argument as,  
 
[S]cience is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is 
more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-
and-order alternatives […] this is shown by an examination of 
historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between 
ideas and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: 
anything goes.
35
  
 
Here Feyerabend sets up his argument as a choice between rationalistic accounts of 
scientific methodology, which would be a barrier to scientific progress, or an open 
free-for-all, that should not be constrained by methodological considerations. This is 
more than just the division that Popper understood between ‘discovery’ and 
‘justification’. For Feyerabend, to ‘discover’ something is to already have justified it 
as a sensible option. The world already contextualizes the claim allowing it to be 
entertained as a possibility. A way to accommodate this claim within the standard 
philosophical accounts, is to say that the ‘context of ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ 
develop historically in parallel’.36 Feyerabend, however, is saying something slightly 
more unsettling for the standard account that, in discovering a phenomenon, we spell 
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out the grounds for its justification; ‘scientific practice does not contain two contexts 
moving side-by-side’ but is a ‘complicated mixture of procedures.’37 It is thought that 
anyone can discover something, but it is only science that justifies it. However, it is 
that justification that needs to be over-ruled in order for science to progress. For, the 
scientific ‘fact’ that has to be overturned, would also have been justified, else it would 
not have been a prior ‘fact’. If we identify ‘justification’ with ‘methodological 
prescription’, and ‘discovery’ with ‘historical description’, as is the received view, 
Feyerabend believes we are already thinking about the order of influence in the 
wrong way. It is more apt to think about ‘justification’ or ‘methodological 
prescription’ as what is historically descriptive. That is to say, any totalizing account 
of justification is a historical description of what counts as methodology at that point. 
‘Discovery’ is where the ‘real’ methodology lies, in that, scientists are breaking with 
the traditions and norms of scientific conduct in order to put forward a new theory, or 
phenomena. Here, is where Feyerabend put forward ‘methodological anarchism’ as 
an alternative to this ‘received view’, which means, scientists, in practice, could be 
doing anything.
38
 The fact that it contains the word ‘methodology’ is a bit misleading. 
For Feyerabend is not offering a methodology or a meta-methodology, but a way of 
thinking about science.
39
 Do we derive scientific knowledge by following abstract 
principles divined by Reason, or is it only in the light of historical outcomes that we 
then judge what is ‘scientific’, which then can be further distilled into abstract 
principles. ‘Reason’, here, is also a part of that historical outcome. For example, once 
we have the historical move from Newton to Einstein, we can then retrace the moves 
in terms of the inevitability of our present situation. Feyerabend writes,  
 
[T]he idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and 
universal laws is both unrealistic and pernicious [and is] detrimental to 
science for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions 
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which influence scientific change [and] makes science less adaptable 
and more dogmatic.
40
 
 
Some philosophers of science have argued for a middle ground between 
methodological anarchism and dogmatism, but Feyerabend’s point is that, in arguing 
for one methodological approach over another, by what standards are we making this 
decision?
41
 This problem alludes to what Feyerabend called the ‘incommensurability 
thesis’. The literature has the ‘incommensurability theses’ of Feyerabend and Kuhn as 
being different. For Feyerabend, it was a ‘worldview’ that was shown up as being 
incommensurable. For Kuhn, it was his attempt to reduce these ‘worldviews’ to 
matters of language or psychology that distinguished him from Feyerabend.
42
 This, 
however, is also a product of the ‘strong/weak’ reading, as one can only derive these 
conclusions if one understands these as the logical outcomes of the philosophies 
offered. I will not discuss Feyerabend’s ‘incommensurability thesis’ at any great 
length, as the same points will be brought to bear in the discussion on Kuhn.
43
 
Needless to say, Feyerabend developed the idea from Bohr and Einstein. Even though 
Feyerabend’s popularization of ‘incommensurability’ led to accusations of 
radicalisation and irrationality about science, it was actually the ideas of scientists he 
was looking to develop.
44
 One result for the person who construes scientific claims 
through the ‘received view’, is to have the rationality of science challenged. It would 
seem unless there are some meta-standards for judging changes in standards, then 
those changes cannot be construed in a non-relativist way. This then implies that all 
standards are relative to the historical time under which they are being investigated. 
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What disturbed Worrall, and many others, is the implication behind the idea that ‘if 
no principles of evaluation stay fixed, then there is no ‘objective viewpoint’ from 
which one can show that progress occurred […] however this is dressed up, it is 
relativism.’45 
 
One of the legacies of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is the proliferation of 
relativism and irrationalism about science. This has been summed up in Feyerabend’s 
famous slogan ‘anything goes’. Hacking notes that this ‘aphorism is often taken to be 
anti-science, a sort of New Age waffle’, but in that ‘anything’, he was not ruling out 
the multifarious methods of science, only stating that we are not limited to them.
46
 
Feyerabend himself addresses this accusation. In Against Method, he writes a 
postscript discussing the criticisms of relativism, and in Farewell to Reason he 
devotes the first chapter to analysing different forms of relativism. Feyerabend insists 
it is out of a desire to understand cultural diversity that we get relativism.
47
 The whole 
of Farewell to Reason is aimed at discrediting a certain philosophical notion of 
‘Reason’ and its associated rationality, which claims that by denying rationality in 
science, we then have to concede scientific progress is irrational. The conclusion 
being, we must then be thinking about ‘rationality’ in the wrong way. In Three 
Dialogues on Knowledge, Feyerabend tries to show that ‘relativism’ is a relation 
between dogmatic worldviews.
48
 In Science in a Free Society, he devotes a chapter 
entitled ‘Conversations with Illiterates’ to these misinterpretations of his work.49 
Feyerabend does not help himself though, as his style of writing much like his 
philosophical ideas, are tinged with anarchism. In that same chapter he chastises his 
critics for not being able to distinguish between playfulness, irony, and argument by 
reductio ad absurdum. By using ‘rationalist’ criteria, Feyerabend sought to show that 
those same rationalists would have to admit that science has developed in a fashion 
that is either, contrary to their standards or in a manner that they would have to 
characterise as irrational. So the ‘reductio’ is that, by the same standards that the 
rationalists wanted to defend the methodology of science, they would be forced to 
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drop it as irrational.
50
 Farrell points out that Feyerabend’s ‘reductio ad absurdum’ 
structure was completely missed by those who reviewed Against Method. Feyerabend 
used ‘reductio ad absurdum’ and ‘modus tollens’ reasoning, precisely because 
rationalists have to accept them. In his epistemological anarchism he wanted to 
demonstrate that one could use rationalist rules without submitting to them.
51
 This 
approach has partly inspired the methodology behind this thesis. Whilst, 
methodologically, I utilise Heideggerian notions in interpreting Kuhn’s work later on, 
I would say ethically my commitment is much closer to Feyerabend. That is, 
Feyerabend seemed more committed to using philosophy and scrutinizing how 
science is interpreted as a means to political and social progress than Kuhn does as a 
philosopher of science.
52
   
 
4.3 - Against a Universal Neutral Observation Language 
 
One of Feyerabend’s main points in Against Method was the idea that there is no 
neutral observation language with which one can judge the claims of a theory. There 
is no meta-language outside of the context within which a theory is proposed and 
meaningful. There is no background reality with which one can test a theory, as those 
background assumptions, which we call ‘reality’, are as much theory-laden as the 
theory under question. It was this new relationship between theory and experience 
that saw Feyerabend depart from the positivist and Popperian philosophy of science. 
Both Lakatos and Feyerabend suggest that science is not an autonomous form of 
reasoning, but is inseparable from the larger body of human thought and inquiry. If 
so, then the questions of truth and falsity, or correct and incorrect understanding are 
not uniquely empirical. Many meaningful questions cannot be settled empirically, not 
only in practice but also in principle. For,  
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[n]o theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not 
always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older 
ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of 
progress. It is also a first step in our attempt to find principles implicit 
in familiar observational notions.
53
  
 
A lot of Feyerabend’s work here had direct implications for philosophical notions 
such as ‘rationality’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘truth’, ideals held dear by scientists. The idea 
that science somehow has a privileged language with which it describes nature is 
directly challenged by Feyerabend’s social and historical locating of science. In 
Against Method, he tries to illustrate this point by way of the ‘Copernican 
Revolution’, in which it is argued that not only is what is observed shaped by the 
ideologies of the time, but what is constituted as rational is also governed by non-
scientific factors. Feyerabend argues through his example, that what Galileo was 
attempting, could indeed be deemed ‘irrational’ by the standards of the day and ‘in 
part, even now’.54 The incongruent experience of a moving Earth, a lack of empirical 
evidence (or the evidence that could also be explained by other geo-centric models), 
and the theoretical inadequacy of the Copernican model all indicate that Galileo was 
not acting out of rational consideration of the evidence at hand. On the 
counterintuitive flip-side, it is argued that the Church’s position was closer to what 
we would recognise as being scientific, by today’s standards, and was also the more 
responsible position of the two viewpoints.
55
  The point Feyerabend is making here is 
that ‘rationality’ cannot be deemed as part of the scientific method, as what we 
consider rational is only subject to the standards and assumptions of its location in 
history and culture.        
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Feyerabend’s example of the ‘Copernican Revolution’ was also good ground for 
showing where other systematic attempts at a demarcation criterion had also gone 
wrong. Feyerabend became a vocal critic of Popperian ideas and saw Popper’s 
attempt to codify the activities of science into scientific and non-scientific statements, 
by way of falsification, as another ruse to straitjacket inquiry. Feyerabend in-keeping 
with his anarchistic ethic argued that,  
 
[t]here are circumstances when it is advisable to introduce, elaborate, 
and defend ad hoc hypotheses, or hypotheses which contradict well-
established and generally accepted experimental results, or hypotheses 
whose content is smaller than the content of the existing and 
empirically adequate alternative, or self inconsistent hypotheses, and 
so on.
56
 
 
As there was no empirical reason to favour the Copernican over the Ptolemaic 
system, one could only evaluate these cosmologies on non-empirical grounds, such as 
metaphysical implications, aesthetics of the mechanics, or maths involved, simplicity 
of explanation, and so on.
57
 Feyerabend accuses Galileo of going against near all of 
Popper’s criteria for what we should consider or defend science to be. As the rotation 
of the stars is relative to a frame of reference on Earth and vice-versa, any attempt at 
establishing which body is in motion with limited data, technology and certain 
background assumptions, one could easily conclude that the motion of the Earth had 
been ‘falsified’ by observation. All that is claimed is that science cannot be reduced 
to a single principle such as falsification, but must also recognise that it is part of a 
wider picture in which ‘non-scientific’ elements also have to be considered. 
 
What has been discussed so far is a brief outline of some of Feyerabend’s key 
philosophical points. A methodological response to a historical question is what 
Feyerabend generated in his critique of science, rather than a realisation that the 
historical approach called into question the methodological conception of scientific 
practice. Some of this misunderstanding has to be levelled at Feyerabend’s writing 
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style, which also raises another issue. From the ‘received view’ it would seem that the 
inability or refusal to write a clear positive account of how things are is to concede 
that one cannot state their position in clear terms. That one resorts to hiding behind 
language and literary devices instead of being ‘up front’. This attitude also belies a 
deeper problem about how one understands how arguments can work from metaphor 
or other such literary devices, which deal with ‘truth’, but do not claim it. What I will 
also attempt to show in chapters 7 and 8 is how this order of ‘literal’ and ‘figurative/ 
metaphorical’ can be inverted. Next I will give a ‘strong’ analysis of Feyerabend in 
line with those responses that saw Feyerabend as ‘anti-science’.58 This is to prime the 
reader as to what can be expected in the chapters on Kuhn, who in many ways 
suffered the same fate.   
 
4.4 - Against Feyerabend 
 
In the following analysis of Feyerabend’s work, I am writing with a ‘literal’ and 
uncharitable interpretation in mind.
59
 It will be philosophically naïve, in that, it will 
ignore the implications of its own position. This I call the ‘strong’ reading, as it has 
such a strong commitment to the metaphysical position it starts from, that it fails to 
acknowledge it. Someone who is philosophically naïve might take the term ‘truth’ to 
relate to some form of representationalism or correspondence between a statement 
about the world and the world itself. The strong reader starts here. Yet 
‘correspondence’ already presupposes a metaphysical relationship between language, 
knowledge and truth. The challenge is to be able to separate methodological and 
historical notions of ‘Truth’, but the abstract reality with which the PUoS encourages 
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us to think about science means we always tend to think about ‘truth’ as purely 
methodological. Next I will present this ‘strong’ analysis.  
 
Against Method, as well as much of Feyerabend’s other writings, contain numerous 
ambiguous or confused statements, which often either end in violent attacks on 
science, or have deep running implications for the enterprise of science as a whole.
60
 
Some of the confusion in Feyerabend is that his vision is simultaneously 
philosophical, historical, and political, so that judgements of facts get mixed up with 
judgements of value. When Feyerabend says, ‘the idea that science can, and should, 
be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious’ he is 
criticizing at length the ‘fixed and universal rules’ through which earlier philosophers 
thought that they could express the essence of the scientific method.
61
 While there 
may be no such thing as the ‘scientific method’, this does not necessitate the non-
existence or the impossibility of developing of certain rules, heuristics and 
procedures, with an approximate degree of validity, on the basis of previous 
experiences. If Feyerabend’s aim in Against Method is to illustrate through historical 
examples, the limitations of any general and universal codification of the scientific 
method, one could reasonably say he had achieved his aim. However, one could argue 
he goes much further and, depending on which edition of Against Method you read, a 
different Feyerabend presents himself. Here the inconsistency of authorial position 
may indicate a weakness of commitment in his argument.  
 
Possibly one of the most infamous and quoted lines in Against Method is, ‘all 
methodologies have their limitations and the only ‘rule’ that survives is ‘anything 
goes.’62 Depending on how we read this statement, it is either trivially true or just 
false. ‘All methodologies have their limitations’ is not a revelation to any scientist, 
but then what is implied is that any method is as good as any other, which is blatantly 
false unless qualified by the statement ‘as long as it produces true statements’. There 
is not one way to drive a car but there are better, more suitable approaches if one 
wishes not to crash. All methods of driving, as with investigating nature, are not 
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equally reliable. In the second edition of Against Method, it appears that Feyerabend 
tries to defend a literal interpretation of the ‘anything goes’ approach,  
 
A naïve anarchist says (a) that both absolute rules and context-
dependent rules have their limits and infers (b) that all rules and 
standards are worthless and should be given up. Most reviewers regard 
me as a naïve anarchist in this sense […][But] while I agree with (a) I 
do not agree with (b). I argue that all rules have their limits and that 
there is no comprehensive ‘rationality’, I do not argue that we should 
proceed without rules and standards.
63
  
 
Feyerabend only suggests what these ‘rules and standards’ might be; they should not 
be a set of general rules or standards, but should be contextual and are to supplement 
those absolute rules, but do not replace them. A problem here is that Feyerabend does 
not commit himself to what these ‘rules and standards’ are and so, unless they are 
constrained by some notion of rationality or truth correspondence, one arrives quite 
easily at a type of ultra relativism. It is also very easy to make criticisms when one 
cannot offer an alternative, and to some this appears to be the bread and butter of 
philosophers of science.
64
 Laudan expresses this worry about relativism, when he 
reads Feyerabend and Kuhn as propounding a view of the irrationality of science 
when it comes to deciding between fundamental competing theories. Laudan couples 
the Feyerabendian/ Kuhnian irrationality of science with the relativism of cultural 
theory, to arrive at a picture that puts scientific claims equal to those of magicians or 
shamans.
65
 However, when Feyerabend comes down from the level of abstraction and 
does address concrete problems in the history of science, he frequently mixes 
reasonable observations with strange sounding suggestions,  
 
The first step in our criticism of customary concepts and customary 
reactions is to step outside the circle and either invent a new 
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conceptual system, for example a new theory, that clashes with the 
most carefully established observational results and confounds the 
most plausible theoretical principles, or to import such a system from 
outside science, from religion, from mythology, from the ideas of 
incompetents, or the ramblings of madmen.
66
 
 
One could defend these assertions by invoking the classical distinction between the 
contexts of ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’. As for Popper, the process of inventing 
theories or discovering phenomena has no codification, all methods and means are 
acceptable.
67
 However, once we have our theory or idea, its justification has to be 
rational, even if what counts as rational cannot be wholly codified. As with 
Feyerabend’s example of Galileo, where it is argued that his actions could be deemed 
wholly irrational, how did we get to a stage where Galileo’s arguments won out 
against the Church? Surely, not because he was better at rhetoric or the greater 
showman? One factor that Feyerabend seems to overlook is that outside of the social 
and philosophical aspects of the Galilean controversy, he and his antagonists shared a 
lot of ideas in common. Both sides agreed that you could describe planetary motion 
and from these descriptions you could deduce certain observable facts. Ptolemy, 
Brahe, and Copernicus along with many other astronomers, believed you could map 
out the heavens. Galileo pointed out trivial facts that his opponents had no option but 
to admit true, such as lamps seem larger than they really are when viewed from a 
distance at night, and that Venus appears smaller in the light of day than at night. It 
was from simple agreed facts, which followed from rational argument that telescopic 
data was allowed to be submitted as evidence, and began to turn the tide in favour of 
Galileo. The change is gradual, slow and messy – to borrow a Quinean idea, each 
claim in the web of science is revisable in the light of new evidence, be it the 
methodology, standards of conduct, theories or facts. As each part is modified it can 
then be judged against the remaining parts of the web to see if the case holds water. 
What does not happen is that the entire web is changed at once. For those same 
standards of rationality, science, theories and facts only make sense in relation to one 
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another, not in their absence. It would be impossible to form an objective consensus 
on what works, have a sense of progression, or knowledge acquisition, if we had to 
replace the entire onto-epistemological network each time. Feyerabend, however, 
seems to deny this distinction between the context of ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ 
by suggesting that division is not as clear as has been made out in traditional 
epistemology.
68
 The rationalist wants to say that the history of science, context of 
discovery and justification, is not piecemeal, but evolutionary. Growing evidence and 
research affects how many prior theories could or could not be justified. With this 
said, this distinction has always been there, for if it were not, the justification of 
theories would be unconstrained and here we would have an ‘anything goes’ 
situation. All of Feyerabend’s use of historical data would appear self-authenticating, 
when we consider the reasons for its use. Feyerabend wants to say that, the history of 
science (HOS) trumps the validity of philosophy of science (POS). Yet, as the HOS 
entails looking at the POS (here the POS is an explication of the notions of 
philosophical/ historical ideas such as rationality, truth, objectivity and so on), how 
can we write a HOS that does not implicitly entail that POS, which the HOS is 
supposed to be critiquing? That is to say, if on the HOS account POS is discredited, 
what is the point of looking at past scientific texts, that would have been written and 
organized by those same discredited philosophical concepts? How exactly is the 
historian supposed to test his model if the ‘historical data’ is composed under an 
opposing POS? As Newton-Smith says, ‘an attack on a particular aspect of method 
presupposes method.’69      
 
In the introduction to the Chinese 3
rd
 edition of Against Method, Feyerabend lays out 
the argument against appeals to ‘non-scientific’ behaviour in the establishing of 
knowledge or ‘success’. He says, ‘‘non-scientific’ procedures cannot be pushed aside 
by argument’, the use of the term ‘non-scientific’ assumes the existence of something 
that is scientific, which appears contrary to Feyerabend’s position.70 He argues 
against the assertion ‘science is always successful’, which on a literal reading no one 
would agree with, and so is a strawman figure to argue against and, as he observes, 
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‘there are lots of failures’.71 Science does, however, count its failures and so in 
establishing that Newtonian physics does not adequately explain the world of the very 
small or the very fast we have, in a certain sense, a success. We ‘know’ something, be 
it a weakness in a theory or underdetermination in the evidence. The same cannot be 
said of a failure in ‘non-scientific’ procedure, the prediction of countless 
Armageddon’s for the devoted ‘non-scientist’ does not show a weakness in the 
process that led to failure in prediction. The idea that the world, one day, will end, is 
compatible with many observations, myths, and stories – and its failure to be realized 
in any actual way, can be saved by ad-hoc interpretation. Even though ad-hoc 
arguments have been used in the advancement of scientific ideas, overtime, further 
observation, evidence and theory remove the ad-hoc component, whereas in non-
scientific ideas they remain stagnant.  
 
Feyerabend, in the same introduction, makes the trivial observation that scientists do 
not know ahead of time what will make it to the level of knowledge. But from this 
states of affairs, he then generalizes, ‘there exists no special way of weight scientific 
promises either – scientists are no better off than anybody else in these matters, they 
only know more details.’72 Again, on a literal reading, of course you cannot guarantee 
the success of an idea, theory or prediction ahead of time, but you can have levels of 
confidence in an idea, some things, given certain assumptions, are more likely than 
others. It is these details that are crucial for knowing why we prefer theory a over 
theory b. Scientists are not better than anybody else in these matters, with regard to 
the power to see into the future (apart from those non-scientists who claim to be able 
to see into the future), but their methodology does give them the advantage. Louis 
Pasteur was accused of being lucky in many of his discoveries, to which he replied, 
‘[I]n the field of observation, chance favours only the prepared mind’, and as Wolpert 
remarks, ‘it is not by chance that it is great scientists who have the luck.’73 The 
rationalist will think there are very good reasons why Pasteur made the discoveries he 
did and not a blacksmith or a baker, or indeed why it took two thousand years for 
Aristotle’s simplified theory of motion to be challenged. It was not questioned by a 
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farmer or soldier, people equally exposed to falling objects, but by Galileo. Galileo 
was looking at the same phenomena everyone else saw, but it took him, with his 
approach to investigating nature, to question a two-millennium old assumption.     
 
The presenting of science as equivalent with non-science, because both fail at some 
level, seems to be trying to lay the foundations for the ‘anything goes’ ethic. Once 
Feyerabend established his ‘anything goes’ idea he frequently draws comparisons 
between science and religious myth. ‘Newton reigned for more than 150 years, 
Einstein briefly introduced a more liberal point of view only to be succeeded by the 
Copenhagen Interpretation. The similarities between science and myth are indeed 
astonishing.’74 It is true, to some extent, that the ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of 
quantum mechanics was accepted dogmatically by fellow physicists, after Niels Bohr 
and Werner Heisenberg showed that the very act of observing or measuring a 
quantum event changes the ‘reality’ of that event. However, if Feyerabend wants to 
draw analogies between myth and science, he should give examples of where myths 
have altered due to their incongruity with observational findings, or ‘suggest how 
experiments aimed at discriminating between earlier and later versions of the myth’, 
helped societies to evolve.
75
 If there are similarities between science and myth, it is at 
the superficial level of how language is used. We see the same techniques at play in 
the New-Age mysticism writings on the links between spirituality and quantum 
physics.
76
  
 
The interpretation that I have presented above is what I have called the ‘strong’ 
reading. It is a particularly uncharitable or ‘literal’ reading of a philosopher, who in 
this case was Feyerabend. A more nuanced reading of Feyerabend saw him turn away 
from the positivist conceptions of truth and knowledge, and in its place offer a more 
historically informed diagnosis of those same problems offered up by the 
positivists/empiricists. Yet his ‘reductio ad absurdum’ structured argument in Against 
Method, his playfulness with language, and his affiliation with Wittgenstein makes it 
easy to lump him in with those ‘Continental’ philosophers of science who would 
undermine the authority of science for making truth-claims. At its core, what I have 
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identified, is the confusion between treating a historical question methodologically 
and a methodological question historically. The ‘strong’ reading only submits to 
ideas, philosophical or otherwise, as being treated methodologically and any 
deviation is an attack on this approach. The ‘weak’ reading, which I only hint at in his 
biographical sketch, highlights both possibilities and presents philosophy with a 
greater role to play in the dialogue between science, education and philosophy.    
 
4.5 – Conclusion 
 
In conclusion to the first section of this thesis, what I have attempted to argue is that 
the PUoS, which is mainly written, organized and delivered by scientists, has a 
distinct lack of philosophical engagement with the ideas being used. What is more, 
many of the publicly outspoken scientists, who are highly credible in their own fields, 
have dismissed philosophy or ridiculed it in some way. I can restate no better 
formulation of this position than the comments in the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Sixth Report: ‘many conventional medical scientists, while accepting the 
validity of accumulative empirical observation, believe that those therapeutic 
disciplines that are based principally on abstract philosophy and not on scientific 
reasoning and experiment have little place in medicine.’77 Here we have a clear 
binary choice between practices based on ‘accumulative empirical observation’ 
deemed as scientific, and practices based on ‘abstract philosophy’, which are not. It is 
not even considered that the position of empiricism is itself an ‘abstract’ philosophy, 
that is supplemented with more than just scientific reasoning. What I have argued for 
in this first section is that science tends to be known via its representation as a 
method, which allows us to collect facts about the world. What the sociology of 
scientific knowledge and PUoS studies have shown is that, knowledge of ‘facts’ is 
itself not a great measure of scientific understanding. The explicit assumption in the 
‘House of Lords’ reports on science, technology and society is that with greater 
knowledge of science, the more in favour of science people will be, which will spill 
over into their personal lives, allowing them to make better decisions. However, 
social research has shown that the opposite is happening. The more people know 
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about science the less they are likely to equate it with social progress.
78
 With the 
mechanisation of industry, jobs and skills have been lost. With the proliferation of 
nuclear energy, the threat of total war and environmental disasters has increased. 
With the over reliance on antibiotics and drug therapy we have seen the creation of 
stronger, more deadly viruses, and the doping of the human condition. The defence 
here is that this is not what science is but how science is used.
79
 All of which then 
draws us closer to our central question of a PUoS, ‘what is science?’80  
 
It is thinking that science is other than what people do, which keeps it anchored as a 
methodology. Here we work from the abstraction of methodology to real world cases. 
My main route to exposing this tradition in thinking about science has been through 
the failed attempts to demarcate science from non-science. Here, I have looked at 
Popper’s use of falsification as a principle of demarcation. I argued that Popper’s 
attempt to give philosophical validity to a methodological conception of science, as 
well as his personal contributions to science, has him elevated above most 
philosophers of science, as the ‘scientists’ philosopher’. Yet as we see for a number 
of reasons, ‘falsification’ fails and can be treated, at best, as a heuristic of scientific 
practice. ‘Falsification’ can then be thought of alongside other heuristics, such as, 
simplicity, beauty, consilience, explanatory power and so on. What this and other 
failures to demarcate science from non-science on a methodological basis should tell 
us is, not that there is no difference between religion, myth and science, but that we 
are thinking about the problem in the wrong way. One could reasonably conclude that 
if we cannot demarcate science from non-science on a methodological basis, which is 
part of the rhetoric of the ‘anti-science’ movements, then maybe there is no difference 
between magic and physics.
81
 If the public is not philosophically ‘literate’, then these 
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alternatives can be easily entertained as genuine possibilities. It is from such a 
position that I think ‘anti-science’ ideologies can take hold, regardless of their 
political motives. This, however, is not a recommendation to replace science with 
philosophy. For even philosophy suffers from the above criticism, when it seeks the 
epistemological clout of science in an area such as ‘rationality’ or ‘consciousness’. 
This was one of Feyerabend’s targets, but such projects still persist today in 
philosophy and science.
82
 
 
In contrast to Popper, I offered Feyerabend, the protégé of Popper as someone who 
trained in science, was closely associated with empiricism as a philosophical position 
and understood the Popperian criticisms of logical positivism. Feyerabend though 
represents the alternative approach to philosophy of science, by thinking about it not 
as a question of methodology, but as a historical process. This approach requires 
adjusting our philosophical lenses and seeing exactly what is abstract in thinking 
about science as a methodology in the first place. As this approach questions and 
critiques the ‘science as method’ conception of science, which is also a direct 
challenge to its philosophical basis as a particular way of finding out facts, it tends to 
provoke a hostile defence. My use of Feyerabend was to illustrate a number of things, 
how a historical approach gets us to reevaluate ideas such as ‘Truth’, ‘Reason’ and 
‘Objectivity’. That a methodological response to a historical question produces 
confused interpretations, and that regardless of what someone writes we are free to 
interpret in a number of ways, that will also highlight our own philosophical biases. I 
also use Feyerabend as he stands as useful bridge between the ‘analytic’ and 
‘Continental’ traditions. For a simple distinction, we could consider the analytic 
tradition being dominated by the ‘spirit’ – an abstract, metaphysical project to know 
the underlying principles of Reason, Knowledge and Truth. On the other hand, the 
‘Continental’ tradition is dominated by ‘life’, starting from people and our 
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experiences of the world who are engaged in practices that maintain rationality, 
knowledge and truth. The critique I give of Feyerabend in the last section with an 
unsophisticated, literal, uncharitable reading of Feyerabend I called the ‘strong’ 
reading. With the strong reading the individual will not only miss the most important 
points of an argument, but that it will also downgrade philosophy as a mode of 
inquiry. If we come away from Feyerabend thinking he is a relativist, irrationalist, 
anti-scientific radical, then we may assume that it takes a philosopher and not a 
scientist to reach such conclusions about science.  
 
To show the direction I wish to proceed in, there are two bibliographical events that 
are instructive. The first is that in the ‘Library of Living Philosophers’ series, a 
notable absentee in the large two-volume tome for Karl Popper is one of his main 
critics, Feyerabend. The reasons for his absence are not clear, but one can assume he 
was either not asked or he did not want to contribute. Considering his vocal criticism 
of Popper and his professional association with most of the contributors such as, 
Popper, Lakatos, Kraft, Feigl, Maxwell, Aggassi, and Kuhn, it would seem strange 
that he was not asked. However, what I find more interesting is the reason for the 
book series, as the name suggests and is noted in the introduction. It is to ask 
philosophers direct questions while they are still alive to avoid ‘interminable 
controversies’.83 Schilpp, paraphrasing Schiller, in response to the idea that one has to 
necessarily interpret a work of philosophy, says,  
 
If, in desperation, he decides that all of the interpreters are probably 
wrong and the only thing for him to do is go back to the original 
writings of the philosopher himself and then make his own decision – 
uninfluenced (as if that were possible) by the interpretation of anyone 
else – the result is not that he has actually come to the meaning of the 
original philosopher himself, but rather that he has set up one more 
interpretation, which may differ to a greater or lesser degree from the 
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interpretations already existing. It is clear that in this direction lies 
chaos.
84
   
 
I quote this passage in full because it illustrates a number of points I wish to develop. 
There is an irony in that this quote should be placed in a large work dedicated to 
Popper who had developed the idea that no observation, like the reading of a text, is 
‘pure’. We come to phenomena with it already interpreted for us. Feyerabend and 
Kuhn were developing this idea, but it was also an a priori metaphysics that allows us 
to think that if each of us comes away with our own interpretation, what is to stop us 
descending into a chaos of competing claims? The answer lies in history and culture. 
Only certain interpretations are possible for each person, or at least meaningfully 
possible. What is more, the aim of the ‘Living Philosophers’ series fails, as can be 
seen from the controversy that raged when Popper  (as with most philosophers) was 
still alive. It is not in the overcoming of interpretation, as we cannot help but 
interpret, but in the knowing why and how one has arrived at their interpretation and 
the resulting problems that come forth from it. Hence, merely asking Popper what he 
‘meant’ is irrelevant if one is already pre-disposed to think and act a certain way. If 
this were not the case there would be no controversies, we would simply explain our 
positions and agree with whoever was correct.  
 
The second bibliographic event, and moving the discussion away from Feyerabend 
and on to Kuhn, is the published work coming from the 1965 ‘International 
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science’. This later became a 4 volume work, out of 
which came Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Popper chaired the debate and 
the importance of which is signaled by Thomas Kuhn stating in the first paper of the 
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book that he will compare his views on scientific development as laid out in Structure 
with those of Popper.
85
 The other two keynote speakers of Lakatos and Feyerabend 
had to re-write their responses to Kuhn, and all other contributions are re-addressed to 
Kuhn, and not Popper.
86
 We may also see a failing in the ‘Living Philosophers’ series 
ethos of simply asking a philosopher ‘what he means’, for even Feyerabend reads 
Kuhn as propounding a ‘theory of science’ of a sociological or psychological 
nature.
87
 That is, he is treating, what I think is actually a historical argument 
methodologically. These two events highlight what is most important for me, that 
language, belief and phenomena come already interpreted, that is, already meaningful 
and what interpretation we come to, is open to philosophical analysis. The beliefs and 
ways-of-thinking that we carry with us will shape what interpretation we form and the 
nature of the problems that will follow from them. Merely asking someone what they 
mean in everyday discourse is usually sufficient to find out what they meant, but 
when the discourse is challenging the foundations upon which common acceptance of 
language-meaning transference, truth or rationality are based, it would seem just 
asking is not enough. What is more, the very way we hold these ideas, the general 
direction of influence they have on us and what we take to be primary in eliciting 
descriptions of ‘reality’ will also determine how we understand those ideas.     
 
Probably the most important and widely read text in the philosophy of science is 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.88 What I allude to in my 
treatment of Popper and Feyerabend, I will develop further with Kuhn as the central 
figure. It will be argued that Kuhn can be read in at least two contradictory ways. 
Two polar versions can be constructed; one version is ‘strong’, which leads to bizarre 
conclusions, and devalues philosophical participation in the arena of understanding 
science. It is this version of philosophy I believe scientists and some philosophers of 
                                                 
85
 Thomas Kuhn, ‘The Logic of Discovery or the Psychology of Research’, in Criticism and Growth of 
Knowledge, ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999a), pp.1 - 24 (p.1) 
86
 This idea of interpreting events can also be seen in why that whole Colloquium happened. Sardar 
writes, ‘the purpose of the Colloquium was to bring Kuhn up against the combined might and criticism 
of the British philosophers.’ Sardar, Thomas Kuhn and the Science Wars, p.35. Whereas Fuller states 
that the Colloquium was ‘officially devoted to the implication of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science.’ 
Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History For Our Times (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), p.288  
87
 Feyerabend, ‘Consilations for the Specialist’, p.197-198 
94  
science debate over when they omit philosophy from public forums in discussing 
science. The other version is ‘weak’, which requires a certain level of philosophical 
‘literacy’, but gives philosophy a genuine role as a monitor of scientific and 
philosophical discourse. In the case of Kuhn, mainstream thinking about science and 
philosophy, I will argue, it is the ‘strong’ version that has taken root.89 What is more, 
as strong versions will be parasitic on one another, the ‘other’ that stands in 
opposition to ‘strong’ accounts of science and philosophy of science, are given more 
credibility by our overlooking the weak interpretation. For example, relativist notions 
of truth can only be sustained if one works off a metaphysics that sustains absolutist 
notions of truth. One can only get a form of idealism present in ‘alternative’ therapies, 
if one is willing to entertaining the hard realism of absolutist scientific explanation. 
All of which is just a confusion of philosophy as ‘realism’ cannot be proved nor be 
demonstrated, it is just a position one holds as a framework for how subject, object, 
mind and reality all hang together. This confusion, I argue, leads to greater public 
misunderstanding over scientific matters. In addition to using Kuhn, I also make use 
of ideas inspired by Martin Heidegger in formulating my ‘strong – weak’ distinctions. 
Again, I will not be asking what Heidegger really meant by his philosophy, just how 
they can be used to clarify or possibly resolve certain problems. Heidegger, like 
Feyerabend, is too easy to misunderstand as being anti-science, irrational or relativist. 
But like Feyerabend’s counter-inductivism, if the conclusion is too easy to come too 
then maybe there is a problem with our thinking. Whether one agrees or disagrees 
with my ‘strong-weak’ readings of Kuhn, or opposes my use of Heidegger, one can 
only really do so on philosophical grounds.  
 
To conclude this section, the direction and aim of the remainder of this thesis can be 
summed up by Feyerabend’s character B in Three Dialogues of Knowledge. In 
response to the incongruity between the ideal cases philosophy deals with and the 
messiness of reality, character A asks, 
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95  
What becomes of the philosophy of science if we assume such an 
attitude? 
 
B: It withers away and is replaced by history and a philosophically 
sophisticated science that can take care of itself. Unfortunately the 
situation today is very different, though there are signs for hope here 
and there. What we have is a philosophically unsophisticated science 
that wants to take over the place of religion and theology had before, a 
scientifically unsophisticated philosophy that praises it and is praised 
by the scientists in turn, a cowardly religion that has ceased to be a 
world view.
90
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Chapter Five 
 
The Role of Philosophy 
 
5.1 - The Effects of Philosophical ‘Literacy’ or Different Worldviews?  
 
The PUoS is thinking about science. It does not require the public to be scientists, nor 
perform scientific duties. I argue that it is in this thinking ‘about’ science that 
philosophy can play a role. ‘Philosophy’, however, is fighting an up-hill battle. From 
the failure to demarcate science from non-science, to the rise in anti-scientific 
thinking challenging ideas such as ‘truth’ or ‘reason’, all of which can only re-enforce 
the subject’s invalidity.1 In the previous chapter, we saw how the more radical 
sounding ideas of Feyerabend have concerned scientists enough to write on the 
subject. Here, as a response to the ‘Science Wars’ and the proliferation of relativism 
left in its wake, we have scientists reminding the general public of the irrelevance of 
philosophy to science. Kitcher remarks how books such as The Unnatural Nature of 
Science or Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrel with Science 
‘make it plain that distinguished scientists find large portions of the work done in the 
name of science studies ignorant, confused and damaging.’2 Sokal has accused the 
academic left of using the tactics of postmodernism within science studies that 
devalue terms like ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’ or ‘rationality’, so that any meaningful 
critique of society becomes impossible.
3
 Ever since Quine in Two Dogmas delivered a 
hefty blow to the rationalist project for how language and the world relate, it as been 
but a short step to the types of meaning holism and ontological relativity that signify 
‘postmodernist’ thinking on science.4 Here there has been a kind of implicit 
assumption amongst those defenders of science in the ‘Science Wars’ exchange. That 
science treated under the Anglo-American traditions of logical positivism and 
                                                 
1
 The conservative right of academia tends to view such statements with what has been described by 
Dennett as a ‘deepity’. This is ‘a claim that appears profound but is in fact a superficial equivocation.’ 
Dan Lloyd, ‘Popping the Thought Balloon’, in Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, 
ed. by Don Ross, Andrew Brook and David Thompson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp.169-
218 (p.171)    
2
 Philip Kitcher, ‘A Plea for Science Studies’, in A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodern Myths 
About Science, ed. by Noretta Koertge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.32-56 (p.32) 
3
 Alan Sokal, Beyond the Hoax: Science Philosophy and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p.107 
97  
empiricism are useful adjuncts to science proper, whereas, those positions on science, 
truth and objectivity, emanating from the ‘continent’ are pernicious and ultimately 
useless as a means to progress, if all truth claims are relative. Whilst the case against 
‘relativitsm’ seems a fair one, the attributing of its source in ‘Continental’ rather than 
Anglo-American pragmatist traditions seems less deserving.
5
  
 
The sort of philosophical practice that has been regarded as the ‘flagship’ for 
postmodernist ‘sloppy thinking’ is ‘deconstructivism’. Putnam describes 
deconstructive analysis as the ‘move from relativism to nihilism.’6 His problem is that 
‘instead of offering a formula which is supposed to tell us what truth is, 
deconstructionists announce that the notion of truth is incoherent, part of 
“metaphysics of presence”’.7 This quote is a reference to Derrida who, for Putnam, 
can only offer metaphysical discontent as evidence for ‘Truth’s’ incoherence.8 It is a 
move, however, to go from metaphysical discontent with a specific notion of ‘Truth’, 
to saying we cannot make true statements. Derrida was not stupid and could see the 
incoherence of saying nothing is true, in the sense that I should deny the existence of 
events, objects or people, but the sort of evidence Putnam requires is not the sort that 
can be given in a formula. Hence, Derrida offers rigorous deconstructive arguments to 
try and undermine the metaphysical assumptions that lead to thinking of ‘Truth’ as an 
ostensive definition, or even its negation.
9
 This sort of misunderstanding is not 
uncommon in academia, so there would appear to be even greater jeopardy with 
regard to public understanding, where ‘philosophy’ is relegated to coffee-house talk. 
For Ayer, clear thinking was part of ‘good prose’ and this is to be contrasted with ‘the 
sort of nonsense we get from Germany and now also from France.’10 Whilst a certain 
conception of philosophy aligns itself with the sciences, it, like science, has become a 
victim of its own success. Where science has the pseudo-sciences, philosophy has 
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what I would call ‘bad’ philosophy. ‘Bad’ philosophy is, for me, to ignore the 
limitations of ones own method. That if one is epistemologically rigorous and force 
analysis to the point of aporia or self-contradiction, these conclusions can point to the 
gap between thought and the ‘logic’ of the text or the inadequaye formulation of the 
problem.
11
 Instead, however, we try and close over this gap by further analysis or re-
telling from first principles, be it logic or meta-metaphysics. Rather than 
acknowledging the limitations of ones own method and what this should tell us about 
our practices, the invested interests of professionalized and institutionalized 
philosophy continue unabated with endless research articles. Most, normally stating 
something quite unoriginal or tediously dry in exposition, to the point that ‘some great 
minds have lamented that 90% of contemporary philosophy, including analytic 
philosophy, is bullshit.’12 For the sorts of scientists I have been discussing, they 
would raise this to about 99.9%. For them, the solution is simple, philosophy has 
nothing to do with science and where it does get involved it appears to muddy or 
obfuscate thought.
13
 No amount of public misconception of what Plato said will affect 
the truths of scientific endeavour. This is the place I wish to target, as it is not 
thinking about philosophy as a subject that I want people to be involved with, but 
developing philosophy as a kind of cognitive tool-kit to be able to spot when 
metaphysical claims are made. For this thesis it is the ability to tell a methodological 
statement from a historical one, and the implications of confusing the two when 
thinking about science. Rather than do away with philosophy we must defend the 
values of good philosophical analysis because if we do not interpret the world, 
someone will interpret it for us. By this I mean, without access to values such as 
consensus, rigour or criticism,  
 
we would still be labouring against massive odds of doctrinal 
imposition and entrenched dogmatic beliefs. More to the point, we 
should possess no means by which to criticize such false or groundless 
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beliefs and thus attain a better understanding of the forces that had 
worked to keep them in place.
14
        
 
Once we are in the socio-political domain the sort of philosophical analysis Sokal or 
Putnam has in mind with ‘deconstruction’ appears impotent in concrete cases. How 
can we address issues of poverty if nothing is true or how can we develop social 
health care policy if ‘science’ or ‘health’ are just social constructs or ‘texts’? This 
position works if we assume this is what the postmoderists or literary theorists are 
saying. Equally, it works as a handy opponent to re-enforce the scientific worldview 
against. Whether this is a result of not knowing enough about philosophy, or part of 
an incommensurable worldview is hard, if not impossible to say. Does Putnam miss 
Derrida’s point due to not reading enough Derrida or because he works within a 
tradition that is ‘incommensurable’ with Derrida’s conclusions, as he is ‘disposed’ to 
read him a certain way? Of course it is possible Putnam has just not read enough 
Derrida or is simply presenting a strawman opponent. This ‘incommensurability’ of 
traditions that Putnam and Derrida represent, however, it could be argued, remain so 
by ‘a product of selective hindsight or a failure to perceive the large areas of shared 
concern which tend to be obscured by differences of idiom and localized professional 
ethos.’15 This selectivity or failure of perception is what we all come with. For even 
before we have committed thought to paper our ideas are based in the world, as this is 
where they come from. Just as Putnam can (mis)-interpret Derrida in a certain way, 
‘science’ too, as a public discourse is also open to interpretation. ‘Texts are in and of 
the world because they lend themselves to strategies of reading whose intent is always 
part of a struggle for interpretative power.’16 The analysis I wish to present of Kuhn is 
to illustrate this struggle and how it does not just stop with philosophers or philosophy 
as a subject, but applies to other discourses such as understanding science. As part of 
my original contribution to knowledge I wish to use ideas inspired by Heidegger to 
render readings of Kuhn as an example of this ‘disposition’ towards one view or 
another. What-is-more, I will show that in understanding the basis of our 
interpretations, we are then in a position to resolve conflicting issues which otherwise 
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may remain latent in our metaphysics or act as device of persuasion when considering 
‘alternative’ modes of thought.    
 
So far I have been arguing that there is a mode of investigation that a certain 
philosophical tradition favours, where methodological abstraction becomes the only 
meaningful way of dealing with science.
17
 Yet, when the epistemic certainty and 
principles of science were turned back on itself, in the form of the ‘problem of 
demarcation’, it only led to failure of those very same principles. Instead of 
concluding that we may have understood the problem incorrectly, it was easier to 
blame the tools. Rather, if we think of science and philosophy as historical practices, 
we may understand why the methodological approach to defining science failed. As 
science is taught as a ‘method’, I believe it is for this reason that some scientists think 
they see the impotency of philosophy. Multiple attempts at defining science from non-
science in point of principle have failed and each time we may consider the tool too 
blunt an instrument. Yet, if like Feyerabend we claim there is no singular method, or 
that we might understand our relationship to science better, if taken from a historical 
perspective, one is accused of trying to undermine the methodological principles of 
science which clearly do work.
 18
  
  
This whole situation is a muddle about philosophy and philosophical thinking. To 
start with, the naturalized, realist, empiricist’s position, with which science is most 
often associated, is itself a philosophical position. There is no way of ‘testing’ to see 
if one has adopted the correct position. To think that any historical analysis is a threat 
to methodological ideals, such as truth, reason or objectivity or to hold oneself in 
relation to reality, so that realism and empiricism seem ‘obvious’, is also to 
presuppose a certain metaphysics. From a PUoS point of view, if certain metaphysical 
or philosophical components become naturalized into thinking about science, so that 
we no longer see them, all kinds of alternative practices and belief systems can be 
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established that are parasitic on those naturalized components. For example, realism 
gives credence to anti-realism, objectivity gives rise to subjectivity, rationality defines 
irrationality, and the binary structures (logics of exclusion) that allow for these 
options to seem reasonable. This is not to say one has to give up real objects, truth or 
reason, but a certain philosophical notion about them. For to treat something ‘as if’ it 
were real, is indistinguishable from it actually being real.
19
 The central themes of this 
thesis are distinguishing the methodological and historical approaches to science, and 
how philosophy can help us make sense of current claims in science for the PUoS. 
These are best illustrated when scientists attempt this themselves, which I will turn to 
next. 
 
5.2 - The Smolin-Susskind Debate  
 
An interesting example of the distinction I have been making and how philosophy is 
used by scientists, is given in a published e-mail exchange between two highly 
respected theoretical physicists, Lee Smolin and Leonard Susskind. The blog that 
published the e-mail exchange says that it is a debate by physicists for physicists, yet 
surrounding the technical details of the science there are fundamental opposing 
philosophical views of what makes something scientific.
20
 I will not attempt to 
comment on the science, but pull from the debate the distinctions I have been making 
thus far. The main crux of the debate is that Smolin argues that there is a version of 
the ‘Anthropic Principle’ (AP) in Steven Weinberg’s theory of galaxy formation. 
Smolin argues that the AP is unfalsifiable and therefore, not science or at least good 
science. Smolin takes a hard Popperian stance. Susskind replies, saying the 
assumption of the AP in Weinberg’s theory is not a philosophical matter but a product 
of common sense appeal. Smolin points out that ‘commonsense’ is local to the people 
thinking it and so it is just a circular confirmation of the principle. The possible 
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universe in which I think x is the universe that is geared towards human life. 
Depending on what scientists take to be relevant in a theory of galaxy formation they 
can adjust assumptions about prior probability distributions and so on, so the AP 
lends no explanatory weight. It is a description and not explanation. Smolin says, ‘if a 
large body of our colleagues feels comfortable believing a theory that cannot be 
proved wrong, then the progress of science could get stuck.’21 In its place Smolin was 
offering a version of natural selection of universes, where black holes act as the 
wombs of universes. He claims his theory not only does not need the AP, but is 
falsifiable. Susskind counters Smolin by claiming we still do not know what black 
holes are. Theoretically a black hole is indistinguishable from an elementary particle. 
Susskind then poses an ontological question, ‘should we treat every particle as a black 
hole?’ Smolin in his final reply has at the heart of his response Popperian science in 
mind, ‘the more vulnerable a theory is, the better science it is’ and we must ‘carefully 
distinguish conjectures from the actual results.’ Susskind attacks Smolin’s central 
piece of logic, implying he is a philosopher and not a scientist and gives a tongue-in-
cheek admonishment of an appeal to authority, namely Popper, a philosopher and not 
a scientist. Susskind then debates over what Smolin means by ‘unfalsifiable’, such 
that a claim cannot be falsified in principle or due to physical or epistemological 
constraints? Susskind then makes a telling remark about his view of science, that an 
idea is not worth pursuing unless it has drawn the criticism of unfalsifiability. He then 
gives examples from psychology, physics, and biology of once previously thought 
unfalsifiable ideas, which now are accepted as common place. Susskind also 
comments that for social reasons physicist will turn a blind eye to theory-evidence, if 
it does not ‘fit’ with their own pet theories. Susskind says that falsifiability tells us 
nothing about the way the world is, if science is only falsification. He references the 
creationism debate saying that two conjectures, one stating that the universe was 
created 6,000 years ago ready-made with the design of an old universe, is as 
unfalsifiable as saying it did not begin this way. Smolin’s position is easy to locate as 
a Popperian and therefore offering a methodological definition of science. Susskind 
puts his cards on the table by saying, ‘good scientific methodology is not an abstract 
set of rules dictated by philosophers. It is conditioned by, and determined by, the 
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science itself and the scientists who create the science […] let’s not put the cart before 
the horse. Science is the horse that pulls the cart of philosophy.’22   
 
Susskind, knowingly or not, has done a number of things. Firstly by giving historical 
examples of where falsification has not worked as a principle for telling science from 
non-science, he is adopting a non-methodological definition of science. That is, 
science is what scientists do, good and bad. He takes Smolin’s criteria of falsification 
to mean ‘observable’ falsification, such that we cannot witness universe formations in 
black holes, like we cannot witness evolution. This rehearses the old debates of 
empiricism and positivism, that one can simply observe facts to prove or falsify a 
theory. Susskind, however, after giving a critique that could have come from 
Feyerabend or Kuhn, then aligns the methodological approach of defining science as 
‘philosophy’. Yet his analysis is not scientific by concluding science defines science 
or science is what scientists do. This could easily be a sociological statement about 
boundary definitions or a philosophical statement about the limits of a methodological 
definition. 
 
This is one example of the methodological versus historical conception of science as 
understood by scientists. This exchange, however, mostly revolved around the ironing 
out of exactly what is meant by falsification and its implications for scientific claims. 
This is old territory for philosophers of science, but another more explicit statement of 
how science is more than its methodology is given by Richard Feynman. For it is all 
too easy to say ‘philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to 
birds’, but that is precisely the point, philosophy is not science, it is thinking about 
science. 
 
5.3 - Richard Feynman on Science 
 
Richard Feynman is noted and quoted for his dislike of philosophy.
23
 This is the 
‘received view’ of Feynman, but was Feynman so anti-philosophy? In a 1966 address 
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at the ‘National Science Teachers Association’, Feynman gave a talk titled, ‘What is 
Science?’ In this talk he makes a distinction between knowing (as an epistemic act) 
and understanding (as a lived relation or tacit awareness). He goes on to dismiss all 
the methodological criteria for what science is taught to be. This I take to be an 
example of how we are not committed to one interpretation of science and that any 
the ‘philosophy’ that scientists despise must be cut from a very thin cloth.     
Feynman states that teaching textbooks on science are the ‘watered-down and mixed-
up words of Francis Bacon’.24 Quoting William Harvey, he critiques the Baconian 
model saying that one cannot merely observe, but a judgement is involved about what 
to pay attention too. He takes this, however, to be an example of how philosophy 
seeks a methodological description of science and has failed. ‘And so what science is, 
is not what the philosophers have said it is and certainly not what the teacher editions 
[textbook] say it is.’25 Feynman, in order to get at the spirit of what he is trying to say 
about science, quotes a children’s poem about a toad asking a centipede how he runs. 
The centipede, in the act of trying to work out how he runs, falls over confused not 
knowing how to stand. Feynman likens the question ‘what is science?’ to the 
centipede, in that, in any explication of what science ‘is’ is more confusing than 
‘doing’ science.  
 
Feynman states that he ‘dislikes philosophical exposition’ and recognizes the 
‘difficulty of the subject’, so instead he chooses to describe how he learned science.26 
In fact, what he does is present what science means to him. Feynman goes on to give 
a series of personal anecdotes of where ‘science’ is present for him. He then stops 
himself halfway through an anecdote on the relationship between mathematical 
symbols and their meanings to consider what they mean in regards to science. He 
states that learning the meanings of scientific concepts is not science. The learning of 
what words and concepts mean is the act of teaching science but not doing it. ‘It is not 
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science to know how to change Centigrade to Fahrenheit.’27 It is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition of science. He describes concepts and words as the tools of 
science, but says they are not science itself, and that merely learning the meaning of 
words will ultimately get you nowhere in science, as all you will only learn about the 
limit of people’s imaginations. Feynman gives an analysis of a child’s textbook lesson 
on ‘energy’, which verges on a critique of metaphysical notions in physics. Feynman 
tells us that the scientific idea of ‘energy’ is so difficult to get right that any everyday 
use of it will derive incorrect inferences or deductions. The problem is that we use 
‘energy’ in a way that is tautologous with its definition. We may say that energy is 
‘in’ a moving object, but it is not ‘what’ makes it move. Yet if we wind up a 
clockwork toy we may say that it is the energy in the springs that are making it 
move.
28
 Feynman suggests that if you cannot re-describe the concept ‘energy’ without 
using the word ‘energy’, or a synonym of energy, you are then only learning 
definitions and have learnt nothing about science. He hints that science tells us about 
the relationships where energy is found but not what it is.  
 
Feynman offers a pet theory for how science got started, but by coming at science 
from the ‘doing’ side, rather than an abstract definition, his analysis takes on a 
historical aspect. He says that humans got to a stage where worldviews could be 
passed on without losing too much information due to our efficiency with language.
29
 
In this inheritable worldview, profitable as well as ‘mistaken ideas’ can be passed on. 
Science for Feynman is, ‘to find out ab initiio (sic), again from experience, what the 
situation is, rather than trusting the experience of the past in the form in which it was 
passed down.’30 Feynman, in attempting a definition of science, also then states that 
science is not its form. To say science is ‘this or that method’ is one of the ways 
science develops, but is itself not science. To copy or imitate form is not to be doing 
science, and from this observation Feynman says he can also re-define science as, ‘the 
belief in the ignorance of experts. When someone says science teaches such and such, 
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he is using the word incorrectly. Science doesn’t teach it; experience teaches it.’31 In a 
sense, it takes learning (scientific training) to be able to conflate ‘experience’ with 
‘science’ as ‘true reality’. To which Feynman suggests a kind of intellectual 
agnosticism, where science is the skill to, 
 
‘[P]ass on the accumulated wisdom, plus the wisdom that it might not 
be wisdom […] to teach both to accept and reject the past with a kind 
of balance that takes considerable skill. Science alone of all the 
subjects contains within itself the lesson of the danger of belief in the 
infallibility of the greatest teachers of the preceding generation.’32 
 
In these two brief descriptions on what science is by scientists I have tried to show 
that the methodological interpretation can be legitimately challenged as to whether it 
is the dominant interpretation over the historical. Ideas, such as starting from 
experience rather than trusting the experiences that has been handed down to us, or 
learning from the episodes of past as to what is ‘unfalsifiable’, are not necessarily 
unscientific, but just an elevation of this historical aspect. 
 
Before I continue with these methodological/historical discourses about science I 
would like to restate why I believe philosophy to be important to understanding 
science. I will then explain Thomas Kuhn’s role in my thesis and how I intend to 
develop those distinctions I have made thus far. 
 
5.4 - The Situation so Far 
 
As human knowledge is not genetically inheritable, the further we press on with 
science’s investigation the more there is for the average person to know about. But as 
has already been argued, simply knowing facts about science is not the equivalent to 
understanding science. The direction someone is heading makes more sense if one 
understands where they have come from. Present scientific achievements need to be 
understood in terms of past scientific activity. Yet it could be argued that we tend to 
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do the opposite. We understand past scientific achievements in terms of present 
scientific activity, as if it were the same thing.     
Today, the current landscape of physics seems to bear a close resemblance, in some 
respects, to that of pre-twentieth century physics, in that metaphysical and theoretical 
ideas abound. The luminiferous aether of eighteenth and nineteenth century physics 
has made way for ideas such as dark energy or multi-dimensional universes. This is 
not to say they are a replacement, wrong or unscientific, but only that they bear the 
philosophical and metaphysical hallmarks that irritated the logical positivists. The 
inability to replace our current theory of gravity, as described by general relativity, is 
also another example of how science does not proceed by falsification.
33
 Closer to the 
day-to-day physics of mechanics or calculus appear more concrete in character, but 
still operate within certain metaphysical assumptions, such as inertia, causation, or 
space-time geometry. The problem is not that science contains metaphysical ideas, as 
arguably it could not operate without them, but that if lacking suitable training in the 
use of metaphysics or with the wholesale neglect of philosophy, we can get into all 
sorts of theoretical, philosophical or linguistic quagmires. From a public point of 
view, the understanding of science can only be impoverished by the attitude that 
philosophy is irrelevant or even worse, antithetical to science.
34
 This is not to say all 
philosophical contributions to science are valid, but the placing of methodology as 
primary to science’s historical development is to read events off as either having an 
invalid contribution, which we label as ‘mystical’ or ‘pseudo-scientific’, or any valid 
contribution as  ‘prophetic’ or ‘genius’.35  
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Neither science nor philosophy has the monopoly on metaphysics, but it is a mistake 
to think one is freer of them than others. A dogmatic belief in this has been called 
‘scientism’.36 I do not take scientism to be an isolated school of thought, but is part of 
a continuum of epistemological claims. At the one end, there is the denial that science 
says anything about reality and at the other, it is only science that can tell us what 
things are real or meaningful. Ryle used the phrase ‘poison-pen effect’, which is a 
rhetorical device where a writer invokes the authority of science to show up the 
illusionary nature of experiential knowledge.
37
 Science tells us that solid objects are 
actually mostly empty space at the sub-atomic level. If we take this to mean our 
experiences of ‘hardness’ are some how figments of our imagination, and what is 
‘real’ is the weak electrical forces of an object pushing against those of my hand, we 
are starting to replace lived reality with an abstract description of it. Another publicly 
outspoken anti-philosophy scientist is Nobel-Prize winner, Steven Weinberg. He sees 
philosophy only as a tool for clarifying the meaning of words.
38
 This is to place 
philosophy’s role as purely semantic or linguistic. Philosophy, for Weinberg, has no 
bearing upon what he believes he is doing. Science, for him, is ‘the slow and 
uncertain progress of physical theories toward an ultimate culture-free form that is the 
way it is because this is the way the world is’.39 The metaphysics that allows the idea 
of ‘ultimate culture-free’ descriptions of reality to make sense to Weinberg is the 
inverse of the metaphysics that can have reality as a creation of the mind or pure 
linguistic construct. With philosophy demoted to the role of dictionary, we may 
struggle to give a non-methodological account of why such non-realist interpretations 
are not valid. Yet, from the constant failure of the methodological account and its 
parasitism on realist/objectivist metaphysics, it is this relationship by which 
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‘alternative’ explanations gain their potency.40 It is between the poles of science as its 
methodological guise and science as unable to say anything about reality through its 
historical guise, that I find Kuhn as a useful mediator, to whom I turn next.   
 
5.5 - Thomas Kuhn  
 
Kuhn holds a unique position for this thesis, as he was a trained scientist who then 
moved into the history and philosophy of science, and his work has dramatically 
divided opinion over what he means or what the most important aspects of his work 
are. Kuhn started out as a scientist, who approached the subject of history of science 
and philosophy as an ‘outsider’. His main book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, as an explanation for scientific change, divided academic opinion on 
what is important about it.
41
 As an explanation or model for scientific change, it has 
also crossed over and influenced disciplines outside of the natural sciences. For the 
purposes of this thesis I offer Kuhn’s work in relation to the PUoS as: 1) to offer an 
alternative to the methodological interpretation of science, and by showing how this is 
constructed demonstrate 2) which ‘Kuhn’ one derives in Structure is a result of the 
relationship one has to the text. By this I mean, whether one is struck by the 
methodological or historical aspects of his book are, in part, a result of a prior 
understanding of those same ideas. How this relates to the PUoS is that which ‘Kuhn’ 
we enlist to help us understand what science is, will also determine the utility of the 
philosophy and science involved. There is a more general point here that the same 
effect is at work in the PUoS itself, in how it frames what science is and how 
scientists have perceived the role of philosophy.  
 
I will not be considering all of Kuhn’s work, but center on Structure as one of the 
most important and influential books in the philosophy of science.
42
 The fact that it is 
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so influential is one of the reasons it has been chosen. It may seem an obvious thing to 
say, but the reasons for its considered importance, I will argue, are the result of the 
interpretations that have been ascribed to it. By this I mean, the interpretations are not 
the result of what one knows about science, history or philosophy as a topic, but the 
philosophical baggage one already possess and brings to bear on those subjects.
43
     
 
Kuhn started out as a scientist, training and eventually receiving a doctorate in 
physics. He then taught an undergraduate class for humanities studies in the history of 
science, as devised by Harvard President James B. Conant.
44
 Kuhn was at Harvard 
whilst Conant was its President and Willard Quine was an active faculty member.
45
 
Conant was important for Kuhn and the development of academic and public 
engagement with science, which again was motivated by surrounding socio-political 
events.
46
 To combat public fears of science (nuclear research programmes), Conant 
highlighted the role of ‘seeing’ science happen. He thought that opening up 
laboratories to the general public would remove any mystique and maybe develop a 
sense of respect for what scientists do, rather than ‘arousing public suspicions’.47 But 
the idea that one merely ‘sees’ science happen is akin to the deficit model’s ‘knowing’ 
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facts. Yaron Ezrahi describes Conant’s ‘seeing is believing’ empiricism as being part 
of a wider ‘visual culture’.48 For it is not enough to be presented with science but it is 
how the public is involved in the justification of scientific matters that count. 
 
Conant found the historical analysis of science far more revealing than the 
philosophical, which for him and Kuhn meant, ‘analytical philosophy’.49 Conant in 
On Understanding Science shows the value of the historical approach by saying the 
answer to the question ‘what is science?’ is unanswerable in analytical terms 
(methodological), but can be attempted in historical terms.
50
 Conant’s take on science 
is just as sophisticated as Kuhn’s and in a particularly revealing passage says, science 
‘almost by definition, I would say, moves ahead.’51 As Swerdlow comments, ‘we live 
in a scientific age not in virtue of what we know, but what we do. Science must 
advance to stay alive, must advance to meet the definition of science.’52 Yet even in 
Conant’s time his courses received wide criticism as a method for teaching about 
science.
53
 Out of Conant’s curriculum came Kuhn’s first book, The Copernican 
Revolution, which had a number of important developments. Instead of treating 
periods of historical scientific development as only movements between conceptual 
schemes, Kuhn thought that the accompanying shifts in intellectual development were 
equally fundamental.
54
 Thus these groupings of ‘conceptual schemes’ can be treated 
as exemplars for how people conducted science, but within these conceptual schemes 
it tells us nothing of how we move from one to the other.         
 
From the ideas seeded in The Copernican Revolution Kuhn went on to write 
Structure. This, like his previous work, was influenced more by mainland European 
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scholars such as Ernst Cassirer, Emile Meyerson, Léon Brunschvicg, Hélène Metzger, 
Anneliese Maier, E. J. Dijksterhuis, Ludwig Fleck and Alexandre Koyré, than Anglo-
American scholars.
55
 Kuhn had exposed himself to antiquated scientific thinking 
where he began to situate this former knowledge as a historian rather than as a 
scientist.
56
 This move slowly began to erode his student ‘textbook’ worldview of 
science.
57
 It is with the publication of Structure that Kuhn’s thoughts on science and 
scientific change began to polarize opinion. On the one hand, it was thought Kuhn 
was rejecting traditional ideals such as truth, rationality and objectivity, long held 
sacred in analytical philosophy and science. This apparent rejection was then 
enthusiastically taken up by more radical thinkers, associated with pragmatism, the 
strong programmes of sociology, and ‘postmodernism’, as a new kind of relativism. 
This relativism could then be wielded against any pronouncements of authority or 
superiority by the sciences as an epistemic enterprise.
58
 On the other hand, Kuhn's 
emphasis on the historical, the scientific community, and practice reinforced an 
emerging trend toward social and cultural history of science. Here Kuhn addressed 
directly what scientists were doing and tried to situate their actions and thoughts 
within the knowledge and problems of their time, rather than reflect upon them from 
the present with what we now ‘know’.  
 
5.6 - The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
 
It is a trivial observation to say that Kuhn has influenced subjects outside of history of 
science. What is less benign is to ask why the same book has created such a divide in 
academic opinion?
59
 What I will try to show in my analysis of Structure is that, those 
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who take ‘methodology’ to be key to understanding Kuhn can then derive a Kuhn that 
is a relativist, irrationalist, anti-realist or any other of the more radical positions 
ascribed to him. However, if one takes the ‘historical’ aspect to be key, one may 
escape those radical positions, without giving up a ‘sensible’ understanding of 
philosophy and science.
60
 That is, we may preserve the special epistemic authority of 
science and find a useful role for philosophy. I will be mainly analyzing Structure in 
its three editions, but taking the 1996 edition as my main source.
61
 Despite Kuhn’s 
own attempts to spell out what he means in Structure I find it more useful to look at 
the reactions to his text, rather than any appeal to what Kuhn ‘actually’ meant. Kuhn 
himself appreciated his detractors more than those that wished to build on what they 
thought he was saying.
62
 So, put another way, Kuhn has more to say than is written in 
Structure, which displaces the author as having any privileged position on its 
content.
63
  
 
A number of things will be argued in chapters 7 and 8: 1) If Kuhn is read as a 
methodology of science, where we take the linguistic or epistemological to be the 
driving force of science, one can derive a ‘radical’ Kuhn or what I will call a ‘strong’ 
version.
64
 2) If Kuhn is read as a historical explanation of science, we can derive a 
‘moderate’ Kuhn as a  ‘weak’ version, and in doing so 3) justify a role for philosophy 
showing that this type of philosophical activity contributes, rather than detracts from a 
public understanding of science.
65
 Patrick Heelan also used the terms ‘strong’ and 
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‘weak’ in his hermeneutic reading of science.66 For me ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ refer to the 
metaphysical commitment we have to our ideas when interpreting the text. The 
‘strong’ version refuses to accept the basis of its own position, whereas the 'weak' 
version becomes a kind of positive, self-undermining practice, that we see with 
deconstructivism. The term pairings of ‘strong’ and ‘methodological’ and ‘weak’ and 
‘historical’ can be used interchangeably. Within the ‘strong’ reading this inability to 
acknowledge the possibility for its own origins produces a scale of methodological 
positions, 
 
that runs from slightly fretful realists anxious to defend their stance by 
making certain seemingly minor (though often in fact highly 
damaging) concessions, via defenders of a middle ground approach 
[…] to fully-fledged anti-realist arguments or out-and-out 
descriptivist/constructivist programs in the Rortian or Goodmanian 
‘ways of worldmaking’ mode.67 
 
In the ‘Huw Wheldon Memorial lectures’, Brian Cox states, in reference to 
explanatory power of science, that ‘as long as you accept that evidence is more 
important than opinion, then this is a statement of the obvious’.68 The methodological 
approach is straightforward on this matter. We look at the theory and the observations 
and see if they are supported. Yet from a historical perspective we see that ‘evidence’ 
is an ambiguous term. This is exactly what is at stake between the physicists Smolin 
and Susskind.
69
 For example, over the last twenty years the ‘hockey stick’ controversy 
over global warming has not only been fuelled by the ambiguities in methods of data 
collection, data coverage, statistical analysis, and modeled assumptions, but also over 
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accusations of data plagiarism.
70
 Cox argues for the authority of the ‘peer reviewed’ 
system, yet scientists can and do get things wrong, and with the added pressure of 
having to publish in order to secure funding, the scientist’s hand may be forced even 
more.
71
 Going back over history we can see how theory dictates what gets picked out 
as evidence. Both Aristotle and Galileo ‘saw’ the retrograde orbit of Mercury across 
the night sky, but evidence in both these contexts cannot be taken in isolation of the 
theory that allows them to recognize the motion of Mercury.
72
  If we do, it allows us 
to think that Aristotle and modern astronomers are both involved in the same activity. 
This was Kuhn’s major breakthrough in reading Aristotle, not as a Newtonian, but as 
an Aristotelian.
73
 Yet, the message Cox delivered, and is central to the methodological 
perspective, is the unequivocation of scientific terms like ‘evidence’, but could as 
easily be replaced with ‘true’ or ‘rational’. Why this becomes problematic for the 
PUoS is that, like Kuhn, how does one solve or address any of the methodological 
problems one may come up against when presented with the history of science?  
 
It was after reading Heidegger that I was inspired with the idea of how one may go 
about understanding those different aspects of Kuhn mentioned so far. It must be 
stated that it is Heidegger inspired ideas that are used in this thesis, and not 
Heideggerian ideas themselves. It was from my reading of Heidegger that I developed 
conceptual tools for separating out the methodological and historical elements of 
Kuhn. There is also a more general reason I have picked Heidegger, as with the 
‘strong’ Kuhn, he has acquired many detractors (rightly or wrongly), so it is with 
acknowledging his influence that we see how philosophy can be part of a practice of 
synthesis and adaptation. As with the strong reading, it is too easy to dismiss someone 
as radical or aiming to obfuscate, rather than make the effort to retrieve some sense of 
intelligibility in their work.       
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5.7 - Martin Heidegger: Introduction 
 
As previously stated I am not so much concerned with what Kuhn ‘actually’ meant 
but more with what interpretations can be developed and how we reflect on the 
origins of those interpretations.
74
 Do they offer fruitful interpretations of science or do 
they result in doctrines that cannot be self-sustained, such relativism, scientism or 
irrationalism? Another philosopher, who arguably has divided more academic opinion 
than Thomas Kuhn, is Martin Heidegger. Whilst Heidegger’s philosophy of science is 
fairly underdeveloped in Being and Time, it is through his brief description of how 
science progresses and some of the ideas expressed in Being and Time that brought 
about the genesis of this thesis.
75
 
  
Science, for Heidegger, means something different to the everyday notion of science 
that we might use. For Heidegger, any area of thought that can be thematized into 
objects for investigation is a science.
76
 However, what Heidegger, and more to the 
point what Kuhn meant by ‘science’ is irrelevant, as this is what will be up for grabs 
by how we read them. As Kuhn was not a trained philosopher and was writing 
Structure with ideas that were new to him, I think there are many philosophical 
themes in the text either not fully expressed or understood. Some have gained 
momentum, whilst others have been overlooked, which may be another reason why 
Structure has achieved the status it has, due to the many philosophical threads one can 
pick out of his text.
77
 There is the naive psychologism, radical meaning variance of 
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terms, the incommensurability of paradigms, or the challenge to the positivist’s 
conception of science, to name a few philosophical issues.
78
 The dominance of the 
methodological interpretation can be seen in Marletta, where he identifies no less than 
three types of incommensurability in Structure, but also stating that Kuhn’s thesis is 
one of methodological incommensurability.
79
 The other types of Incommensurability, 
as followed by Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey, are semantic and ontological.
80
 
Marletta chooses to avoid ontological relativism as it ‘is a complex position which 
involves not only the thesis of incommensurability, but also the structure of 
paradigms and the refutation of the correspondence theory of truth.’81 I will argue that 
if Kuhn is read through my ‘strong’ version, one will come to similar conclusions as 
Marletta. Here ontological relativity in science becomes very hard to defend, if one 
wants to save other notions such as ‘objective truth’. On the other hand, the ‘weak’ 
version will not only show how one arrives at the ‘strong’ interpretation, but also why 
something like ‘objective truth’ does not have to be risked. 
  
As my use of Heidegger is heuristic in understanding Kuhn my argument does not lie 
with what Heidegger ‘meant’ either. For Heidegger can be viewed as one of those 
guilty of paving the way for those radical postmodern interpretations of science that 
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this thesis looks to discount.
82
 To see, however, how Heidegger’s thoughts led to my 
use of him in understanding Kuhn, it will be instructive to the reader to know how his 
general philosophy sits with regards to science. In chapter 6, there will be a more 
detailed exposition of the central terms under use in the construction of my ‘strong’ 
and ‘weak’ readings.  
 
For me, a ‘philosophy’ that is merely a relentless debate about the existence of 
‘reality’ seems unsatisfying as an activity. It would seem more useful to be able to 
understand what makes such debates intelligible, rather than trying to achieve any real 
answer to such grand philosophical questions. It will be through Heideggerian 
inspired ideas that will allow me to create and analyze ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ readings of 
Kuhn. The ‘strong’ reading deals with a very narrow conception of philosophy and 
philosophical terms, whereas the ‘weak’ reading will allow us to expose metaphysical 
fixations and thus dissolve any antagonistic dualisms that come out of the ‘strong’ 
reading. One of these antagonisms is between the ‘realist’ and ‘anti-realist’ 
philosophies of science. Due to lack of space and its only inferred presence in 
Structure, I will not address this debate at any length. Suffice to say that to 
presuppose realism, which is probably the most commonsense position to take-up, is 
also to take up implicit metaphysical notions about how experience and language 
relate to the world. The denial of this is to make ones-self an anti-realist, idealist or 
instrumentalist. Yet why do they have to be the only other options? In the strictest 
terms I am a causal-realist, but I have no way of ‘proving’ this position. For this is to 
then fall into methodological discourse, which has to presuppose metaphysics that 
then become sustenance for anti-realist or subjectivist positions. What I am attempting 
here is to expose the possibilities for just such arguments, which means by force of 
rigour, evidence and logical argument we can side with the best case, which are all 
standards of the scientific enterprise.    
  
One of Heidegger’s main ideas was the division between being and beings and the 
priority of ‘ontology’. His claim was that we tend to understand our being in terms of 
beings, that is, the awareness that we are is understood in term of objects, which are 
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themselves not self-aware. For Heidegger, this notion of being is ontologically 
structured, which is how we relate to own understanding of our history, from which 
ways-of-being arise. One way-of -being is that developed by the sciences where we 
try to reduce the understanding of ourselves to neurons firing or an assembly of 
matter.  Where it gets tricky is that he wished to reverse this relationship. Being is not 
reducible to beings. Beings are only beings because we have being, which also 
involves the ability to interpret oneself and the cultural history that supports it. In the 
absence of our being beings would not exist. The tethering of being, beings and 
existence is crucial for Heidegger. Now to ask what being is, whilst a legitimate 
question, brings home the extent to which we are ‘methodologically’ inclined. This is 
exaggerated more so if Heidegger is treated with naivety, as to what is being 
expressed.  
   
As it is only people that can encounter objects and can situate things as objects, these 
acts are worked out beforehand in our tacit knowledge of what ‘existence’ is (due to 
us having an awareness of being). However, if we were to vanish, as Heidegger 
writes, ‘what would vanish from the world would be the capacity to uncover entities 
as existing and as the entities as they are.’83 Without the world of people, objects 
neither do nor do not exist, because existence in any meaningful sense requires a 
world.
84
 It is absurd to think that in the absence of people objects would literally 
disappear, but what would would be our understanding of them, which includes what 
it is to designate something as a being. As we are in a world, we can reflect upon the 
possibility of us not being in it and so when one says something like, ‘neither does nor 
does not exist’, it appears as a paradox. So it is pointless to talk about electrons in the 
absence of the practices and ways of being that give meaning to their existence. 
Heidegger’s ontological difference may then be put another way. Being is ‘a criterion 
for meaningfulness’ and beings are ‘the meaningful thing itself’.85 This now seem less 
mystical, but the problems one may have in understanding such statements, without 
descending into relativism or anti-realism, is where I see an overlap with Kuhn. 
Another example of how we may be disposed to read something as a methodological 
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statement is through the logic of something like ‘does and does not exist’. 
Methodologically we can understand this as objects ‘literally’ existing for one person, 
but not for another, from which it would follow that there is no objective notion of 
truth. Understanding a claim as paradox in this sense makes all claims equal, where 
we get the problems of irrealism or radical incommensurability.
86
 Many philosophers 
and sociologists have used this more radical sounding version to argue against the 
idea of scientific progress, the authority of scientific claims or show the irrationality 
of science.
87
 Not only has this confusion resulted in a number of spurious ideas about 
how science is thought to function, but also has resulted in unhelpful readings of 
philosophers like Kuhn and Feyerabend.
88
 
 
5.8 - Summary  
 
To restate my problem: depending on what my philosophical disposition is or what 
my worldview is like, not only am I pre-disposed to read Kuhn in a certain way, but I 
can also find vindication for my beliefs in that text. But surely a selective reading of 
any person can result in variety of interpretations, a kind of underdetermination by 
reading. This is true, but as philosophy is not science we are not looking to ‘prove’ a 
position but expose the possibilities for any such interpretation and thus show some 
positions to be more tenable than others. Hence, recourse to methodological 
arguments will only take you so far. For any decent pseudoscience can compete on 
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those grounds by equivocating over terms such as ‘evidence’ or ‘truth’. More to the 
point, this is what someone like Kuhn seems to be advocating. Yet on a more subtle 
reading we can bring into doubt both the dominance of the methodological 
interpretation and the authority of a ‘received’ understanding of Kuhn.   
So why Kuhn? In the literature we do not find the same fuss being made about the 
logical positivists, empiricists or Popperians, as any attempt to provide a 
methodological account of truth, or statement-object reference, I would argue, fits 
with the ‘worldview’ of most scientists. When ‘verificationism’ failed, it was replaced 
with falsification, when that failed it was demoted to a heuristic, at which point it was 
replaced with structuralism and metaphysical naturalism.
89
 Although I am not arguing 
from an instrumentalist position, I do agree with Bas van Fraassen that any theory of 
science that is based on formal logic or linguistic analysis cannot work. It is this same 
‘worldview’ that is extended to reading Kuhn that generates the problems one finds. 
Bas van Fraassen writes, ‘[p]erhaps the worst consequence of the syntactic approach 
was the way it focussed attention on philosophically irrelevant technical questions 
[…] solutions to purely self-generated problems, and philosophically irrelevant.’90 
Whilst van Fraassen is typically held up as a representative of ‘constructive 
empiricism’, his attempt to move the debate from an endless cycle between realism 
and anti-realism is still taken as a methodological claim that then becomes embroiled 
in another dispute about whether ‘unobservable’ is different to ‘unobserved’.91 
Another philosopher who has tried moving the debate on, with some success, bringing 
the traditions of ‘analytical’ and ‘Continental’ philosophy closer together, is Michael 
Friedman. Friedman has tried to reconcile Carnap’s neutralism with the metaphysics 
of naturalism, here he argues that Carnap’s project of using the methods of formal 
mathematical logic are to embed observable and theoretical phenomena in the 
ontology of an appropriate mathematical structure. Here we are not concerned with 
whether objects exist, but whether there exists a corresponding mathematical logical 
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structure that supports the scientific claim. Friedman tells us that the ontology of these 
structures is to be found in ‘the ongoing practice of modern physics itself.’92 This 
ultimate concern for ontology is what maybe links Carnap and Kuhn, rather than the 
surface similarities with language.
93
 
 
By using Heidegger, I hope to open ways of reading Kuhn and by developing 
concepts inspired by Heideggerian philosophy, look to see why someone might read 
Kuhn in the ‘strong’ as opposed to the ‘weak’ sense. Next, I will be discussing how 
the two readings of Kuhn will be constructed and defining those Heideggerian 
inspired ideas that I will be using in generating those versions. Then, I will go on to 
give two polar accounts of Kuhn’s position in Structure that can be read either, as a 
methodological or historical account. The strong version will argue for the issues of 
knowledge and language as primary to how science functions. The weak version will 
argue for historical act as primary. The ability to know which version one is 
interpreting requires philosophical training, and it is this role that I see for philosophy 
in a public forum. Moreover, the adjustment in perspective that the methodological 
and historical accounts require can be brought to bear on the ‘problem of 
demarcation’. This can be expressed best as the difference between the questions 
‘what is science?’ verses ‘what does it mean to be scientific? 
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Chapter Six 
 
Heidegger’s Influence 
 
6.1 – My Route to Heidegger 
 
Before I engage with Heidegger, I will first spell out his methodological importance 
to my thesis and exactly what I find useful about his work. I will then acknowledge 
the debates and critical reception surrounding Heidegger’s philosophy. Finally, I will 
address those concepts in Heidegger’s work that I have taken and developed as my 
own for reading and interpreting Kuhn.
1
 
 
Autobiographically, in reflecting on my journey into Heidegger, I realized that I was 
guilty of the same accusations I have brought against the ‘non-literate’ scientists and 
PUoS in their dislike or ignorance of philosophy. Originally my use of Heidegger was 
to illustrate what happens when philosophy ‘gets out of hand’. He was going to be 
used as an example of the ‘postmodern drivel’ that passes for philosophy, with 
seeming contradictions, paradoxes, pseudo-mystical language, and so on. For this is 
how I came to Heidegger, with prior expectations of radicalism, mysticism and 
general obscurantism. It was then in taking the time to make sense of Heidegger, 
knowing that he is frequently cited as one of the 20
th
 century’s most influential 
thinkers, and immodestly asking that maybe he is not all to blame?
2
 The breakthrough 
came when I realized I was not defending what philosophers of any age ‘actually’ 
meant, but in reading, making sense of, applying to modern problems and assessing 
those implication, we have the act of philosophy as a practice. This is what I was 
defending and trying to promote in a PUoS. An educational process that seemed to be 
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deficient in philosophical awareness, rather than demanding that everyone read the 
same books or follow a certain philosophy. It was also in retrospect that I understood 
how I came to Heidegger and had already dismissed his work out of hand, which I 
had accused scientists of, in not bothering to understand Kuhn or the philosophy of 
science in a charitable way. As I had come to his work already interpreted for me as 
‘nonsense’, which struck me as analogous to what I was arguing against in the PUoS. 
For I had been arguing that ‘science’ was already interpreted for people and the means 
to interpreting through philosophical thinking had been airbrushed out of the picture. 
So, a simple question like ‘what is science?’ presupposes a ‘what is’ that directs our 
thinking in a particular direction. I even found this present in scientists’ own 
understanding of other scientists. Richard Feynman has been typically held up as pro-
science, anti-philosophy scientist, which he is explicit about to a degree, but it appears 
to be against a very narrow conception of what philosophy is. In promoting his 
‘philosophy of ignorance’, as Feynman calls it he writes, ‘hence, what is not 
surrounded by uncertainty cannot be truth’.3 These do not seem the words of someone 
vehemently against philosophical thinking. 
 
It was from reading Heidegger that I have mined some useful conceptual tools. These 
not only helped me think about why I had that initial response to Heidegger, but it 
also gave me a means to read Structure and understand the divisions in thought it has 
caused.
4
 Also, in reading the philosophers that had been influenced by Heidegger or 
took issue with him, I noticed similar projects in academics defending philosophers 
from a particular pre-critical attitude towards their work. By ‘pre-critical’, I mean an 
understanding inherited by virtue of the life one has happened to have led, which for 
me, was ‘Heidegger as Nazi’, without ever having read Heidegger or had him 
explained to me. ‘Pre-critical’ may also include a knowledge that is second-hand as 
filtered by a tradition, which may make us pre-disposed to read a philosopher a 
certain way. This, however, does not mean we cannot overcome the traditions we 
come from, if we allow philosophy to work as a kind of self-undermining practice. 
So, like my defending a certain reading of Kuhn as being more credible than a radical 
‘postmodernist’ position, I see other academics battling to keep credible readings of 
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other philosophers. Here I have great sympathy with the works of philosophers like 
Michael Friedman, Christopher Norris, and Pierre Hadot, who look to clarify thought 
and use philosophy as means to combat ‘sloppy thinking’, not propagate it.5 
 
What I found most instructive in Heidegger and Being and Time, for reading Kuhn, is 
the conceptual separation of what I have been calling the historical and 
methodological perspectives. It was only through reading Heidegger and 
understanding the consideration we should give to the historical account, such that we 
always start with being, which is the being of a living person, who is not just alive, 
but living in a time, with customs, ideas, beliefs, and so on. What I also took from 
Heidegger is how traditional philosophy has always sought to suppress the priority of 
being in favour of an abstract account of beings, which I have been calling the 
methodological view. Where we are able to view the world and ourselves as existing 
like ‘things’, neutral, indifferent, timeless, and from this state-of-affairs try and work 
out the abstract rules for all existence or reality. This key notion is expressed in 
Heideggerian language as ‘ontological difference’.6 What this mean for us, is that 
what I have termed the ‘strong’ reading, is to be aligned with the ‘methodological’ 
perspective, or to start from beings (things). What I have termed the ‘weak’ reading, 
can be aligned with ‘historical’ perspective, or that of being. As this might sound a 
little vague it can be understood, as Sembera defines it, as a ‘criterion for 
meaningfulness’, which is bound to historical-cultural context.7  
 
It must be re-stated that I am not offering a theory of science or a philosophy of 
science but offering a heuristic role for the concepts I have derived from Heidegger’s 
philosophy. Where philosophy ‘gets out of hand’, is where it sees itself as a 
competing or completing the methodology of science, as an equivalent discourse. I do 
not want to offer a ‘Heideggerian’ account of Kuhn or science but only take what is 
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relevant for my purposes, that is, we can either begin with an abstract account that 
includes people or we can begin with people who create abstract accounts. Nothing 
mysterious or grandiose, but it helps us consider the implications for our conclusions 
if we understand where we have started from in our interpretations. These same 
starting points will also inform ones approach and understanding as to the point and 
value of philosophy. The sorts of questions asked in philosophy ‘101’ of the type seen 
in the Platonic dialogues and the sorts of issues considered as ‘problems’ in 
philosophy, seem to be a million miles away from the real world. Does anyone really 
doubt that the chair they are sat on is real? If this is what people take philosophy to 
be, then it is indeed almost useless as an activity. If, however, this is the study of a 
subject to show how thinking and problems are constrained by social-historical 
factors, then it is of use. If we are looking for reasons how a question like ‘is the chair 
real?’ even becomes a meaningful problem, we are half way to finding the answer. If, 
however, we are actually just trying find out if the chair is real or why we can doubt 
such a proposition, then not much is going to get illuminated, or as the saying goes 
‘the game is not worth the candle’. What is worth the candle is the new interpretations 
and understandings that come to bear, not just in what philosophers ‘meant’, but the 
activity of philosophy itself, which then opens up news ways of thinking. In my case 
it has been to develop ideas inspired by Heidegger and construct ways of reading 
Kuhn and why one reading tends to dominate. The effects of a dominant interpretation 
means it takes over until it is understood as just fact, which means we are having 
things interpreted for us, which while not always bad, is a slippery slope to ‘thinking’ 
being thought for us. Where on completion philosophy disappears. If we have means 
for ‘thought’ to undermine itself, philosophy will always be relevant in creating and 
producing new ways of understanding. This procedure of getting ‘thought’ to 
undermine itself is part of the tradition of deconstruction. Whilst I will not draw 
exclusively on literary theory or literary criticism, I do find parallel conclusions in the 
deconstructivist literature, such as literal-metaphor inversion. This will be explained 
as I construct the two readings. 
 
With the methodological and historical distinction in mind, I wish to reconsider the 
responses to the PoD. A PUoS that understands the question ‘what is science?’ from a 
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methodological standpoint, will only encounter further philosophical pseudo-
problems, either in the logic by which science proceeds or how unfalsifiable we are 
allowing our assumptions to be.
8
 Rather, if we take up the historical stance and ask 
‘what does it mean to be acting scientifically?’ such that all actions of scientists are 
embedded in a given culture and location in time, we find that such problems do not 
arise. What is more, if we wish to push further with the interpretation, it is in the 
historical analysis that we find the conditions for such philosophical problems. For 
science is whatever scientists do; as Susskind concisely puts it, methodology ‘is 
conditioned by, and determined by, the science itself and the scientists who create the 
science.’9 Or as Feynman says, ‘to find out ab initiio (sic), again from experience, 
what the situation is, rather than trusting the experience of the past in the form in 
which it was passed down.’10 These, however, tend to occur only at times of 
revolutionary science where science is ‘inevitably dependent upon philosophical 
questioning’.11 This is not to say that the methodological approach is wrong, for it is 
definitely the best way of organizing routine scientific practice, but asking and 
understanding what science is is not doing science. We only constrain our own ability 
to interpret if we give credence to only one view, which tends to think about science 
as it is organized, that is, methodologically.    
 
Next I will briefly consider the reception of Kuhn’s Structure. It is in the reception 
and criticisms it received that we may also start to uncover the conditions for what I 
have called the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ readings.   
 
6.2 - From Kuhn to Heidegger 
 
What I will develop as the ‘strong’ reading in chapter 7 can be recognized by a 
number of characteristics, which conclude that Kuhn’s leading ideas, were either 
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absurd, contradictory, trivial or just wrong. Shapere, in the first review of Structure, 
was highly critical of the idea of ‘paradigms’ and their inability to be formally 
expressed.
12
 Scheffler gives an eleven-point critique of Kuhn’s ideas and argues 
against the metaphors of psychological, political and religious conversion.
13
 Indeed, it 
is not hard to see why Kuhn generated these responses. For he worked at a time when 
industrialized ‘Big-Science’ was becoming the standard model for practicing 
scientists.  
Not only was Structure not well received by scientists, but also by fellow 
philosophers of science, describing it as ‘unoriginal, dry and confused.’14 After this 
first round of academic exchange, a more considered voice was raised in his defense. 
Though there is vagueness with Kuhn’s terminology and use, what was taken to be 
the most persuasive parts of Structure were considered both ‘obvious and 
insignificant’.15 To read Structure as a methodological statement about science would 
prompt these responses. If we take methodology as only being able to tell us what we 
can know with any certainty, given certain methodological constraints – it is then 
implicitly tied to epistemology. Once our discussion starts with epistemology, we are 
then on a sliding scale of how knowledge makes contact with the world. The stronger 
the reading of Kuhn, the more bizarre the conclusions that can be offered.  It was this 
image of Kuhn that people either rallied against or endorsed, but did so from a pre-
existing tradition. In Britain, Kuhn’s rejection of falsification as a means of scientific 
progression was regarded as an anti-positivistic challenge. On the other hand, with 
Kuhn’s endorsement from Carnap, one can read his efforts completely in line with the 
logical positivists, such as an informal development of the relativized a priori.
16
 For 
others, Kuhn’s apparent relativistic take on the truth of paradigms is widely 
applicable.
17
 Still today, Kuhn the radical, relativist or the irrationalist can be found in 
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academia and deployed by groups who may have an vested interest in undermining 
scientific authority.
18
 For with not much effort or training in philosophy, one can take 
from Kuhn a face-value reading of a concept like ‘paradigm’. This can then be 
translated ‘into a range of roughly equivalent ideas which exploit its [paradigm’s] 
more extreme cultural-relativist implications while ignoring (or dismissing) those 
aspects of his theory that resist such assimilative treatment.’19 Ultimately it is not the 
concepts that get exploited, but the people who uncritically take on second-hand 
accounts of what Kuhn ‘meant’.  
 
Structure was, in part, written out of a reaction to what Kuhn saw as an anachronistic 
reading of past thinkers and scientists. The story of science as told by ‘textbook’ 
science education and by a certain philosophical tradition, gave the impression that 
science was a linear progression, from one great discovery to the next, usually by 
individuals gaining closer access to the ‘Truth’.20 Kuhn’s own ideas on the 
development of science were galvanized when he studied the European schools of 
thought, that had a tradition of treating ideas in their own historical context. Kuhn 
begins Structure by framing some of his ideas within established neo-Kantian 
traditions of people like Koyré and Meyerson.
21
 Kuhn, himself, notes that there are 
‘philosophical implications’ for Structure’s historical orientation, but those 
implications are double edged.
22
 He first claims that any scepticism detected in 
Structure is directed towards a ‘philosophical attitude’ rather than ‘any one of its fully 
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articulated expressions.’23 What is not articulated, and which I hope to elaborate on, is 
the ‘philosophical attitudes’ of scientists and the metaphysics underlying those 
commonsense notions of ‘Truth’, ‘Reason’, and ‘Objectivity’, rather than trying to 
undermine or prove any one philosophical, historical or scientific account. 
 
From a mixture of Kuhn’s lack of philosophical training, and working between 
Anglo-American and European traditions from the history of science, we get a tension 
between the methodological and historical in Structure. The ‘weak’ reader of Kuhn 
will tend to empathize with the historical view more, where Structure is understood as 
revealing science to be a historical phenomenon that does not conform to its 
methodological descriptions. Mary Hesse, for example, in her review of Structure said 
that, ‘one can find many ideas typically ascribed to Kuhn and Structure in well-known 
scholarly work’, which range from philosophy of science to historiography to 
sociology of scientific knowledge.
24
 Hesse claims that Structure’s main contribution 
is the ‘historical pattern’ it draws, but I think that his ‘pattern’ can be different for 
each of us due to our prior understanding of ideas or the interpretations we inherit. 
 
Whilst the use of Heidegger for me is purely heuristic in reading Kuhn, I will still 
have to acknowledge the reception and problems Heidegger has generated. If this 
were a thesis on Heidegger it is arguable whether I could achieve my aim in opening 
up the interpretations of science, or at least recognizing why we have the ones we do. 
For ‘meaning’ in Heidegger can be to return ‘back to its proper, self-identical core’ in 
being.
25
 I would say, though it is not my aim to prove it here, that just like Kuhn, 
Heidegger too suffers from a ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ reading. I will only allude to this in 
the background literature and the variety of responses he has received, before staking 
out those concepts that I will be applying to Structure.  
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6.3 - The Critical Reception of Heidegger 
 
It could be viewed as poor methodology to use an example that is regarded as being 
more complex, unintelligible, or obscure than the thing I am trying to illuminate. The 
worry is that I become ‘lost’ in Heidegger or slip unaware into Heideggerian-
neologisms, assuming they make sense.
26
 Just the language alone is daunting as 
Mulhull writes Heidegger’s German rendered into English makes for a ‘tortured 
intensity of prose’.27 Yet we do not stop at something just because it is hard. In 
looking at where Heidegger came from, when he was writing, who he was addressing, 
why he uses the phrases he does and the subsequent path his work took into the 
English speaking world, a story can be told that makes sense of the reputation he has 
gathered. It was from this reputation that Heidegger had figured in my pre-critical 
understanding of him. For example, Edwards takes Heidegger to task on his apparent 
failure to grasp Russell’s ‘existence is not a predicate’ argument.28 Yet, any time 
spent reading Heiegger and his surrounding works, we see that he not only was well 
acquainted with the problem in Aristotle, but also in Kant’s original formulation. 
Moreover, logic was a major component of Heidegger’s doctoral thesis, along with 
mathematics and medieval history.
29
 So, regardless of whether he is right or wrong, a 
simple dismissal of Heidegger and his ability to grasp the logic of the argument seems 
a little premature. This leads Edwards to say that Heidegger’s faulty understanding of 
being is a ‘pseudo-inquiry and his quest a non-starter.’30 Edwards’ attitude is not 
uncommon in the literature. John Searle says, ‘most philosophers in the Anglo-
American tradition seem to think that Heidegger was an obscurantist muddle-head at 
best or an unregenerated Nazi at worst.’31 Heidegger’s Nazism tends to be the 
‘elephant in the room’, but for my purposes his political and moral convictions play 
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no more of a role than Feyerabend’s past involvement with Nazism did. What is more 
it goes to show that no person is above their cultural-historical situation. Blattner says 
that Heidegger’s ‘turn’,  
 
away from traditional philosophy and its logical methods makes 
Heidegger almost unintelligible to mainstream academic philosophers 
trained in traditional philosophy, especially those reared on formal 
logic and the generally empiricist epistemology that is standard fare in 
the world of English-speaking philosophy.
32
  
 
Wrathall says, ‘philosophers with analytical sensibilities often see Heidegger as a 
throw-back to the bad old days of metaphysical (i.e., unscientific) speculation – an 
appearance only heightened by his seeming inability or refusal to make clear, logical, 
analytical arguments.
33
 Heidegger’s reception as a champion of anti-science, 
speculative, big question philosophy has been attributed to Werner Brock, who first 
published the English translations of Heidegger’s work.34 Heidegger can be 
considered problematic for a certain population due to his assertion that ‘being’ is not 
based in propositional, logical, or representational modes. Most Heidegger scholars 
refer back to him either as part of early or later bodies of work. The early Heidegger, 
under influence from Husserl, argued for philosophy as an ‘absolute’ science, whereas 
the later Heidegger rejected this position as absurd.
35
 Heidegger, near the end of his 
career, turned to art and poetry, which has been regarded as belonging to his 
‘mystical’ turn.36 
 
For all the negative criticism of Heidegger (rightly or wrongly), he is still massively 
influential in his own right, as a thinker. His ideas impacting way beyond philosophy 
into fields such as, architectural theory, cultural criticism, literary criticism, theology, 
psychotherapy, and cognitive science. Just to show that Heidegger does not escape 
from the same sorts of intepretation problems found in Kuhn, without getting too 
involved in Heidegger scholarship, we see in Glazebrook’s reading of Heidegger’s 
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thoughts on science ‘as a philosophy of science.’37 Whereas, William J. Richardson 
argues that Heidegger ‘offers no philosophy of science’.38 Indeed, ‘on the longest day 
he ever lived, Heidegger could never be called a philosopher of science.’39 This 
division of reading extends throughout the literature on Heidegger, from the emphasis 
he placed on practice over theory, or the body over the social, to his conception of 
‘truth’.40 Blattner gives a two reading account of Heidegger’s rejection of the realist-
idealist debate. One reading he calls ‘deflationary’ and the other the ‘robust’ 
reading.
41
 Whilst the reasons for these interpretations could occupy a thesis in itself, I 
am just letting it be known that any recourse to what Heidegger ‘actually’ meant is 
not relevant for me.  
 
6.4 - The Post-Positivistic Philosophy of Science 
 
Where Heidegger and Kuhn have shared ground is in the post-positivist philosophy of 
science, through works of philosophers like Caputo, Heelan, Kockelmans and 
Rouse.
42
 This relationship and direction of influences are not necessarily in 
chronological order either.
43
 At the same time there have been substantial works on 
Heidegger that fail to include a single essay on his thoughts about science.
44
 More 
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recently, the work of Ginev has explored the theme I wish to take up with Kuhn in 
addressing two accounts of how he can be read. His analysis is exclusively of Kuhn’s 
notions of ‘normal science’. The two readings he calls ‘the tradition-bound and 
framework reading of normal science’, which ‘are not only two opposite 
philosophical interpretations of Kuhn’s ideas, but two conflicting tendencies in 
Kuhn’s thoughts.’45 Elsewhere, Ginev has identified two general readings for 
interpreting science, one he calls ‘knowledge construction’, which can be loosely 
associated with my strong reading, and ‘constitution of meaning’, which would fit 
with my weak reading.
46
 Ginev through his take on Kuhn’s ‘normal science’ gives 
form to my two readings of Kuhn. He says, ‘the paradigm of science-as-practice as 
opposed to the paradigm of science-as-knowledge was initiated precisely by Kuhn’s 
elaborations on the notion of normal science.’47 It is by using Heidegger that I wish to 
push these divisions further throughout Kuhn. 
 
One of the methodological legacies Heidegger left the philosophical community was 
the project of ‘deconstruction’. This for Heidegger was a way of doing philosophy 
and we find in post-positivistic philosophy of science and sociology of science this 
general theme of separating knowledge from the practices that constitute the meaning 
for knowledge. In De Vries similar ontological account of Wilfred Sellars’ work, 
writes ‘the idea that some form of scientific image of the world is possible 
independently of the framework of persons, which could then be “joined” to it, has 
lost sight of the fact that science is primarily a human activity.’48 I see my 
methodological/ historical divide as fitting those categories, with knowledge on the 
one hand and practice/ human activity on the other. This is a means to yield 
interpretations that may help us think about science and philosophy. So those that 
have already given a Heidegger-Kuhn account become more instructive, once we 
acknowledge the traditions those readings come from. For example, Dreyfus gives a 
particular ‘Anglo-American’ reading of Heidegger, but also draws the comparison 
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with Kuhn. He says ‘Heidegger provides a sophisticated account of science which, 
like Kuhn’s, emphasizes the role of scientific skills and theory in producing data, but, 
unlike Kuhn’s, still leaves room for scientific realism.’49 I am not sure that it is 
obvious Kuhn does not leave room for scientific realism, or that Heidegger was 
arguing for realism in scientific claims. It is in how someone can understand the claim 
that Heidegger or Kuhn was neither realist nor anti-realist that we find one of the uses 
of philosophy. It should not be our first reaction to dismiss it as nonsense until it has 
either collapsed under the weight of its own claim, or the rhetorical devices that allow 
a claim to pose as meaningful or profound are turned inwards in an effort to 
undermine itself. The fact that Heidegger never achieved his aim of answering the 
question concerning the meaning of being is not relevant for me. In his effort, 
however, to answer this question, he developed a number of methodological tools and 
conceptual devices, that I will modify and apply to Kuhn, presenting ways to 
understand him. Whilst this could be a general claim, I hope to show that how one 
understands Kuhn will also impact on how one regards the worth of philosophy for 
science, and more importantly, PUoS. Next, I will describe the concepts I will be 
using as inspired by Heidegger. I will first explain what I have taken to be of 
relevance from Heidegger and how I have adapted them for my own purposes for 
constructing a ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ reading.   
 
6.5 - Ontological Difference: Methodological and Historical Interpretations 
 
A crucial distinction in Being and Time is the difference between beings and being.
95
 
In Heidegger’s language the sciences make up a practice that is ontical, if it 
investigates beings, whereas an investigation that considers ‘being’ is ontological. 
This difference between beings and being is known as ‘ontological difference’. To 
regard something as a ‘being’ (object) it requires us to take up an abstract relationship 
with it, that we might view it in terms of properties, categories, or attributes. The 
ability to take up either an ontical or ontological relationship with the world and 
ourselves is expressed by ‘Dasein’.50 The putting of ‘beings’ first we can align with 
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the methodological interpretation of science, or what I have also called the ‘strong’ 
reading. Being, on the other hand, is always the being of a person. So, to be a scientist 
is to be involved in a way of acting or conducting oneself. As this happens in a world 
that is historical, such that the world informs or makes intelligible (criterion of 
meaningfulness) ways of acting, the being of a scientist is connected to history. This 
we can align with the historical interpretation or what I have also called the ‘weak’ 
reading. Whilst my interpretation of Kuhn does not depend on ontological difference 
in the sense that Heidegger means it, ‘being’ and ‘beings’ are handy distinctions with 
which to organize the following concepts around.  
 
6.6 - Fundamental and Regional Ontology 
  
In Heidegger’s philosophy being is ontologically fundamental and is primary to 
beings, which occupy regional ontology. Fundamental ontology is rooted in 
ontological difference, that is, the awareness of being. Another way of expressing 
fundamental ontology is how we relate to own understanding of our history, from 
which ways-of-being (ways of acting towards the world) arise. For me, fundamental 
ontology can be aligned with something like ‘tacit understanding’, where we already 
have a sense of our world, which is beyond explicit formalization. Regional ontology 
is what traditional philosophy has normally taken to be ontology, in that it refers to 
‘what there is’, and seeks explicit formalization of it. As the strong reader starts from 
this as a meaningful statement, its origins are in epistemology and language. For me, 
it will be this methodological view that situates regional ontology ‘as if’ it were 
fundamental ontology and thus looks to ground its own account as being fundamental 
to the activity of science.  Here, we can only account for the activity and progress of 
science in terms of the reality it describes. What is more, for the strong reader we only 
get something like the historical account because ‘truth’ only finds its ‘real’ 
expression under the methodological account. This has been one of the criticisms of 
the sociology of scientific knowledge, in that, how can a second-order activity be 
‘more true’ than the first order-activity it looks to critique? How can the constructivist 
take on scientific truth be ‘more true’ than the facts it looks to undermine? Ultimately, 
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because the strong reader starts from a position of regional ontology, it will leave 
unacknowledged a metaphysics that makes sense of its epistemology, that is, the 
presumed model of how language, knowledge and reality all relate. 
   
The weak reader starts from a position of fundamental ontology or tacit awareness, 
which requires a world for this to be the case. It will be through tracing the historical 
developments of science that we see how science cannot be grounded in regional 
ontology or methodology, as it is this that comes under challenge when scientific 
breakthroughs are made. We see in the history of science that every methodological 
rule for conducting science is broken or ignored at some point. We also see how the 
background assumptions (what was taken to be fundamental to scientific description) 
are challenged in revolutionary science and become open to scientific inquiry 
(become part of regional ontology). Yet, science can be conducted in the absence of 
these supposedly fundamental ideas, as it is the experiences and explanations of the 
past that scientists are looking to overcome in generating new knowledge. Heidegger 
argued that, systematized knowledge seeks to cover over the ontological origins of its 
own practices, which has extended to the very question concerning the meaning of 
being.
51
 The similarity I would like to draw from this is that, the ‘strong’ reading 
seeks to establish itself as the ‘real’ version of science, where knowledge is a by-
product of following simple methodological rules, such as checking theory with 
observation against the evidence. As we are starting at the level of regional ontology 
and epistemology, we can re-describe events as the product of the incommensurability 
of theories, meaning variance of terms, or changes in psychological perspective. This, 
in turn, has given rise to the research agenda for the past thirty years in sociology of 
science, philosophy of science, and science and technology studies.  
 
Two more Heideggerian concepts that stem from ontological difference are those of 
‘categorical’ and ‘lived’ space.  
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6.7 - Categorical and Lived Space 
 
There are two types of space that can be discerned in Being and Time. When 
Heidegger speaks of ‘being-in-the-world’, we might think that this means a spatial 
location, such as tea in a mug, but this is to be thinking ‘methodologically’. Because 
we have ontological difference and tea mugs (as far as we know) do not, we exist in a 
different way to all objects. We are in the world in a unique way. Yet, it is perfectly 
possible to treat people ‘as if’ they did exist in this way. We may treat people through 
taxonomic, ethnic or gender categories, in order to say ‘what’ they are. In order to 
frame a person as an object or a ‘what’, science represents people in ‘categorical 
space’. ‘Categorical space’ is the abstract notion of space, which can take the form of 
co-ordinates on a map, geometrical representation or topological description. 
According to Heidegger, we do not primarily experience the world in this way, but it 
has been the quest of science and traditional philosophy to understand our existence in 
exactly these terms. This is to understand ourselves and the world around us, in terms 
of ‘beings’, part of which, is to understand abstract categorical space as being more 
fundamental than real, lived experienced space. ‘World’ here also takes on a specific 
meaning, such that we might refer to ‘nature’ or the planet Earth. To understand a 
person as occupying categorical space is to have them like the tea in the mug. Here 
they have properties, which exist in a specific location and time. Yet, to understand 
‘in’ in this sense is part of the tradition of epistemology, in which we can categorize 
and quantify the world around us. When we do make scientific statements they are 
expressed as part of categorical space. It is the methodological view of science that 
takes this way of expressing the world as primary, as it is necessary to the 
organization of science.  
 
The other way we can understand the ‘in’ of ‘being-in-the-world’ is not as an object 
in a physical location, but as a part of ‘lived spaced’. 52 When we say ‘I am in a bad 
mood’, ‘in trouble’, or ‘in love’ the ‘in’ does not refer to a spatial location. Since this 
is not a spatial location, the ‘world’ is not one either. This may be a tricky idea to 
grasp, the world as a non-thing, but these two ways of understanding the world are 
crucial for my interpretation of Kuhn.  The ‘world’, in the ontological sense for 
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Heidegger, was bound to ‘being-in-a-world’.53 It is only people that have a world as 
people exist in a way that no other entity does. ‘World’ in this sense refers to a way-
of-life or activity, such that we might talk about the academic, financial or sporting 
world. The ‘world’ here does not refer to the planet Earth or ‘nature’. To repeat, we 
exist in a way different to all other things due to ontological difference. We differ by 
virtue of the fact that our own existence is a question or concern for us. This can only 
be recognized in light of a world that structures our ways-of-being towards it. So the 
world, in this sense, is not a thing but a system of relations which we come to 
understand by our involvement with it.  
 
The methodological view around which we organize science has brought about a 
particularly successful way of understanding the world, culminating in things like 
‘objectivity’. It is in opposition to this that all other ways of understanding the world 
have been placed. So any statement about being ‘in love’ becomes a subjective 
statement referring to an internal psychological condition. Yet, Heidegger would want 
to say that these expressions of ‘being in love’ or ‘being in turmoil’ refer, ultimately, 
back to our being (a fear of death), which is a lived relation between the world and 
our awareness of being. Here ‘in’ is not a thing inside another thing, but refers to our 
familiarity with the world or the world as we ‘feel’ it. Being in love or in exile refers 
to a world that makes these possibilities real for us and indeed other possibilities 
unlikely, for they are historically and culturally contingent.
54
  How I am as a human is 
thus a part of ‘lived space’, so to be an ancient Egyptian Pharaoh was a real 
possibility 3,000 years ago, but it refers to a specific way of life that is now no longer 
meaningfully possible. ‘Lived space’, however, is made up of activities and practices, 
by people’s involvement with the world that structures actions as meaningful.55 Now 
other possibilities exist for ways-of-being, such as our digital extended selves that 
would have been a meaningless pre-Internet. Due to ‘lived space’ having a historical 
and cultural component, I place it with the historical view in contrast to the 
categorical space/ methodological view. It is the categorical/ methodological that tells 
us ‘what’ we are and it is the lived/ historical that tells us ‘who’ we are. The problem 
for Heidegger was that people often misunderstand themselves in terms of the world 
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or they mistake the ‘what’ for a ‘who’.56 Who I am is what I am. Yet, Heidegger 
wanted to say that it is precisely the other way around. We first have a sense of who 
we are as we are born into a world that is already interpreted as meaningful for us and 
we then learn to see it as a ‘what’ or something more abstract.  To place the 
categorical/ methodological as more important than lived/ historical, as a ways of 
experiencing the world, is to confuse an ontic description with an ontological 
condition. That is, as I imply a world, I can understand myself in terms of categories, 
properties, and attributes. This is an ontic statement. To say that my world fell apart 
after my dog died refers back to myself and how I am in my world. Not only can we 
confuse what I am as part of who I am, but the ways the ‘world’ is conceived in both 
these descriptions also become confused. There is the ‘world’ as a thing or object 
(categorical/methodological) and there is the ‘world’ as a non-thing or system of 
relations, that structure our experiences of who we are. Theses two ways of 
understanding the world are significant for our readings of Kuhn, for they can be 
related to how we understand terms like ‘paradigm’ or ‘world’. For Kuhn, a 
description of the world that involves categories, properties, and attributes is called a 
‘paradigm’. Yet, due to our tendency to understand the world in the methodological 
sense, we mistake ‘paradigm’ (what nature is) for the world (a non-thing) when 
reading Kuhn. To put it another way, the strong reader will collapse the ideas of 
paradigm (regional ontology) onto world (fundamental ontology), where as the weak 
reader will not. For the weak reader, the ‘world’ is what we have a tacit understanding 
of as part of fundamental ontology, whereas ‘paradigm’ is what our regional ontology 
is. Paradigms tell us ‘what there is’ at any one point in history. The world, however, is 
not a thing, but something that gives structure to our interactions with other beings. 
Where the strong reader collapses these distinctions, the weak reader keeps them 
separate. The very fact that how we describe reality has to change in order for 
knowledge to advance means there is never a perfect one to one mapping of what the 
world is and what our paradigms say about it. Some paradigms used to contain 
phlogiston and aether, but now they contain dark energy and matter. It is not that to 
understand nature or oneself in terms of a paradigm/ regional ontology is wrong, as 
we are human, bipedal, mammals and without such a mode of inquiry science could 
not be performed. It is that to only think about ourselves and the world in such a way 
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is a mistake. That is to say it may be the best way for doing science but not 
necessarily the best way for thinking about it. 
 
‘Lived space’ is what pre-exists ‘categorical space’, as we are always already in a 
world which we tacitly understand. We come into a world that is already meaningful, 
but metaphysically the strong reader wishes to place the origins of that meaning or 
intelligibility in categorical space. Raymond Tallis gives an account of these two 
notions of space in discussing ‘facts’, and also the conditions for either a strong or 
weak reading depending on the emphasis we use. Whilst we use the term ‘fact’ as a 
shorthand for ‘what there is’ we are actually committing to a metaphysical idea of 
‘what there is’. He says a fact is ‘not something like an object that is simply ‘there’’.57 
A ‘fact’, he says, is dependent on how we notice the world and how we choose to 
divide it up. So even on an everyday level my bedroom has the possibility for a 
number of facts, but that possibility is constrained by the world I occupy, or what I am 
allowed to acknowledge as being ‘there’. Some get confused here between social and 
natural facts, arguing that a chair might not be a chair in another culture, but neither 
can deny it as an object. It is this way of thinking about things that comes from the 
methodological interpretation. For in order to see just an ‘object’ one has to abstract 
the chair (something meaningful) into categorical space, so in the absence of culture 
or the vagaries of language we can objectively state there is at least one fact. Tallis 
says ‘facts are the progeny of a three-in-a-bed between my consciousness, my 
language (and the habits of noticing and dividing dictated by my language), and 
whatever is intrinsically there, independent of my awareness and descriptive habits.’58 
Depending on which element in this tripartite we choose to emphasize we then situate 
ourselves as a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ reader. For the strong reader it is our consciousness 
of what is intrinsically there (our consciousness is about something) that guides our 
language. The weak reader starts with our habits of noticing, that is informed and 
made meaningful by the world, which enables us to abstract the ways we are in the 
world so we can have something like ‘consciousness’, or make a statement like 
‘intrinsically there’. It is these same approaches that can either make sense or a 
nonsense of a question like ‘what is science?’ As we saw with Popper or any 
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philosophical criterion of demarcation, there is the implosion of science as it tries to 
account for itself methodologically. It tries to give the ‘what there is’ of a practice 
whose aim is to say ‘what there is’. Heidegger expresses this implosion as ‘no science 
can know from itself about its own fulfilled form of knowing. We cannot reflect on 
physics, as a science, with the help of the procedures of physics.’59 
 
There are additional Heideggerian concepts that I will need to describe, and which I 
have already alluded to, which are those of the ‘ready’ and ‘present-to-hand’. I will 
then explain these distinctions through the fundamental difference that I call ‘about’ 
and ‘of’ languages.  
 
6.8 - ‘About’ and ‘Of’ languages 
 
For Heidegger how we get at the structure of the world and fundamental ontology is 
through how we relate and use the world around us. Being is a kind of activity of 
existing. Existing and being in this sense implies a world (a non-thing). There are for 
Heidegger two ways of relating to the world that reveals its structure, the ‘present’ 
and ‘ready-to-hand’. Heidegger argues the origin of theorizing for the scientific 
enterprise is in the present-to-hand. It is an abstract relationship that allows us to 
distance ourselves from the world and to reflect upon it as a thing ‘as if’ we were 
absent from it, or existing in it like everything else. This is the essence of the 
methodological approach, that the world can be reducible to objects, categories, 
properties, and so on. Once we have a completely faithful description of the world, we 
have scientific reality, which tells us what there is. What the strong reader does not 
acknowledge is that this is a metaphysical view. ‘Reality’ is somehow this abstraction. 
The other way of relating is called the ‘ready-to-hand’. For Heidegger the ‘ready-to-
hand’ is our ordinary state of being. It describes how we are when we are involved or 
absorbed into the world in our everyday lives. Normally, we are active in the world, 
either trying to achieve something, get somewhere, or do something. In these 
instances the things we are involved with (our worlds) become transparent to us, we 
are not aware we are using or occupied with it. Here we are not inspecting the world, 
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as with the present-to-hand, but are busy using it. It is only when our involvement 
with the world is disrupted, such that something does not work as expected, do we 
then take up the ‘present-to-hand’ and abstract the problem. The more controversial 
point in Heidegger is not just that we have these two modes of relating, but that the 
‘ready-to-hand’ is more fundamental than the ‘present-to-hand’. 
This is because both have their source in our being, but only in the ready-to-hand is 
this origin made visible through the analysis of human being. In the present-to-hand, I 
treat myself as though I were an object, and thus my own being remains hidden. In the 
ready-to-hand, on the contrary, the difference between my being and the beings, that I 
relate too is part of the relation itself. This is why the majority of Being and Time is to 
show that there is a difference between the present-to-hand, and the ready-to-hand, 
and that the latter has priority over the former. 
Again, one mode of relationship is to abstract and the other is to be involved. In order 
to get to a point of abstracting we have to presuppose we are already in a world doing 
stuff. It is just that this is obscured in the present-to-hand and can lead to the 
interminable debates, for example, about whether reality is real or not. For Heidegger, 
at least, to have a relation to something always presupposes a ‘reality’ of some kind or 
other, whatever that reality might be. 
 
To align our concepts, on the one side we have the ‘methodological/regional 
ontology/categorical/present-to-hand’, and on the other we have the 
‘historical/fundamental ontology/lived/ready-to-hand’, all of which is a tension 
between being and beings. From understanding these ideas I have developed them as 
part of my original contribution to knowledge, in what I have called ‘about’ and ‘of’ 
languages. These will help me draw out the distinctions I wish to make, which are 
inspired by Heidegger, but do not use his vocabulary.  
 
An ‘about’ language we can align with this first group of ideas 
(methodological/regional ontology/categorical/present-to-hand). It is simply a 
language that is about something else. For example, mathematics is about quantities 
and their relationships, classical physics is about objects and motion, and football is 
about a game or sport. This language is always proposition/ discourse based; it is 
what science aspires too, that is, science is about making true statements about reality. 
Here there are already three fairly vague terms such as, ‘science’, ‘true’ and ‘reality’ 
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and yet I doubt scientists would disagree with this description. This agreement 
coming from whatever we are talking about being already meaningful. That is, we 
always experience ‘reality’ or science’ as something, it is already about something. 
This is what gives our practices certainty and makes ‘regional ontology’ its domain of 
description.
60
 So the ‘about’ language of classical physics is about classical sized 
objects, which exhibit a number of properties given the ways we are allowed to 
examine them. Objects that travel slower than light speed, and are more massive than 
elementary particles, can then be described in terms of things that are ‘about’ 
mechanical forces or constant mass. Other words for an ‘about’ language are 
epistemology and knowledge. Once we are at the stage of having developed an about 
language we are fairly certain in our knowledge and what is in the world. This is what 
science, in its methodological guise, aims at and what the traditional philosophy of 
science wants to uncover. How do language, knowledge and reality hang together so 
that we have these successful descriptions of nature? In addition to this, we have what 
I have called an ‘of’ language.  An ‘of’ language is how an ‘about’ language is 
realized in the first place. Just as ‘world’ for Heidegger could be a non-thing or non-
propositional, so too is an ‘of’ language. An ‘of’ language cannot be written, spoken 
or abstracted into symbols, but is simply done. Once we begin to talk about an ‘of’ 
language we have taken up an ‘about’ language. Whilst this might be problematic for 
discussing an ‘of’ language, if one can keep this conceptual division in mind, then 
what follows will be all the more easier. So the language of mathematics is proofing, 
calculating, completing operations and so on, in measuring and recording one is 
performing the language of classical physics and the language of football takes place 
on the football field. So before we can talk about ‘mechanical forces’ or ‘constant 
mass’, as meaningful objects belonging to classical physics, we have to be involved in 
an ‘of’ language that allows those ways of talking and acting to be meaningful. 
Science presupposes a person doing the science. For example, ‘even logic 
presupposes the disposition of the logician to attend to the purely formal relations of 
concepts or propositions’.61 It is the activity of logicians or how logicians are, that in 
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some way, inform what logic is going to be. It is the methodological view that 
abstracts to saying, it is the rules of logic that says how logic is, ‘as if’ it were world-
less. ‘Of’ languages are meaningful actions, produced by being concurrent with an 
‘about’ language. For example, one can only ‘drive’ in a framework that makes 
driving meaningful, which requires a world (non-thing).  
 
To elaborate further, consider the apocryphal story of the invention of the game of 
rugby football. It is said that William Webb Ellis whilst playing football caught the 
ball and ran with it. In the context of the game of football this act was not ‘about’ 
football, it did not make sense. It does, however, in the language ‘of’ football, since 
the latter is playing football. It takes place in lived-space with other people. It is non-
propositional. FIFA, UEFA or FA rules and the like are all ‘about’ football but are not 
football themselves. All ‘about’ languages are propositional or discourse based. For 
anyone who has ever played football it was not impossible to pick up the ball, it was 
just not permitted or meaningful given the rules they were asked to play by. In a 
situation where someone handles the ball who is not the goal-keeper or referee, the 
‘about’ of football is challenged by a new ‘of’ language. Here, we can either change 
the rules of football to include such acts or we invent a separate game, which then 
develops its own ‘about’ language. Now we start to see how two ‘about’ languages 
quickly become disparate. One cannot scrum in football nor keep goal in rugby. What 
stops us being locked into whatever game we are playing and allows change to occur 
is that both parties would have a tacit understanding of what ‘games’ or ‘sport’ are, by 
being part of the same world.  
 
We are primarily active in the world by ‘doing’ (of) and not involved in theorizing or 
abstracting the world (about).
62
 So the very possibility of having a regional ontology 
(about) is based in something more fundamental, the world, which necessarily implies 
activity (of).
63
 One cannot have an ‘about’ language without the ‘of’, but an ‘of’ 
language only makes sense, retrospectively, in light of the ‘about’. This first order of 
influence is the weak reader’s understanding, where we get the knowledge, methods 
and beliefs of science, without first having those activities that allow us to form them. 
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The second order of influence is taken as primary by the strong reader, that is, we are 
only able to discuss the activities of the past and what people do because of what our 
language and knowledge express about reality as vindicated by science. For the weak 
reader the methodological perspective is actually a comment about science, at given 
point in history. The language of science, which metaphysically is what the 
methodological aspect aims at, is in the doing of science, which is a historical 
practice. The strong reader, however, collapses these distinctions and understands 
methodology as the language of science. 
 
Ontologically, an analysis of what it means to be (of/fundamental) is prior to knowing 
what things there are (about/ regional). This corresponds in the shift from asking 
‘what is science?’ to ‘what does it mean to be scientific?’ From the former question 
we will get the traditional answers that most philosophers of science have given, such 
that values, virtues, principles and methods are specified as a priori conditions, if 
certain functions are to be performed. This tells us what science is ‘about’ at any 
particular point in history, but not how it got there. In the latter question we are 
asking, what were scientists doing (of) in order to later abstract a methodological 
narrative (about). Put another way, what it means to be scientific is prior to what 
science is.
64
  
 
So in order of influence, the weak reader understands that the ‘of’ comes before the 
‘about’ and the strong reader understands this as the opposite. So, a typical strong 
version of science would be: who I am is only possible because of what I am (atoms, 
electrical forces, a mammal). So the efforts of scientists to reduce something like my 
enjoyment of music or art to an ECG scan or evolutionary adaptation, is a re-
enforcement of this order.
65
 If science is to function as science it has to utilize its 
methodological interpretation. What I am arguing is that this is only one interpretation 
                                                                                                                                            
63
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.31 
64
 Ginev argues something similar when he says that the three major readings of science, scientific 
realism, semantic realism and constructive empiricism all imply essentialism. They start with the ‘is’ of 
‘what is science?’ Scientific realism posits scientific objects as ‘things’ and are reified by science’s 
theories and experiments. This Ginev says is a version of naturalist essentialism. For semantic realists it 
is the ‘semantic interpretations (models) of theory’s conceptual structure’ and the reification is of the 
mathematical structure. Here Ginev argues we are led to a form of Platonic mathematical essentialism. 
Ginev, The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism, p.24  
65
 Tallis calls the attempt to describe consciousness as the seat of happenings in the absence of the 
person living it as ‘neruomythology’. Tallis, The Kingdom of Infinite Space, pp.160-161 
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of science. However, as it is so dominant as an interpretation, any attempt to 
challenge it from a philosophical perspective is met as a challenge to the idea that 
things cannot be true, real, objective or rational, i.e., those things used by the 
methodological approach.
66
 Of course there may be some who do intend this to be the 
case, but it is only by understanding the philosophical content can one counter such 
claims. We find such spurious ideas in ‘New Age’ writings on science or Creationist 
science ideology. The paradox is that they require the fact that regular science works 
so well in order to legitimize their own competing claims. What is more, the fact that 
the methodological view is so prominent as an understanding of science, to the point 
where it is believed to be necessary for science to function, pseudosciences also adopt 
this view which, knowingly or not, come with the same metaphysics. So if we take 
‘reality’ to be what our ‘about’ languages are ‘about’ and what makes our statements 
true is by these corresponding to the way the world really is (as a thing), such that 
there is no difference between our ‘about’ and ‘of’ language, we invite philosophical 
problems. Whilst this hardly ever stops science from being practiced, it allows for 
rhetorical devices to be used in questioning the epistemic authority of science (if we 
understand this to be what science is). So we may be able to deploy meta-inductive 
scepticism about progress in science, which is intuitive enough for most people to 
understand, but sufficiently philosophically complex that most people cannot contest 
it. We also find that competing claims in pseudoscience require the fact that orthodox 
science works so well in order to give meaning to its own discourses. This may be 
evidenced by the plethora of New Age literature that have a titled pre-fixed with 
‘quantum’.67  The term ‘quantum’ is now shorthand, not only for cutting-edge 
science, which has allowed the modern world to take shape, it is also a legitimate 
claim in saying the world is not as we perceive it, and suitably complicated that not 
many people understand it.
68
 It would not be so bad if those propagating these ideas 
                                                 
66
 Kuhn acknowledges this in ‘Reflections on my Critics’. In addressing the charge of relativism and 
irrationality, Kuhn explains that he does not know what work the term ‘irrational’ is doing as a 
criticism. If by this we mean ‘unjustified belief’, then he says, to argue for it as a part of science is ‘not 
only absurd but vaguely obscene […] to suppose, instead, that we possess criteria of rationality which 
are independent of our understanding of the essentials of the scientific process is to open the door to 
cloud-cuckoo land.’ Thomas Kuhn, ‘Reflections on my Critics’, in Criticism and Growth of 
Knowledge, ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
pp.231-278 (p.264)   
67
 Deepak Chopra, Quantum Healing: Exploring the Frontiers of Mind/Body Medicine (London: 
Bantam Books, 2010) 
68
 This makes ‘quantum’ the perfect rhetorical device for saying whatever you want. But for however 
‘mystical’ or ‘Eastern’ some like Deepak Chopra thinks it is to ask ‘how things really are’ is to be 
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were demonstrably untrustworthy or caddish but people such as Deepak Chopra are 
trained medical doctors and hold positions as university lecturers. The relevance of 
this is how ‘expertise’ and ‘science’ are viewed by a public who many not be asked to 
understand the subtleties and complexities of science that philosophy brings with it. 
What I will want to say on our weak reading is that terms like ‘quantum’, as used by 
someone like Chopra, is not the limit of a metaphor but language that talks of ‘how 
things really are’ is.  
 
In the following two readings of Kuhn, I will continue to be using the distinctions 
applied and defined so far. For the ‘strong reading’ I will make synonymous with the 
methodological approach, that is, to put an ‘about’ language first. The ‘weak reading’, 
which will be synonymous with the historical approach will put the ‘of’ language 
first. In the two readings, I will reconstruct Kuhn’s concepts of paradigms, normal/ 
revolutionary science, and incommensurability to present two polarized 
interpretations of Structure. One will be the basis for an answer to the traditional 
‘what is science?’ question. The other will act as grounding for understanding why the 
question ‘what does it mean to be scientific?’ should precede it. The hope is that the 
weak version will present us with a better way of reading Kuhn, but also the exercise 
itself will give purpose to philosophy as a public activity. By analyzing what it means 
to be scientific, it is this understanding of science that one could not be made aware of 
if one only studied science as a subject or collection of facts, in ignorance of its 
philosophical content. ‘Good’ philosophy seems less about giving answers and more 
about problematizing the answers we already have. It is this methodologically 
centered reading of Kuhn I hope to problematize, by not only showing how one 
arrives at something like the strong reading, but by also offering an alternative. 
Hopefully, one should notice that we have a complete inversion of chapters 3 and 4 in 
chapters 7 and 8. In chapter 7 by using the same metaphysical commitments of 
Popper (science as methodology) we can render a ‘radical’ Kuhn who, like a ‘radical’ 
Feyerabend, is easy to dismiss or mock and with it, a certain conception of 
philosophy. This has the dual function of producing a ‘ready-made’ strawman from 
which we can support even more spurious readings of science, epistemology and 
                                                                                                                                            
involved with a certain kind of metaphysics. In this instance probably the neo-Kantian variety that 
enabled such things as the ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of quantum mechanics. What is more, the very 
idea of ‘mind’ in Chopra’s ‘mind-body’ view is a Cartesian hang-up. Ibid., p.102 
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metaphysics and denigrating the worth of philosophy as a public discourse for 
understanding science. I argue this is because Kuhn’s statements on the development 
of science, through its various stages, are taken as methodological prescriptions. 
Unlike Popper, this Kuhn is not elevated to the status of the scientists’ philosopher, 
even though at a metaphysical level he and Popper are committed to the same things. 
Where Popper wanted to downplay the role of metaphysics and any supporting 
philosophy, by identifying scientific statements that pass the test of falsifability he, in 
turn, galvanized a metaphysical worldview and a supporting philosophy that make a 
nonsense of alternative explanations. That is, if we presuppose science is its 
methodology (where ‘of’ and ‘about’ are the same) when we received a historical 
critique of methodology and its supporting metaphysics/philosophy, we may feel 
inclined to interpret this critique as an alternative or substitute for methodology. Here 
we are led to accusations of relativism, irrationalism, or subjectivism about science. 
So, inadvertently a Popperian conception of science and its relationship to the world 
not only plays up the pseudo-problems of philosophy, which it looked to conquer, but 
it downplays the usefulness of philosophy in clarifying problems, which it sought to 
do, by giving the individual a lack of options in thinking about science.     
 
In chapter 8 I give a more considered reading, as argued for with Feyerabend, where 
we can derive a Kuhn that is not ‘radical’, explains why something like a 
metaphysical commitment to ‘science as methodology’ does not work, and gives 
philosophy a valuable role in understanding a subject. This version opens the 
interpretations of science up, rather than pinning the individual down so they are 
forced to accept historical claims as methodological. Whilst this is the general thrust 
of what I am doing, these two readings are not addressed directly towards Popper or 
Feyerabend, but what they represent under these two readings. 
    
To re-state a point, this is not a thesis about Kuhn’s ideas in relation to Heidegger, but 
are about a Heideggerian inspired analysis of Kuhn. Through my use of the concepts 
laid out here I hope to not only show that ‘understanding’ is a product of how one 
comes to a text (a prior understanding of ideas) but that there are better and worse 
ways of reading Kuhn. At its best philosophy can help us dissolve the old 
antagonistisms of historical thought, but at its worst it limits us to one interpretation 
of those ideas which then turns back on itself, so that we give up on the enterprise of 
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philosophy altogether. Heidegger notes an expression of this problem with thinking 
about science, 
 
A fog still surrounds the essence of modern science. That fog, 
however, is not produced by individual investigators and scholars in 
the sciences. It is not produced by man at all. It arises from the region 
of what is most thought-provoking – that we are still not thinking; 
none of us, including me who speaks to you, me first of all.’69 
 
With this in mind I proceed to the next section. 
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 Martin Heidegger, ‘What Calls For Thinking?’, in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. by David 
Farrell Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp.345-367 (p.355) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven 
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The Strong Reading 
 
7.1- Kuhn and Structure – The Strong Reading 
 
In order to begin our strong reading of Kuhn and Structure, I will first set its context. 
In order to derive the strong version not much work is needed, which may also 
explain its proliferation. Kuhn, as with Feyerabend in chapter 4, can be read prima-
facie, ‘literally’, without much philosophical sophistication. I would hazard to say it is 
a ‘commonsense’ reading, but ‘commonsense’, like ‘experience’, or ‘reality’, covers 
over a range of philosophical problems, which we no longer have to engage with, 
once they are removed from our discourses as problematic. The term itself has a 
history that tells us more about what is completely uncommon to our experiences. For 
example, Aristotle thought ‘commonsense’ was a principle that governed our senses 
to be found in animals, as well as humans, but later developments of ‘commonsense’ 
have it as a uniform response to reality.
1
 What is out in the world is literally common 
to our senses. The term is intricately linked to philosophical issues, such as mind, 
epistemology, ontology and metaphysics, yet we use it in an everyday sense. The 
strong reader will forgo this and assume that each of us comes to Structure in the 
same way.   
 
As I am trying to construct an unsophisticated, ‘commonsense,’ reading of Kuhn, it 
will appeal to the methodological perspective of philosophy and it will understand any 
historical claims as a substitute for methodology. It will mistake historical critique for 
methodological prescription. I hope to show that a ‘traditional’ interpretation can 
account for the stronger and hence more speculative, or radical conclusions of Kuhn’s 
work. This is not to argue that this version of Kuhn is ‘wrong’ but that once we start 
limiting ourselves to one interpretation, that does not defend the epistemic authority 
of science, it at once also devalues philosophy as a practice.
2
 Here we may be 
                                                 
1
 Dorothea Frede, ‘The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’, in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima 
ed. by Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992),  
pp.279-296 (p.284) 
2
 As Alexander George says, ‘one’s judgements about the relevance of the considerations Kuhn points 
to will be determined by one’s position on the very issue on which these considerations are meant to 
bear. Kuhn’s work consists, then, not so much in a refutation of a certain Viennese approach to science 
as in a decision to proceed differently.’ Alexander George, ‘Opening the Door to Cloud-Cuckoo-Land: 
Hempel and Kuhn on Rationality’, Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy, 1 (2012), 
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ethically inclined to side with the weak over the strong version. For once we are 
unaware of how we arrive at an understanding we are open to intellectual abuse, be it 
scientifically, politically or religiously.  
 
7.2 - Framing the Strong Reading 
 
The strong version will take up a methodological stance as primary. Here the ‘about’ 
language takes precedence over the ‘of’ language. Just to frame the strong reading, 
here are some commonsense assumptions about our starting point. We exist in a world 
and science is the finding out of facts about reality from the ideas we have about it. 
We may simplify this relationship to the dichotomy of theory to fact, this being a 
central preoccupation with the empiricists, positivists and rationalists. Science is the 
collection of facts about the world, how theory and observation interact, and 
philosophy of science is to uncover the hidden mechanisms by which this is possible. 
Science is about how reality really is, not how we think it ought to be. We all have an 
understanding of the difference between knowledge and belief and the problems these 
can bring if we confuse the two. Nahin states that the pre-science of someone like 
Descartes was more in the tradition of Aristotle than any science we know today. For 
him Aristotle and Descartes were involved in wishful thinking about reality, that is, 
‘physics the way we think it should be, rather than what experiment shows it to be, 
arguments that today seem ludicrous.’3 Rather, we should always go with what 
observation and evidence tell us, over what we want to be the case. To view 
observation and evidence as ‘world-less’, such that one can simply compare 
observation, theory and evidence, would make Aristotle and Descartes appear 
‘ludicrous’ by today’s scientific standards. Carl Hempel articulates this ‘world-less’ 
methodological commitment when he says, 
 
The philosophy of science is regarded as concerned exclusively with 
the logical and systematic aspects of sound scientific theorizing and of 
the knowledge claims it yields. On this view, the psychological, 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://jhaponline.org/journals/jhap/article/view/1301> [accessed 16 Nov 2012] This ‘to proceed 
differently’ is for me the adjustment between the historical and methodological approach.   
3
 Paul J. Nahin, When Least is Best: How Mathematicians Discovered Many Clever Ways to Make 
Things as Small (or as Large) as Possible (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.105 
[Italics in original] 
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sociological, and historical facets of science as a human enterprise are 
irrelevant to the philosophy of science, much as the genetic and 
psychological aspects of human reasoning are held to be irrelevant to 
pure logic, which is concerned only with questions of the deductive 
validity of inferences, logical truth and falsity, consistency, provability, 
definability, and the like.
4
 
 
We could re-describe this as a division between objective and subjective knowledge. 
That the subjective elements of humans, their biographies, histories and beliefs have 
no bearing on whether a mechanism, inference or deduction is true or not. Kuhn, 
traditionally, has been understood as disregarding this relationship or split between 
subjective/objective, analytic/synthetic and with it the picture of what science is and 
its relationship to philosophy of science. For example, George argues that Kuhn’s 
dilemma is whether any historical case-study could force one to give up the idea that a 
description of what scientists actually do is grounds enough for saying we cannot 
conclude what they ought to do.
5
 This dissolving of the contexts of ‘discovery’ and 
‘justification’ is almost unavoidable, but how one arrives at this conclusion from his 
words, can be framed as a strong or weak understanding of the ideas contained 
within.
6
 For this reason the aims and approaches of chapters 7 and 8 fit well within 
the methodologies of deconstruction and hermeneutics.  
 
A strong reading frames all inquiry through ‘about’ languages. The inquiring mind of 
a person wants to discover truths about an indifferent external reality. The hope being 
that we can define exactly or describe the external world through a formal language 
(mathematics, logic, and science). A one-to-one correspondence between these 
languages and reality, in this model, is what we call ‘truth’. Truth is about the meeting 
                                                 
4 Carl Hempel, ‘Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives’, in Introductory Readings 
in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Robert Hollinger, David A. Kline and E. D. Klemke (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1988), pp.292-304 (p.293). Kuhn directly responded to Hempel ‘his work does 
nothing for me at all when I work on, say, the history of thermodynamics or of the quantum theory.’ 
Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientifc Tradition and Change (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p.12 
5
 George, ‘Opening the Door to Cloud-Cuckoo-Land’, p.1 
6
 The ‘inevitability’ of this conclusion merits that only so many interpretations are possible. For if there 
were the lack of constraint on ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’ or ‘reason’ that the strong reading of Kuhn implies 
the very medium contradicts the message. As Derrida writes, ‘[a deconstructive reading] must always 
aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does 
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up of discourse with world. Again, there is something very plausible about this. What 
is at stake in this model is how we know our methods of inquiry are reliable, 
removing the subjective content of our psyches, and the influence of culture or beliefs 
as bias? Slowly, ‘science’ has condensed as our finest example of inquiry into the true 
nature of reality. Here we have to fight our experiences, as the world is very different 
to how think it is. It is not intuitive to think that the earth is revolving or we all came 
from single-celled organisms. Science is the removal of ‘mind’ from our intuitive 
knowledge of the world, hence why for Aristotelians their belief that the world does 
not spin is just plain wrong. A view of reality that has the earth spinning and rotating 
around the Sun is closer to how things really are. What this strong view passes over is 
that any attempt to say what there ‘really’ is, or give a representation that has absolute 
one-to-one correspondence between discourse and the world, is a metaphysical 
consideration. 
 
It is itself a worldview that puts the extremely powerful methods and techniques of 
science as primary or that allows science to function, as a science.
7
 As part of those 
methods and techniques it can generate and revise propositions in an objective sense, 
for they are concretely about something. If this is all we take science to be we can 
easily fall in to the trap of thinking that the ‘about’ language is fundamental and that 
all inquiry and understanding is grounded in epistemology or discourse.
8
 The 
theorizing that this particular stance allows cannot account for itself in terms of the 
metaphysics it supports. Where we start from dualisms such as, subject-object, 
internal-external, and work outwards. The friction that is generated by this underlying 
tension becomes visible in our understanding when we conclude that Kuhn is arguing 
for relativism, irrationality, anti-realism, anti-science or that people can ‘literally’ live 
                                                                                                                                            
not command of the patterns of the language that he uses.’ Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. 
by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), p.158    
7
 Fuller notes, ‘social scientists were attracted to Kuhn's book precisely because it seemed to provide a 
blueprint for how a community of inquirers can constitute themselves as a science, regardless of their 
subject matter.’ Steve Fuller, ‘Being There with Thomas Kuhn: A Parable for Postmodern Times’, 
History & Theory, 31 (1992), 241-275  (p.269)  
8
 Chalmers accuses Kuhn of confusing objective and subjective knowledge in explaining paradigm 
change. He says ‘statements do not have properties in the sense that physical objects do, and spelling 
out the mode of existence of such linguistic objects, as well as other social constructions such as 
methodological rules and mathematical systems, is a tricky philosophical business.’ Alan F. Chalmers, 
What is This Thing Called Science? 3
rd
 edn. (Maidenhead: The Open University Press, 2010), p.127 
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in different worlds.
9
 The term ‘literally’ will also be significant, as in the strong 
reading ‘literalism’ is what we are aiming for. A = A, paradigm equals world, our 
‘about’ and ‘of’ languages are the same. They all seek a literal one-to-one 
correspondence, which the history of science seems to deny us. On the weak reading, 
though it may sound contentious and contrary to commonsense, these models are in a 
sense just metaphors, and there can be no literal tracing of world by discourse or 
collapsing an ‘of’ language into an ‘about’.       
 
With the strong version, what we should find is that we derive a Kuhn that appears to 
be stating something either banally trivial, or wildly speculative. Both are predicated 
on the grounds that either epistemology or language is the driving force of science. 
The observation that Kuhn can be read more than one way is not novel and itself 
seems a truism. Pinch, for example, notes that Kuhn’s  ‘paradigm’ has been taken by 
the mainstream to mean either the sum cognitive output of a field or the impact of that 
knowledge on surrounding social activity.
10
 Pinch claims that this can be identified in 
the American and British traditions of sociology of science, where the cognitive and 
social activities of science are kept separate. My interpretation, however, hopefully 
goes beyond the descriptive into not only analyzing why we get certain readings, but 
also an ethical sense of which we should prefer. As the claims of the strong reading 
can range from the banal to the absurd, it will be argued that the resultant conclusions 
are aimed at the apparent processes that divulged them, philosophy. So in the case of 
philosophy of science, a statement that amounts to a triviality such as ‘different 
people have different opinions’, shows the redundancy of the practice. And where we 
derive seeming absurdities, such as science being irrational or jettisoning objectivity 
for relativism, philosophy appears destructive or a nuisance. Bernstein suggests that 
these misreadings of Kuhn exist for good reasons as it ‘has currency in its continued 
propagation for certain interest groups.’11 It is, however, by the same means that these 
                                                 
9
 For Newton-Smith, this strong position is what is most signficant about Kuhn’s work. W. H. Newton-
Smith, The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p.103 
10
 Trevor Pinch, ‘Kuhn – The Conservative and Radical Interpretations: Are Some Mertonians 
‘Kuhnians’ and Some Kuhnians ‘Mertonians’?’, Social Studies of Science, 27 (1997), 465-482  (p.466). 
Pinch lists a number of theorists that have made the division between ‘paradigm’ as cognitive content 
and ‘paradigm’ as social activity. Hagstrom (1965), Crane (1969; 1972), Mullins (1973), Gilbert 
(1976), Law (1976), Edge & Mulkay (1976), and Small (1977), ibid., p.467 
11
 Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p.150 
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readings can be problematized and thus render them ineffective as weapons of 
rhetoric or persuasion.    
 
In order to see why the ‘strong’ reading may seem commonsense, it will be useful to 
look briefly at the history of Structure and the impact made by Kuhn. Dudley Shapere 
was the first person to give an extensive review of Structure and put Kuhn on the 
academic radar. The review portrayed Kuhn as representing an anti-positivistic theory 
of science.
12
 Fuller speculates that this was an exercise in displaying the power of 
sophisticated philosophical investigation against the ‘wild-eyed claims of historians 
overly impressed with the remoteness of the past.’13 This ‘historicist turn’, with 
notable members such as Norwood Hanson, could be regarded as a ‘revolt against 
positivism’.14 Shapere saw the future of philosophical scientific inquiry as represented 
in Frederick Suppe’s book The Structure of Scientific Theories.15 This told the 
impressive story of the rise of the ‘received view’ of analytic philosophy over neo-
Kantian doctrines. In the ‘Afterword’ to the second edition, Suppe predicted that the 
influence of Kuhn was winding down and that the future of historicist philosophy of 
science belonged to Toulmin and Shapere.
16
 It would seem strange if Kuhn were 
‘anti-positivist’ he should seek the help of Carnap, the leading positivist, and even 
stranger to enter into correspondence over the development of Structure.
17
 Another 
bibliographic anomaly is that Larry Laudan, the torch bearer for ‘historicism’, did not 
receive a single comment in Suppe’s massive 800 page opus, publishing the second 
edition of The Structure of Scientific Theories in the same year as Laudan’s Progress 
and its Problems.
18
 Laudan went on to develop the area of sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK). This became known as the ‘Strong Programme’ to distinguish it 
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 Dudley Shapere, ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’, The Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), 
July (3), 383 – 394 
13
 Fuller, ‘Being There’, p.244 
14
 Ibid., p.243 – For examples of Hanson’s work and the unwelcome reception the ‘historicist turn’ 
received see, Norwood R. Hanson, ‘Scientists and Logicians: A Confrontation’, Science, 138 (1962), 
1311-1314; ‘The Irrelevance of History of Science to Philosophy of Science’, in What I Do Not Believe 
and Other Essays, ed. by S. Toulmin & H. Woolf (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971), pp. 274-287 
15
 Frederick Suppe (ed.) The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2
nd
 edn. (Illinois: Illini Books edition, 
1977)  
16
 Ibid., pp.631-649 – Suppe’s makes it clear that the ‘worldview’ perspective is on the way out making 
way for an objective realist account of scientific theories and the objects they refer to. Suppe, however, 
tentatively concedes ‘I wonder if we really can give a philosophical argument in favor of this [realism]. 
Is it not simpler just to say, ‘well, this is the best thing to do?’ Ibid., p.598  
17
 George A. Reisch, ‘Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?’, Philosophy of Science, 58 (1991), 264-277  
18
 Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977) 
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from other methodologies, such as Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, who 
argued that the rational methodology of the natural sciences precluded it from social 
explanation. It was in the 1970’s that the ‘Edinburgh School’ emerged, bringing 
together the studies of history, philosophy and sociology of science, the three main 
areas Kuhn brought together in Structure.
19
 A largely constructivist agenda arose from 
this melting pot which adopted Kuhn as a member.
20
 More recently, introductory texts 
to the sociology of science or postmodernism, represent Kuhn’s philosophy of 
science, less as one of anti-positivism and more one of full-blown relativism.
21
 Kuhn, 
as a relativist, may now be the ‘received view’ of his work. For example, Merchant 
states in the opening to her article, The Theoretical Structure of Ecological 
Revolutions that in assessing the approaches to theories of environmental histories she 
‘accepts the relativist stance set forth in the first edition of his [Kuhn] book’.22 I do 
not have a problem with people using a relativist framework for investigating various 
approaches, but I do disagree with using the authority of Kuhn to give extra academic 
and theoretical credence to an argument, by assuming relativism as a given.
23
 
Feyerabend notes this pre-critical adoption of what Kuhn ‘meant’ by philosophers 
when he says,  
 
Kuhn's ideas are interesting but, alas, they are much too vague to give 
rise to anything but lots of hot air. If you don't believe me, look at the 
literature. Never before has the literature on the philosophy of science 
been invaded by so many creeps and incompetents. Kuhn encourages 
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 We may also include the ‘Bath School’ as an affiliate with notable members being Harry Collins, 
Trevor Pinch and Robert Evans. 
20
 Barry Barnes, T.S. Kuhn and the Social Sciences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
21
 Michael Erickson, Science, Culture and Society: Understanding Science in the 21
st
 Century 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p.71; Ziauddin Sardar, Thomas Kuhn and the Science Wars 
(Cambridge: Icon Books, 2000), p.32 
22
 Carolyn Merchant, ‘The Theoretical Structure of Ecological Revolutions’, Environmental Review, 11 
(1987), 265-274 (p.265) – Merchant caveats her claim to the first edition as in the postscript to the 
second and third editions Kuhn spells out why he is not a relativist and those that think he is are 
mistaken. More recently Merchant has used ‘Kuhn’s perspective’ not declaring him a relativist but as 
giving a ‘perspective internal to the working of science and the community of scientists.’ – Ecological 
Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New England, 2
nd
 edn. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010), p.3 
23
 If we trace the history of Kuhn’s work and the reception, critiquing and assimilation of Structure in 
the literature we find it difficult to deny its place in the narrative of historicist philosophy of science 
over the positivistic tradition. Take Lakatos and Musgrave’s Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
for what started out being a festschrift to Popper, is now received and taught as a collection of 
responses to Kuhn. 
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people who have no idea why a stone falls to the ground to talk with 
assurance about scientific method.
24
  
 
If we follow an uncritical positing of relativism we can ultimately arrive at a place 
that science does not make objective true statements about the world or is just one 
competing form of knowledge. This, in conjunction with the failure of demarcation, 
would appear to be a situation that could only be made possible by the presence of 
philosophy. It then takes ‘commonsense’ scientists, such as Sokal and Hawking, to 
come along and tell postmodernist and constructivist philosophers that what they are 
doing is wrong. Yet, the means to resolving these problems do not come from outside 
philosophy, but from within. This is where philosophy shows its true value to public 
discourse. We can uncover the metaphysical requirements for relativism or anti-
realism, such that we turn philosophy back upon itself without it consuming itself 
entirely.  
 
As I do not have the room for every aspect of Kuhn’s philosophy, the aspects that I do 
address are to be illustrative of: 1) how any reading is predicated on a prior 
understanding, which itself contains philosophical notions. 2) By using ideas inspired 
by Heidegger to show how we can arrive at ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ readings, and 3) in 
doing both 1 and 2 not only to bring to the fore the value of philosophy for thinking 
about science in the PUoS, but alsoto show that we have good reasons for preferring 
one reading over another. So when we read in Hawking that ‘philosophy is dead’ or 
Weinberg aims at a ‘culture free description of how reality is’ in science we know 
when scientific opinion has moved over to metaphysical or even mythical 
speculation.
25
 What is more, we may be able to state the very conditions for why a 
scientist could entertain those ideas as meaningful in the first place. 
  
So that the reader may be able to follow the developments I wish to problematize, I 
will next give a brief overview of Structure. This will be followed by a strong reading 
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of the central concepts of ‘paradigm’, ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ science, and 
‘incommensurability’. The ‘elephant in the room’ with Kuhn is whether he is a realist 
or anti-realist. As I do not have the room to address this concern it is hoped that by the 
end of this thesis one will realize that this problem is a result of the strong reading and 
that the weak reading is a means to dissolve such metaphysical antagonisms.  
 
7.3- The General Structure of Structure 
 
Just so we can locate ideas when they are being discussed, I will give a brief overview 
of the structure of Structure. Kuhn’s argument follows the layout of his chapter 
headings, in that we move from pre-normal to normal science via incommensurability 
of theories, to the establishing of paradigms and the breaking of paradigms by 
anomaly and crisis. Pre-paradigm, there are numerous competing explanations and 
perspectives for ‘what there is’, and one, for whatever reason, draws more attention 
than others. Once the fundamentals of this new perspective are worked out it begins to 
extend to new phenomena. We could loosely call this a ‘paradigm’. In the presence of 
a paradigm ‘normal science’ takes place, which acts as an expression of the paradigm. 
Normal science is concerned with ‘puzzle-solving’, and describes the majority of 
practices scientists are involved with.
26
 Normal science recognizes, identifies itself 
with, and is based on the paradigm, so much so, that its main theories, experiments, 
research values and metaphysical assumptions are given a coherence that allow 
further cumulative puzzle-solving to occur.
27
 Normal science, however, seeks to 
replicate itself and give a full explication of its domain. In doing so, it accumulates 
anomalies, which for the most part it suppresses, re-describes or ignores, until the 
paradigm, which supports the ‘normal science’, can no longer make sense of those 
anomalies and remain coherent in their presence. The paradigm enters a state of 
‘crisis’, where the scientist is forced to ask fundamental questions about the paradigm. 
As it is the paradigm that tells scientists ‘what there is’, this can no longer be trusted 
and so we return to the maelstrom of competing theories and perspectives from which 
the enterprise started. When one theory gains ascendancy over the others and settles 
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as the new paradigm, we can be said to have undergone a ‘revolution’. The problem 
then arises that, as the paradigm is in dispute, what does the scientist then appeal to in 
order to guide research? If the paradigm had previously contextualized evidence, 
observation, theory or what was reasonable to assume, what are we left with? 
Moreover, what was considered ‘unscientific’ by the old paradigm, might well be part 
of our ‘new science’ in the prevailing paradigm. 
 
This is, more or less, the pattern for scientific development Kuhn presents us with. In 
his concluding remarks to the introduction he potentially signposts us with a warning,  
 
[M]any of my generalizations are about the sociology of social 
psychology of scientists; yet at least a few of my conclusions belong 
traditionally to logic or epistemology […] can anything more than 
profound confusion be indicated by this admixture of diverse fields and 
concerns?
28
  
 
The warning could possibly be that if one thinks that just because the generalizations 
are about sociology, psychology, or have consequences for logic or epistemology, that 
if one takes science to progress by these means, then only confusion will result. With 
this said I look at the strong reading of ‘paradigms’ next.   
  
7.4 - Paradigms 
 
One of the central concepts in Structure is what Kuhn calls ‘paradigms’. This is 
crucial to an interpretation of his book, in what one understands them to be. From this 
it dictates how they change and how science relates to them.
29
 After fifty years of 
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analysis, one still struggles to find a definitive definition of paradigm, but it seems to 
be the case that it is easier to say what one ‘does’ rather than what one ‘is’. This is 
born out by the fact that multiple definitions and uses of paradigm can be found 
throughout Structure, which will remain a problem for our strong interpreter.
30
 Kuhn 
himself in the postscript to the revised editions acknowledges this problem with 
‘paradigms’. Not, that is, the idea but in their articulation, ‘several of the key 
difficulties of my original text cluster about the concept of a paradigm […] I suggest 
the desirability of disentangling that concept from the notion of a scientific 
community.’31 His own re-articulation of the concept of paradigm leads him to 
present them as having two major uses – the first is sociological, in that, it refers to 
the practices of a given community, the second is paradigm as ‘exemplary past 
achievement’.32 As these distinctions were not clear in the first edition and a wealth of 
literature was evoked by these misgivings, many of which, Kuhn himself did not 
agree with, he then claims that paradigms are, ‘the most novel and least understood 
aspect of this book.’33 Kuhn’s own disagreement with those interpretations of what he 
was saying is either a testament to the radical nature of those ideas or 
misunderstanding is easier than he supposed.
34
 If a paradigm is both a set of beliefs 
within a community of practitioners and is also an historical event the paradigm 
identifies with, what then is its content? One of the problems that are present with the 
strong interpretation is that in asking for a definition of a paradigm, we are making the 
same mistake as in asking for an exact definition of science. It would seem for Kuhn 
that a paradigm is everything to science.
35
 The extensiveness, however, of what a 
paradigm is will either have to include everything and thus explain nothing, or at least 
account for the success of one paradigm over another, without recourse to explaining 
the paradigm’s success in terms of what scientists are doing, which is working within 
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a paradigm. Sidestepping this initial problem, we can identify a paradigm by its 
operation in a ‘mature’ science. Again, Kuhn does not define this but uses it 
synonymously with the term ‘normal science’. In Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge he says that the transition from immature or proto-science to science is 
marked by the ‘abandonment of critical discourse’ and we only take up critical 
engagement with the paradigm once the mature or normal science has entered into a 
state of crisis.
36
 The claim that routine science ‘abandons critical discourse’ is a hard 
idea for the strong reader to take without concluding either, 1) that such a practice 
would be irrational, or 2) it would not be a science. 
 
What is a paradigm under a strong reading? How does this affect our understanding of 
Kuhn or his vision for the development of science? The first definition we are 
provided with is found in the ‘preface’ to Structure; a paradigm is a, ‘universally 
recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and 
solutions to a community of practitioners.’37 As we have seen Kuhn can mean 
‘paradigm’ in more than one way, and for the strong reader, it will be problematic that 
Kuhn does not stick to this definition of paradigm. For its meaning becomes so loose 
that ‘anything that allows science to accomplish anything can be a part of (or 
somehow involved in) a paradigm.’38 Shapere notes that the concept of ‘paradigm’ 
bears a large responsibility for how we see scientific development in Kuhn, and that if 
we are to make sense of Kuhn’s account of scientific change, ‘paradigm’ must contain 
significant explanatory power. It is this explanatory power that is lacking as a result of 
the sheer width of the term paradigm, as paradigms are not rules or theories for saying 
such and such is correct, but are more ‘global’ from which, rules and theories are 
abstracted and deployed in research.
39
 
  
What the strong reader expects of a ‘paradigm’ is to know what it is ‘about’, so that 
we can look at two or more paradigms and see what is common between them. In 
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looking for those similar properties, there is the hope that we can distill a 
methodological account such as, rational choice theory between paradigms. At the 
very least, we will want to keep the distinction between ‘context of discovery’ 
(psychological or social) and ‘context of justification’ (methodology) alive. If we can 
deduce normative rules that are common to paradigms we can save science from the 
charges of irrationality or relativism.
40
 If we concede that historical research shows 
that there exist guiding factors, held by the majority of scientists over a certain period 
of time, and it is those guiding factors that have allowed science to progress, what 
then are those guiding factors? If what is common to those scientists over time is 
bound up in the term ‘paradigm’, which enable scientists from different backgrounds 
and disciplines to share research and compare evidence or theories – can we distill 
those overlapping features into a coherent logic of discovery or underlying philosophy 
of science? 
 
What we find, when we look towards Kuhn’s concept of paradigm as a 
methodological suggestion for how science proceeds, is a muddle of answers. Kuhn 
says that ‘tests and theories must proceed from within one or another paradigm-based 
tradition’ and yet paradigms cannot be formally expressed. When the historian or 
philosopher of science tries to unveil the underlying structure that scientists follow 
they find that, ‘phrased in just that way, or in any other way he can imagine, they 
[rules or general beliefs constituting the paradigm] would almost certainly have been 
rejected by some members of the group he studies.’41 The fact that some people can 
reject part of the paradigm, and that for Kuhn paradigms are open to ‘direct 
inspection’, that then allows the scientist, historian or philosopher to agree that a 
paradigm exists, ‘without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full 
interpretation or rationalization of it.’42 More recently, those that have taken the idea 
of ‘paradigm’ as a methodological suggestion have sought to ground it in the 
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cognitive sciences.
43
 Here scientific development works by way of a ‘group-licensed 
way of seeing’, so that similarities between a proposed puzzle solution and the 
paradigm correspond.
44
 The Kuhnians involved in the ‘psychological turn’ take this 
literally as a matter of cognitive processing, such as how I might distinguish 
similarities between family members, smells or tastes.
45
 Eventually what is sought is a 
tacit knowing that is acquired by frequent encounters with the paradigm’s exemplars 
and the potential puzzle-solutions they allow.
46
 Here we are faced with the problem of 
how the ‘tacit knowledge’ in the scientist’s head relates or influences the outside 
paradigm or how the paradigm becomes embedded in the scientist’s psyche.47 The 
shortcomings of the methodological suggestion of ‘paradigm as shared exemplars’ are 
raised by Nickles, in that, the exemplar Newton gives in the Principia are not the 
exemplars found in twentieth century physics textbooks.
48
 The exemplars have 
changed in response to more modern puzzle-solving. At the heart of the cognitive 
science approach or ‘psychological turn’, however, still lies a representational model 
of the world to mind. Here scientists see ‘stimuli’ from which we abstract to forms of 
reasoning or cognitive habits located in the brain, which call to the senses different 
data sets or experiences.
49
 Notice that ‘stimuli’ is as abstract as the term ‘evidence’ or 
‘observation’, but it is what our ‘experiences’ are about. This fails to acknowledge 
that we do not encounter ‘stimuli’, but an event that is always already meaningful for 
us.   
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Returning to paradigms as described in Structure. Kuhn makes it clear that a mature 
or ‘normal science’ cannot operate in the absence of a paradigm. It is only by normal 
science that we know a paradigm or that a paradigm even makes sense, yet a 
paradigm does not require shared agreement of its interpretation, nor a fully explicit 
set of rules in order for it to guide research.
50
 Indeed ‘the existence of a paradigm 
need not imply any full set of rules to exist.’51 Moreover, Kuhn believes paradigms 
not only ‘could determine normal science without the intervention of discoverable 
rules’ but ‘actually do operate in this manner.’52 If the existence of a paradigm is 
conceivably non-reducible to a set of axiomatic rules, it would appear that paradigms 
are necessary yet inexpressible, all encompassing yet revisable, tacitly knowable, yet 
not explicitly known.
53
 The effect of paradigms is to be found at the ‘conceptual, 
theoretical, instrumental and methodological’ levels functioning to instruct the 
scientist ‘what both the world and his science are like’.54 When expressed as such, 
how can science, the epitome of human rationalization and objectivity come from 
anything like a paradigm? What is then the explanatory scientific worth of such a 
vague concept? How can a paradigm be open to direct inspection when scientific 
‘facts’ can only be observed through a paradigm? The polysemy of this term would be 
a problem, if it were a methodological suggestion for how science progresses. It 
would seem akin to saying the word ‘magic’ as part of a scientific explanation. As 
with Feynman, we have already seen the problems that arise if one wants to know 
what science is through the definition of words. As with his example of ‘energy’, 
philosophers tend to use or understand the term ‘paradigm’ tautologically so nothing 
new is learnt, or it then becomes very hard to articulate.
55
 A few of the criticisms the 
term paradigm incurred may reveal this propensity. James B. Conant wrote to Kuhn 
expressing his worries that he would be understood as the guy who ‘grabbed on to the 
word ‘paradigm’ and used it as a magic verbal wand to explain everything.’56 Shapere 
found it ‘mysterious’, ‘vague’, and ‘ambiguous’, whereas Wisdom thought that is was 
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‘not easy to say what it means’, and for Scheffler, ‘the adoption of a new scientific 
theory is an intuitive, mystical affair, a matter for psychological description primarily 
rather than for logical or methodological codification.’57 For Cedarbaum, a paradigm 
is ‘an axiom system and a model (in the technical sense) for that system.’58 If 
‘paradigm’ is understood in the methodological sense, it will be construed through the 
normal scientific worldview, which is to say it must be ‘about’ something. In science 
a term is the shorthand for a long description. Here we have seen philosophers and 
sociologists busily trying to find out ‘what’ a paradigm is or how science is 
structured.
59
 Shapere says, ‘one reason why, in particular cases, identification of “the 
paradigm” is so difficult: not just because it is hard to see, but because looking for the 
guiding elements in scientific activity is not like looking for a unitary entity that either 
is there or is not.’60 Kuhn’s initial attempt to prevent such confusion led to him 
enlisting the help of Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’s’, but unfortunately 
Wittgenstein, like Kuhn is also open to interpretation.
61
 Hoyningen-Huene gives a 
detailed exposition of the changing nature and role of paradigm for Kuhn. He notes 
that in the second edition of Structure Kuhn tries to disambiguate the term paradigm 
by introducing the notion of the more analytically sounding ‘disciplinary matrix’. For 
Hoyningen-Huene, it was this that marked the beginning of a period of confusion, 
which ultimately led to Kuhn abandoning the term ‘disciplinary matrix’ altogether.62 
The inclusion of ‘disciplinary matrix’, which includes the socialization of scientists 
into ‘seeing’ similarities, the analogy drawn with Wittgenstein’s ‘family 
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resemblances’, plus a leaning to a more linguistically focused analysis, would push 
the strong reader to think that these are all methodological suggestions for linguistic, 
sociological or psychological investigation.
63
 The use of ‘family resemblances’, for 
Shapere, is inappropriate. As Kuhn’s idea of paradigm does not necessitate any 
common property that guides scientific procedure, in the same way that our inability 
to define what is common to all games implies that games must derive from a unified 
abstract idea. As the rules that guide normal research are abstracted from the 
paradigm, there would seem no possible way to compile a set of rules for 
investigating the paradigm in order to inspect it.
64
 This objection has been leveled at 
the vagueness of the concept, which for Masterman is just the result of a crude 
analogy.
65
 
 
One way of ‘inspecting’ paradigms has been through ‘scientometrics’. Derek de Solla 
Price, who popularized the term ‘Big Science’, has taken to studying the ‘life cycles’ 
of sciences based on Kuhnian categories. One scientometric indicator of where a field 
is in the Kuhnian life cycle is called ‘Price’s Index,’ which measures the obsolescence 
rate of journal articles in terms of diminishing citation patterns. A high obsolescence 
rate means a paradigm is performing at top puzzle-solving levels.
66
 Such that a 
contemporary physics journal would not publish anything on 19
th
 century Newtonian 
mechanics, as it would appear there is nothing left to discover about it. This would 
now be the domain of history of science or some such supporting fields. Fuller claims 
that work in ‘scientometrics’ ‘rests on simplifying assumptions about the international 
political economy of science that cannot help but contribute to the image of science as 
a self-contained, self-sufficient enterprise.’ He also argues that scientometrics takes 
the science policy maker as evaluator not prescriber, as if science had its own ‘natural 
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trajectory’, and their job is to diagnose when it veers off course.67 The British rival to 
scientometrics can been seen as arising out of Mulkay’s early writings on Kuhn, 
where he was considering how the notion of paradigm may be used in empirical 
research. He suggests that ‘it is in the latter sense of intellectual prescriptions, or 
technical and cognitive norms, that Kuhn’s notion of paradigm is most important for 
the sociological study of scientific innovation.’68 
 
If a paradigm governs what theories are successful, what counts as evidence, or as 
rational, we can then be drawn into a debate about explicitly defining ‘success’, 
‘evidence’, or ‘reason’ independent of the activities that require them or make them 
meaningful.
69
 But can we give an account of ‘evidence’ in the absence of a theory? 
Arguably, evidence is ‘about’ a theory and that is what makes it evidence and not just 
some random observation. Equally, success, which the sciences definitely achieve, 
can always be gained by ad hoc modifications; indeed Kuhn tells us that through 
normal science a paradigm is maintained by ‘numerous articulations and ad hoc 
modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.’70 If the 
success of science is explained in terms of the success of paradigms, which is 
accomplished by adjusting observation and theory to suit, then science takes on a 
twisted façade, a decidedly anti-scientific enterprise. Possible problems to consider 
for the strong reader are ones of meta-methodology, such as trying to discover a 
‘logic’ of scientific discovery, a rational choice algorithm for deciding between 
paradigms or even a structure of successful theories that may remain stable across 
paradigms. The current attempts to flesh this out has been through structural realism, 
which still raises questions about whether mathematical structures are lost in 
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paradigmatic theory change?
71
 Those who look to the logico-mathematical structure 
of theories continue the debate within the purest of ‘about’ languages. What Kuhn 
called ‘paradigms’ can be rearticulated as ‘research programmes’, ‘research-
traditions’, or ‘worldviews’.72 For the strong reader, we are still trying to produce an 
abstract methodological account of how we interact with the world as a thing. This 
could be through logic, the structure of theories, or cognitive perception, which is then 
to make ‘knowledge’ about our worldviews the problem. Laudan’s meta-inductive 
pessimism argument, about the reality of the objects that our theories describe, is a 
major threat for the methodological understanding of science.
73
 Here, philosophers 
have pushed realism back to the essential parts of theory structure or come up with 
new models for reference between types and tokens.
74
 Yet ‘there is no consensus 
among those defending standard realism in the face of theory change.’75 The 
discussions about reference and referent are ‘about’ the objects of our regional 
ontologies, does A refer to a real or fictitious A? These arguments overlook the very 
grounds for making such claims, that our words and experiences are already about 
something.  
 
Stanford gives a useful contribution to this debate with his ‘unconceived alternatives’. 
This states that throughout history scientists have failed to conceive alternative 
theories that are equally well-confirmed to the theories of the day by the available 
evidence and, crucially, that such alternatives eventually were conceived and adopted 
by some section of the scientific community.
76
 For me this is an indication of why 
certain ideas were held over others due to what could be meaningfully said at any one 
point.  
It is not just knowledge of how our best theories connect to reality that is the problem. 
Kuhn’s linguistic and psychological ‘turns’ have generated a wealth of research into 
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how paradigms might be cognitive structures.
77
 This psychological interpretation is 
understandable, in that, Kuhn does use concepts from psychology to demonstrate his 
points. Another characteristic of the strong reading is whether one takes Kuhn’s 
comparisons as ‘literal’. Kuhn talks about conversion experiences and the throwing of 
gestalt switches when one finally succumbs to the dominant paradigm.
78
 The language 
of religious experience or cognitive switches implies that the act of being persuaded 
lies outside of evidence or compelling reason. If one does not become religious based 
on evidence or by reasoned argument – it would suggest a type of faith or evincing by 
rhetoric.
79
 Kuhn goes on to draw the similarities between scientific crisis and 
paradigm change with that of political revolution.
80
 The implication is that the success 
or failure of a paradigm is brought about by the satisfying or disenfranchising of its 
members, and from the chaos of political ambiguity parties will collect around central 
ideas or values that should constitute the new politics. Opposition groups will remain 
loyal to the old values and visions of society, but ‘once this polarization has occurred, 
political recourse fails.’81 Once divided on central ideological issues, there is no 
political standard that one can appeal too for the efficacy of institutional reform or 
societal structure. The two parties can no longer debate on any agreed or shared 
ground. For example, if one party believed that money should no longer play a role in 
the new system of exchange, how then would they debate on issues that implicitly 
relied on concepts such as, capital, credit, or taxation? As the reforms are outside of a 
common discourse, the parties then have to fall back on to ‘techniques of mass 
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persuasion, often including force.’82 Kuhn presses on with the politico-scientific 
comparison, in that, when a scientist argues in favor of their paradigm, she can only 
do so from within the confines of that paradigm. They may only use evidence, logic, 
observation or a rationale that their paradigm allows. As there is no higher set of rules 
from which one can judge between ‘paradigms’, each person’s argument becomes 
self-referential. This can be likened back to Wittgenstein’s ‘games’ and asking what is 
common to all games in and of their structure. For example, what counts as ‘castling’ 
in my game only applies to chess and does not have its equivalent in tennis. Here the 
arguments for one paradigm over another ‘cannot be made logically or even 
probabilistically compelling’ for those who refuse to accept the premises of the 
opposing paradigm.
83
 All attempts at converting the conflicting parties can be 
understood by the strong reader as acts of persuasion. The term ‘persuasion’ carries 
with it a sense of manipulation by an external force. Kuhn’s referencing of Orwell’s 
1984 in how the outcomes of paradigmatic crisis are made to look like natural 
progression can, for the strong reader, put the impetus for scientific movement in 
rhetoric or a kind of ‘brain washing’ by historical manipulation.84  
 
Part of this historical manipulation is what has come to be called ‘Whig history’, 
where we tell the story of the present as an inevitable outcome of the past.
85
 A logical 
conclusion for the strong reader where evidence, logic and observation cannot be 
appealed to in preferring one paradigm to another implies that scientists are not 
occupying the same reality. Kuhn does not shy away from drawing the conclusion that 
scientists from different paradigms ‘live in different worlds’.86 It is this claim, more 
than most, that have led contemporary philosophers of science to label Kuhn a 
‘relativist’, ‘subjectivist’, or ‘irrationalist.’ Yet, Kuhn tells us that scientists cannot 
just be slaves to the paradigm because science would never progress. Rather they need 
to balance an ‘essential tension’ as a professional.87 A commitment to both tradition 
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and innovation, or ‘conservative and innovative imperatives’.88 This for the strong 
reader, is a statement of epistemology, which can be accessed through social 
psychology and organization theory. So for the strong reader, if science is its 
paradigm and paradigms tells us ‘what there is’, there is a horribly circular 
relationship between knowledge, language and reality. We only know what reality is, 
through our perception of it, as described by our language. However, what we 
perceive is pre-determined by the paradigm, which is what we appeal too in order to 
find out ‘what there is’. The strong reader collapses the distinctions between paradigm 
and world into the same thing. They are all ‘about’ each other. The problems this 
understanding produces will be discussed under the heading of 
‘incommensurability’.89 The concept ‘paradigm’ is closely connected to the concept 
of ‘normal science’, and this will be the next concept to be given a strong 
interpretation. The counterpart to ‘normal science’ is ‘revolutionary science’ via 
‘crisis’, which will also be developed.   
 
7.5 - Normal and Revolutionary Science
90
 
 
Normal science is not the same as a paradigm, but it does allow normal science to 
function, which in turn re-enforces what the paradigm is. People who practice normal 
science are committed to sharing the same rules and standards as each other. The 
consensus this sharing derives is what stabilizes the endeavor of normal science, 
allowing that research tradition to continue. In opposition to normal or mature 
science, there is immature science. An immature science is said to be pre-
paradigmatic. It is immature as it has not agreed upon a single research tradition and 
is pre-paradigmatic as it is lacking consensus across the domain.
91
 Here disagreement 
is at a fundamental level. What should count as an assumption, what should be taken 
as meaningful, what needs to be explained, and so on. Normal science, which is the 
result of paradigmatic dominance, is a ‘relatively late acquisition in the course of 
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scientific development.’92 During a science’s fledgling years it proceeds without a 
paradigm to guide it. It is, however, the difference in development between that pre-
paradigmatic history and where the subject is now that reveals the importance of 
‘normal science.’ The early developmental stages of a science are characterized by a 
state of intense discussion and debate over fundamentals that precede work under a 
single paradigm. Kuhn qualifies this with the development of optics. ‘[N]o period 
between remote antiquity and the end of the seventeenth century exhibited a single 
generally accepted view about the nature of light.’93 Pre-Newtonian paradigm, the 
scope of possible disagreement, minor consensus or lack of collective progress, is for 
Kuhn illustrative of a tradition working without a ‘normal science’. It is the type of 
agreement that can be brought about by working under a single paradigm is that 
allows an immature practice to become a science proper. Kuhn, like Popper, uses 
examples from Ancient Greece to illustrate his points, but their conclusions for the 
strong reader are antithetical.  
 
This is best exemplified by the exchange in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. 
Here, Kuhn was attacking the simplistic view that science progresses by the repeated 
attempts to falsify fundamental assumptions by way of bold conjectures. Kuhn’s 
argument is that what Popper attributes to normal scientific research, is actually the 
reserve of crisis and revolutionary science. Indeed, science would get nowhere if a 
paradigm was constantly in dispute, which for Kuhn is evidence of there being no 
paradigm. Instead, Kuhn suggests once a paradigm is up and running it is down to 
normal science to maintain it and rather discussing the fundamental constituents of the 
paradigm, scientists become involved with ‘puzzle solving’.94  
 
The intricate and detailed investigations that paradigms permit in normal science 
explain, for Kuhn, science’s productivity, which is galvanized when ‘its members take 
the foundations of their field for granted.’95 For Popper, science is demarcated from 
non-science by a methodological commitment to falsification, which is characteristic 
of critical rational discourse. For Kuhn, the evolution of an immature science to a 
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mature one is when critical discourse has been completely abandoned and replaced by 
consensus over the fundamentals.
96
 The strong reader, who is methodologically 
orientated, will take Kuhn’s critique of Popper and falsification as either limiting the 
role of rationality, or offering in its place, a methodological substitute in consensus 
formation, which can be explained by rhetoric or psychological dispositions. This 
depiction of Kuhn’s ‘normal science’ makes it closer to a cult than a science, with a 
closed society of followers, not open and free investigation. Above all, it is with the 
abandonment of critical discourse that science seemingly becomes an irrational 
activity and not the personification of ‘Reason’ that it is thought to be.97 Kuhn 
develops the idea of normal science further in the relationship of puzzle to puzzle-
solver. Here, we take ‘puzzle’ in the everyday sense of the word. The paradigm under 
which a normal science operates instructs what can be taken as a legitimate puzzle or 
not. The normal science of Newtonian physics would allow a principle like ‘action-at-
a-distance’ to be legitimate, whereas within Einsteinian physics it would not.98 One 
cannot be working in an Einsteinian paradigm and still accept faster-than-light 
phenomena. So, if a puzzle cannot be stated in recognizable terms, which the 
paradigm permits, it can be seen as either not scientific or having no proper scientific 
solution.  
 
As many such problems are untranslatable in terms of normal scientific research they 
are then regarded as too complex, poorly formulated, or too vague to warrant 
scientific investigation. Normal science, if performed well, will convince the puzzle-
solver that there is ‘nothing to see’, as it were, in the foundations of that science and 
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instead re-direct their attention to surface problems. It is with these sorts of puzzles 
that most scientists are involved with. Such is their commitment to the footings of that 
science, and the authenticity of their puzzles, that they may be prepared to dedicate a 
whole professional life or equally risk academic isolation in pursuing a pseudo-
puzzle. For example, Brian Josephson shared the Nobel-Prize for his theoretical work 
in superconductivity, which led to the discovery of a new phenomena that now bears 
his name (Josephson Effect), along with several applications of it (Josephson 
Junctions).
99
 He then ‘quit mainstream physics and became preoccupied with 
paranormal phenomena.’100 In a booklet for the Royal Mail, for their one hundredth 
anniversary of the Nobel-Prize stamp collection, he wrote, ‘quantum theory is now 
being fruitfully combined with theories of information and computation. These 
developments may lead to an explanation of processes still not understood within 
conventional science such as telepathy’.101 The reaction from the physics community 
was unanimous in condemning such ideas. Yet as Strogratz points out, ‘a hundred 
years ago, no one would have believed that electrons could synchronize by the 
billions and pass through impenetrable barriers.’102 In the puzzle-solving analogy the 
normal scientific community not only regards Josephson as being a bad puzzle-solver, 
as his puzzle does not fit that of accepted normal practice. They have actively tried to 
limit his ability to put forward new puzzles, as they would appear to be counter-
instances to the accepted paradigm.
103
 Yet Josephson, ‘by the rules’ is among the best 
puzzle-solvers for winning the Nobel-Prize, and with that distinction he remains 
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emeritus Professor of Physics at Cambridge University. Using our science as 
‘method’ or ‘knowledge’ description then, can we really say Josephson does not 
understand what science is as he is using ideas that contravene currently agreed 
normal scientific practice. Cases like Josephson show that normal science ‘does not 
aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none.’104 Normal 
science, if done well, should not produce anomalies or data to the contrary. It should 
not call forth new phenomena or aim at the production of new theories. It should only 
direct itself ‘to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm 
already supplies.’105 Yet, the almost esoteric level of investigation that normal science 
conducts, weakens the joints of its own paradigm by constantly coming into conflict 
with anomaly, through its routine practices, that eventually lead to its displacement. 
This constant conflict with anomaly can, if not managed well, develop into a state of 
crisis and one which eventually leads to a revolution and replacement of part or all of 
the hosting paradigm. An anomaly is ‘the recognition that nature has somehow 
violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science.’106 
Anomalies are found, not by ‘testing’ (as this is not the aim of normal science), but by 
repeated failure to solve a puzzle.
107
  
 
For the strong reader the term ‘puzzle-solving’ is deliberately used over ‘testing’. The 
analogy being that one completes a jigsaw or crossword, but does not test it. Puzzles 
only really tell us about puzzle makers and our ability to agree over proposed 
solutions. They do not tell us why we have puzzles or why puzzles should be 
solvable. It is only when we reach the stage of puzzles, when many puzzle-solvers 
have had a go and agree that the puzzle is not genuine and something more 
fundamental is amiss, do we then get some kind of testing. The puzzle-solvers then go 
away and look at all the old completed puzzles to see where they might have gone 
wrong. This is where testing of the rules of puzzle-solving occur and it is not until 
most major anomalies can be accounted for by a new theory do we start to usher in a 
new paradigm. The new paradigm will make sense of the old missing pieces of the 
previous paradigm. For Popper, where ‘paradigm’ was linked to our historical 
                                                                                                                                            
Approach to the Cold Fusion Nuclear Reactions of H/Ni’, Journal of Nuclear Physics, May (2011), 
<http://www.journal-of-nuclear-physics.com/?m=201105> [accessed 13 Sept 2012]  
104
 Kuhn, Structure, p.52 
105
 Ibid., p.24 
106
 Ibid., pp. 52-53 
177  
perception of reality this relationship was still a ‘logical’ one. In his understanding of 
‘paradigm’ as dominant theory and his ‘framework’ metaphor as ‘mutually 
untranslatable languages’, he kept the discussion fixed as a methodological 
suggestion.
108
 That is, we are still dealing with a language-knowledge relationship. 
Popper concluded that Kuhn’s description of normal science depicted the world of 
applied science, not pure science.
109
 That Kuhn’s formulation was predicated on 
relativised knowledge and ultimately was a threat to how science was conducted. 
Popper, however, did agree that science was confined to a ‘framework’ and that we 
were, in a sense, prisoners to this framework, but unlike Kuhn, we were able to 
critically assess the dimensions of this framework.
110
 Watkins puts it stronger still, 
‘normal science (in which there is not really any testing of theories), is genuine 
science; Extraordinary science [revolutionary science] (in which genuine testing of 
theories does occur) is so abnormal, so different from genuine science, that it can 
hardly be called a science at all.’111 Watkins, building on Popper’s interpretation, 
takes Kuhn’s description to be either psychological or sociological in nature, leaving 
the testing of theories within normal science as impossible.
112
 Watkins then goes on to 
compare Kuhn’s concept of ‘normal science’ with that of a theologian trying to gloss 
over the inconsistencies in two passages of the Bible.
113
  
 
Kuhn, arguing against Popper, that falsification cannot be the mark of what makes 
one thing a science and another not. He takes as one of his marks the development of 
the geo/ heliocentric models of the solar system, but elsewhere he uses the examples 
of astrology. Both made predictions that failed, both accounted for those failures 
within terms of the system that made them. Here Kuhn is saying that failed 
predictions can amount to the falsification of a theory or, what is more likely, and 
more routinely practiced, is it can be overlooked or explained by additional factors. 
Kuhn says, ‘of the two criteria, testing and puzzle-solving, the latter is at once the less 
equivocal and the more fundamental’ to science.114 Here again, we notice that Kuhn is 
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not just using ‘puzzle’ as synonym for ‘testing’. Since Kuhn is arguing for the 
principle of ‘puzzle-solving’ over ‘falsification’, along with pretensions to 
indoctrination within the dominant paradigm, science takes on the guise of a dogmatic 
belief system, closer to a religion than what we would ordinarily call science. 
Likewise, in comparing what scientists do to a professional puzzle or crossword 
solver, implies there is no necessary connection between their solutions and what 
there really is.
115
 With these two descriptions combined, ‘science’ appears to be 
closed, insular, cult-like, narrow-sighted, and against the strongest protests of the 
Popperians, not looking to prove itself wrong. If anomalies are always being 
overlooked and falsification is only a last resort, if the paradigm fails to support itself 
– how then is science different to a religion? How is religious belief different to 
scientific fact? Is its’ rationale based on the same ground as the meta-physical and 
pseudo-scientific systems it looks to debunk, replace or explain? Here we can 
understand religious or political discourse and normal science as being ‘about’ the 
same sort of thing, that is, maintaining dominance as a belief system. To take Kuhn’s 
conception of normal science, as part of a logic of science, we either get serious 
problems with science as a practice or a conception of science that can be used to 
justify ‘fringe’ practices, that then become associated with ‘abstract philosophy.’116  
 
So how does one move from a normal science, a tradition that is insular, blinkered, 
non-seeking of novelty and lacks testing, to a place of ‘revolutionary’ science? The 
preceding paradigm has to have entered into a state of crisis, so much so, that the 
rules, puzzles and solutions as promised by the ruling paradigm constantly fail. This 
then leads scientists to look for alternative perspectives with which to explain these 
failures. How a paradigm gets itself into this state of crisis is not just a failure of 
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theory against observation. In Kuhn’s example of the ‘Copernican Revolution’ as a 
paradigmatic crisis, he points to additional factors as driving this change. It was the 
case that planetary movements, eclipses and equinoxes were meeting with the 
discrepancy of observation, but the reasons people were looking for accuracy in the 
first place was so that reliable calendars could be made. It was the social pressure of 
calendar reform, such as knowing when the date for Easter fell, that partly drove the 
development of the celestial models, and partly, why so much attention was placed in 
one area where ‘the break down first occurs’.117 For Kuhn, a new paradigm is not a re-
articulation of an old paradigm, but a ‘reconstruction of the field from new 
fundamentals.’118 For the strong reader, ‘fundamental’ here is understood as 
fundamental ontology.
119
 The weak reader understands any ability to articulate a field 
begins with its regional ontology. For even if we are re-stating something that is 
fundamental to a science, such as what type of space-time geometry we believe to be 
the case, this is still regional ontology. Yet, as the strong reader discerns no difference 
between ‘paradigm’ (what we say about the world) and the world itself (as a non-
entity) this reconstitution of ontology is understood as fundamental. It is with ‘crisis’ 
that the conflation between regional and fundamental ontology creates greater 
problems. It is with the paradigmatic shifts in knowledge that the methodological 
description of science becomes endangered. Here, the strong reader has no recourse to 
a methodological principle by which the truth of one paradigm can be assessed over 
another. This then also endangers those faculties and ideas that allow us to perform 
science in first place, such as reason, objectivity and truth.   
 
The ‘transition’ from one paradigm to another and the subsequent changing of how 
one views the field has been of significant interest to readers of Kuhn. In particular, 
his analysis of how or why one would choose between competing paradigms. On a 
strong reading, revolutions in science, to follow Kuhn’s language, are conversion 
experiences, or gestalt switches. The term ‘revolution’ itself has political 
connotations. A revolution being a violent upheaval of norms and traditions brought 
about, not by consensus, reasoned argument, or appeal to evidence, but as an 
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expression of dissatisfaction with the current status-quo and that change can only be 
brought about by force. Once the revolution is underway, why or how one is 
converted can lie in factors outside of the discourse of science. So that one becomes a 
proponent of a particular party of science for non-scientific reasons.
120
 The idea of 
conversion, or understanding by gestalt switch, implies an instantaneous shift in 
worldviews. The idea that scientific change between paradigms is a forced affair by 
way of rhetoric or literal visual-field alteration, with small appeal to evidence or 
scientific reasoning due to the paradigms controlling influence, means that competing 
paradigms are often ‘incommensurable’ with each other.121  
 
This is where I would like to look at the strong understanding of ‘world’ as the 
difference between ‘world’, as the planet we literally inhabit, and ‘world’ as non-
entity that structures our experiences. It is in this the first sense that the strong reader 
will proceed with Kuhn. The ‘world’ is what our knowledge and experiences are 
‘about’ and science as a methodological approach is ‘about’ the reality of this world. 
This is a purely discursive notion of world with definite properties and qualities. 
Scientists, like the layman, live in this world as an object that occupies space. The 
implication of ‘world change’, if taken literally, pushes forward the agenda of 
relativism as two people can now occupy two different conceptions of world and with 
it two different ‘about’ languages.122 Due to their language/ knowledge being about 
two different things, it is a short step to radical ‘incommensurability’. What is more, 
any non-literal way our strong reader can conceive of ‘world’, in paying Kuhn poetic 
license, will be limited by the methodological representation of it. Hence, Masterman 
finds Kuhn’s concepts vague or crude.123 Here we still have to explain how the 
‘world’, however non-literal, changes with scientific knowledge and how this might 
be achieved.
124
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7.6 - Incommensurability 
 
In the failure to give a complete account of the scientific enterprise, by a ‘logic’ of 
discovery, or that science works by a number of methodological principles, such as 
falsification, this leaves our strong interpreter of Kuhn with yet another problem. It is 
obvious that science is one of the most successful endeavors ever taken up by humans 
and yet we cannot adequately account for its success by its own methods. For if 
science is progressing in knowledge, becoming wider and deeper in its understanding 
of nature, and its advances are objectified by the development of better and more 
sophisticated technology, why cannot science give an account of itself? Some may 
then be forced to jump from the observation that science is unable to account for its 
own success, such as a theory of successful theories, to the conclusion that either 
‘paradigms’ are some mystical organizing property, or, science’s success is based on 
more than just methodology. The latter has been of great interest to philosophy, 
sociology and cultural studies, but still suffers from the strong-weak distinction that I 
have been arguing for.
125
 A strong form of this ‘more than just methodology’ that 
constitutes science’s success can be expressed in the dualisms of 
absolutism/objectivism/realism versus relativism/ subjectivism/anti-realism. This 
debate has been going on in philosophy, sociology and history of science for some 
time and does not show signs of ending anytime soon. Kitcher recognizes the futile 
tennis match that is scepticism about scientific progress and argues for the 
establishment of a serious historical epistemology. He says this is, ‘not needed merely 
to free us from the nagging of annoying skeptics [but] it can also play a powerful 
elucidatory role in domains of knowledge where our understanding of what the 
practitioners say and do is cloudy or incomplete.’126 What he singles out as historical 
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epistemology, I expand to public discourses of philosophy, where we may not 
necessarily just look at scientists, but also at what sceptics say and do.       
 
A bridging point from our discussion of ‘paradigms’ that will carry with it, on a 
strong reading, the deeper philosophical problems of ‘progress’, ‘objectivity’ and 
‘rationality’, is in chapter IX of Structure, where Kuhn writes,  
 
[A]s the problems change, so, often, does the standard that 
distinguishes a real scientific solution from a mere metaphysical 
speculation, word game, or mathematical play. The normal-scientific 
tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only 
incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has 
gone before.
127
 
 
Kuhn appears to be saying that two paradigms are not only mutually ‘incompatible’, 
but also ‘incommensurable’. Much has been made of this argument, that due to no 
objective third position, two paradigms cannot be evaluated for their comparative 
truth content.
128
 As what was once a genuine scientific puzzle or assumption in one 
paradigm, such as classical Euclidean geometry for Newtonian physics, is no longer a 
part of the puzzles or background assumptions of a different paradigm, such as, the 
non-Euclidean geometry of Einsteinian physics. The problems that the background 
assumptions raised for Newtonian physics, such as absolute space-time, now no 
longer exist in the new paradigm, but have changed to include different phenomena or 
predictions, that could not have been considered under the old paradigm. Moreover, 
with the retention of terms from one paradigm to the next we are faced with the 
concern of meaning variance over time. The problem then becomes, even if a new 
paradigm does incorporate a lot of the previous paradigm, do the concepts and terms 
still mean the same thing?
129
 Hacking expresses the linguistic-epistemological 
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significance of this for physicists when he writes that ‘Newton’s term ‘mass’ may not 
even mean what it does in Einstein’s relativistic physics’.130 So how do scientists 
know that they are measuring or talking about the same thing? Here, we start to 
venture into the realms of linguistic relativity and radical meaning variance. Where in 
order to understand another person’s language or culture we must first maximize what 
is obviously true or false, and from this we can then begin to understand what is 
common to experience. This view of interpretation by radical translation, where we 
put language first, can also be seen in the work of Geertz.
131
 For any sociology or 
philosophy of science that makes language or epistemology fundamental to the limits 
of the scientific process, we then can mistake what science is ‘about’ (things that can 
be said with a high probability) for its ‘of’ language (what can be said). For if only 
language constrains what can be known or how we know it, ideas central to science 
then become a ‘language construct like any other concept.’132 To start with language 
or knowledge as an expression of language in the strong reading, is to metaphysically 
fence oneself in. To begin with either is to start at the end of a process or chain of 
reasoning, not the beginning.
133
 What I mean by this is that to get to a stage where we 
can treat cultural, sociological or philosophical terms in the abstract, is to begin from 
a place where those terms already make sense to us. So, for the sorts of analysis and 
investigating where we can abstract the world into ‘things’, so it is ‘about’ language 
or knowledge production, is to take up a highly specialized relationship with the 
world. So to understand reality in relation to Einsteinian physics so that ‘change’ is 
about entropy or thermodynamics takes years of training. This way of viewing things 
is highly contrived, but it is the strong reader who inverts this as to understand that 
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our ways of being-in-the-world (‘of’ languages) emanates from our ‘about’ languages 
and are not the basis for them. To consider the methodological stance as primary, is to 
place an ‘about’ language prior to an ‘of’ language, which leaves the person with little 
room for understanding how statements about science can be anything other than 
methodological.   
     
If we place the source of incommensurability at the level of language, be it linguistic 
or textual, it can be argued that there is no objective third position from which to 
evaluate the problems of language. What is at stake in such an interpretation is that 
science, as well as philosophy, becomes in Rorty’s words, just another ‘kind of 
writing’.134 Here the claims of science can be placed alongside other literary genres or 
tropes. The simple one-to-one correspondence of science texts can thus be restated in 
socio-political or economic terms as a form of classic bourgeois realist interpretation, 
that occurs only through habit rather than any necessary relationship.
135
 Here the 
misunderstanding of the weak position can set philosophers such as Derrida, 
Heidegger, or Feyerabend up as ‘postmodern’, in that their suggestions are interpreted 
as being methodological substitutes for ‘truth’, ‘real’ or ‘objective’. If this is the case, 
not much can be done with these as ideas, as a notion of ‘truth’ that tries to undermine 
methodological propriety or logical form cannot be used in any positive sense for 
making claims about the world.  For that reason, it is possible to write that ‘Heidegger 
and Derrida are emblematic figures who not only do not solve problems, they do not 
have arguments or theses.’136 
 
As words like ‘true’ have their methodological expression as being ‘about’ something, 
which are always part of a process that make these notions known or meaningful. Yet, 
we by-pass this process and begin from an abstract conception of how language, 
mind, knowledge and world all hang together. If our language is always about 
something, to then bring that ‘something’ into doubt challenges this relationship. 
Rather, if we understand that the language ‘of’ communication is to be in a world that 
allows for meaningful statements to be expressed, such that our language already 
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refers to a world that has a history and our ideas are culturally bound to it. So as with 
Wittgenstein’s ‘private language’ argument, our language can never just be ‘about’ 
something as it comes from a lived process (an ‘of’ language), which is itself non-
linguistic. This argument will be developed more as part of the weak reading of 
‘incommensurability’.137 I will do this by placing the level of incommensurability in 
and around the problems of language and knowledge (‘about’), rather than paying 
attention to the conditions and practices that give debates about theories of meaning 
or truth their intelligibility (‘of’). Here, if we understand that incommensuability 
occurs as a result of a mismatch between our ‘about’ languages, we then have space to 
re-position what our language or knowledge is about. However, if like the strong 
reader, we think that incommensurability is a product of our ‘of’ languages, all those 
unpleasant logical problems to do with ‘truth’ arise. Yet, the very fact we are able to 
have the debate should make the even the strongest reader sceptical. That is, if strong 
incommensurability were really a problem we would not even be able to discuss it, let 
alone argue that certain positions are untenable.         
 
Kuhn states that we have to accept that when a paradigm changes the standards 
governing ‘permissible problems, concepts and explanations’ also change.138 The idea 
is that along with the paradigm, the contents of the paradigm change as well. Its 
concepts, methods, phenomena, what counts as evidence, and so on, all change. The 
terms may stay the same, but their meanings can change. In order to make sense of 
paradigm change, and what gives science the illusion of a fluid, incremental trajectory 
through time is that,  
 
[P]ast ‘paradigms’ are reinterpreted by current ‘paradigms’ to appear 
as if researchers of the past had been involved in the same projects as 
current researchers. Current historians of science read the past texts of 
science from the perspective of their own dominant paradigm thus, 
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they view past research as less competent attempts to disclose the 
same world.
139
  
 
This idea takes up an argument in Structure that is aimed at the positivistic view of 
science, where scientific knowledge is progressive and accumulative. The stronger 
implication is that later sciences cannot be derived from earlier ones, as the two do not 
and cannot share the ‘same world’. The two worldviews are ‘incommensurable’. 
Much has been made of this idea, almost to the point where it dominates the theme of 
Structure, as if the whole book were an argument for ‘incommensurability’, but in 
fact it is only mentioned about a dozen times.
140
 Strong Incommensurability as a 
central idea follows nicely from chapters, such as, ‘Revolutions as Changes of World 
View’.141 For if language and how we perceive the world are so tightly knit, 
something like a paradigm shift alters what the literal-world is like for us. Here Kuhn 
attempts to give a psychological account of why the world can take on different 
appearances, to different people, at different times.
142
 With this he is questioning the 
methodological attempt to produce a neutral observation language, when data/ 
evidence would appear not to be fixed, if the phenomena the paradigm permits can be 
so radically different in interpretation. If an object is given meaning by a theory and a 
theory is given meaning in relation to a paradigm, there is a sense in which people 
from different paradigms ‘see’ different things. How literal and far one takes this 
conclusion is a part of the strong interpretation.
143
 A strong reading of Kuhn takes 
both ‘incommensurability’ and ‘world change’ as a doctrine for relativism or a form 
of subjectivism that would make the scientific enterprise irrational or even nihilistic. 
The worry here is that scientific truths are not transcendental, but paradigm relative. 
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Kuhn does not give a definition of ‘incommensurability’ in Structure, but in order to 
derive the sorts of problems that a strong reading encounters we can take 
incommensurability to mean two things that are ‘incomparable’ or ‘incompatible’. 
This incomparability is not just of paradigms, but everything they contain, theories, 
beliefs, metaphysics, methods, standards for evidence and rationale.
144
 Kuhn 
introduces the concept early on in Structure ‘what differentiated these various schools 
was not one or another failure of method (they were all ‘scientific’) but what we shall 
come to call their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing 
science in it.’145 Later on in his discussion, when he analyses the nature and the 
necessity of scientific revolutions, he says ‘the normal-scientific tradition that 
emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually 
incommensurable with what has gone before’.146 Kuhn inquires as to why proponents 
of competing paradigms ‘may hope to convert the other to his way of seeing his 
science and its problems [but] neither may hope to prove his case’.147 He singles out 
three reasons why ‘the proponents of competing paradigms must fail to make 
complete contact with each other’s viewpoints.’148 We may already note the 
‘religious’ overtones of the use of the word ‘convert’ – that choices between 
paradigms are not based on evidence, but more on what seems like a form of 
revelation or blind faith. ‘In the first place, the proponents of competing paradigms 
will often disagree about the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must 
resolve. Their standards or their definitions of science are not the same’.149 ‘[Yet] 
more is involved than the incommensurability of standards’.150 Thus, for example, to 
make the transition from Newton’s to Einstein’s world, ‘the whole conceptual web 
whose strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on, had to be shifted and laid 
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down again on nature whole.’151 In a revealing statement about the disparities 
between these worlds Kuhn says,  
 
In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of 
competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. One 
contains constrained bodies that fall slowly, the other pendulums that 
repeat their motions again and again. In one, solutions are compounds, 
the other mixtures. One is embedded in a flat, the other in a curved, 
matrix of space. Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of 
scientists see different things when they look from the same point in 
the same direction [… ] Equally, that is why, before they can hope to 
communicate fully, one group or the other must experience the 
conversion that we have been calling a paradigm shift. Just because it 
is a transition between incommensurables, the transition between 
competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic 
and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at 
once (though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all.
152
 
 
The strong reader will take Kuhn’s notion of ‘different worlds’ as literal, that is to 
say, there will be two sets of languages and knowledge, that are about two different 
worlds. Our knowledge of the world is tied up with our beliefs and language through 
which we represent the world, but due to our occupying two different spaces 
consensual agreement is almost impossible. Their paradigms are about two different 
things. An incommensurability that is framed as this means that person a and person b 
can literally experience the world in two contradictory ways because the world is 
different for them.
153
 There can be no mutual point of reference over which to agree 
about things. Hoyningen-Huene has a sense of this strong reading with the 
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methodological conception of incommensurability. He says, ‘to gain knowledge about 
the subjects of world constitution means to treat them as objects belonging to one’s 
own world, and this implies the use of substantial parts of ones own idea of reality.’154 
The problem then is that one cannot get at a general theory of world independent of 
‘ones own idea of reality’.155 A possible source of this linguistic bind can be traced to 
Wittgenstein, but by the same token, what elements one stresses in his philosophy 
also producs a strong/ weak interpretation.
156
 The strong readers can just as easily 
situate their position as the result of this or that language-game. So their inability to 
express, compare, or validate the representational worldview can be by either a 
relativist account of truth or by investigating further the methodological relationship 
between language, knowledge and world. If we take incommensurability to be a 
mismatch between two points, each with its own subject-object language 
representation, then to map one point onto the other we would have to account for 
‘meaning variance’. A strong reading has Kuhn as advocating ‘radical meaning 
variance’ (RMV). For if all the terms of a theory derive their meaning in relation to 
one another from within the theory, the change in meaning of any one term can give 
rise to a change in all terms. So, if Einstein and Newton were describing different 
things or their terms had different meanings, then the theories are not in competition 
with each other as they are not theories about the same thing. This sort of conclusion 
is directly against the traditional view of science as an evolutionary progession of 
theories. Newton-Smith, argues for RMV in Kuhn, and goes to great lengths to show 
that it is irrational and a hindrance to scientific Enquirer.
157
 RMV also has implication 
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for the objects that the meanings of terms are supposed to refer to, in that, either 
people are talking about different objects, in which case, they cannot be compared. Or 
the objects about which we talk change in accordance with the changes in their 
meaning. These ideas are only operational at the level of regional ontology, in that, 
the objects of a domain are different or change only as much as we are able to 
describe or justify them in our ‘about’ languages. So, for Newton, ‘mass’ was about a 
constant quantity, where as for Einstein, it was about a relative quantity. Their 
paradigms were about different physics, which enable us to interpret the world 
differently. What the strong reader does not pay attention to is the ‘of’ language that 
allows us to recognize the paradigm and thus re-evaluate it. The ‘of’ language comes 
from being in the world, where we can then start to make statements about it through 
this specialized way of viewing it, that I have called the methodological stance. 
However, the strong reader regards paradigm and world as identical. So the world we 
have tacit understanding of (non-propositional/ non-literal), is the same as the world 
our thoughts, ideas and language are about (propositional/ literal). So when terms 
change their meanings, the objects to which those terms refer must change also.  
 
This particularly linguistic take on Kuhn is evident in Newton-Smith. He concerns 
himself with meaning change of scientific terms across paradigms. He cites Kordig’s 
arguments against RMV, that if communication between two paradigms is impossible, 
then RMV would be methodologically undesirable for scientists. Newton-Smith notes 
that just because a thesis is methodologically undesirable does not mean it is false. He 
says that ‘[RMV] does rule out thesis of verisimilitude, and this ought to prompt us to 
consider an alternative approach to the meaning of terms within scientific theories 
which does not give rise to [RMV].’158 Reading Kuhn through the ‘linguistic turn’ 
makes it hard to see how he was not advocating a form of RMV, yet at the level of 
commonsense, it seems unbelievable that two scientists, from different cultures or 
historical periods, cannot/did not see the same thing. This tie between language and 
perception is strengthened from Kuhn’s reference to reading Whorf in the preface to 
Structure.
159
 This, along with the meaning-holism that was being developed by Quine 
that was taking affect in the philosophy of science during that time period, may act as 
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a bridge to linguistic-cognitive relativism and social constructivism promised in the 
strong reading.  
 
Incommensurability limits our ability to share a world. Here we are trapped inside our 
own paradigms, forms of life, or language games. As Kuhn says, ‘practicing in 
different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from 
the same point in the same direction.’160 If we cannot compare theories or appeal to 
evidence or logic to discern between competing paradigms, what then can be those 
guiding factors? If we are not choosing between Einstein and Newton on the grounds 
that Einstein explains more and is more accurate than Newton, then on what grounds 
do we appeal? There would appear to be no rational reason for choosing one paradigm 
over another due to the inability to compare. Polkinghorne claims that ‘Kuhn does not 
flinch from drawing [this] conclusion’, and that he over emphases the role of social 
factors and personal psychology to the extent of ‘proclaiming the efficacy of scientific 
mob rule.’161 Those ‘interest groups’ that proliferate the strong reading actively 
encourage the irrationality of science or the intellectual weight of Kuhn’s association 
with it. Here they use ‘paradigm’ and ‘incommensurability’ as just one more 
rhetorical tool with which to deny evidence-based research, in areas that have socio-
political import, such as climate change studies.
162
 This undermining does not just 
apply to the natural sciences, but also our accounts of history. Chapman says ‘in the 
context of the culture wars […] historical revisionism is any attempt to revise 
historical understanding through political and ideological dishonesty.’163 This too can 
be a powerful rhetorical tool if the questioning of how things ‘really happened’ is tied 
to ideological notions, such as national identity. This intellectual dishonesty can be 
very hard to discern from legitimate critiques of Enlightenment ideals, if one only has 
a methodological understanding of how science and its associated terms work. So 
from the relativism detected in the strong reading of Kuhn we can form a critique of 
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‘how things really happened’, which for some is the work of ‘moral relativism, 
postmodern philosophy, and a “politically correct” agenda’.164  
 
7.7 - Introducing the Weak Reading 
 
In opposition to the strong reading, which puts the methodological conception of 
science first, and from which we derive an account of reality, I will offer the weak 
reading. As the ‘strong’ reading seems to appeal more to commonsense, I will make 
more of the concepts I presented in chapter 6, to distinguish the weak reading by.  
Science has to view things through the methodological lens, as this is part of how it 
works. It has to abstract the world into ‘things’ in order to get to the level of normal 
science, which permits the acute level of inquiry needed. This is all very well for 
‘doing’ science, but a PUoS is not about ‘doing’ science, but understanding and 
talking ‘about’ science. This does not require the methodological stance, but what I 
have called the ‘historical approach’. Putting his more radical sounding conclusions to 
one side, Heidegger warned that if we only understand life in terms of the 
methodological stance we not only then begin to interpret ourselves in those terms, 
but we take it to be the fundamental description of what it is to be human.
165
 Science 
then becomes the only genuine form of understanding – not only for comprehending 
nature but our own existence. This can be harmful in a number of respects. Where we 
understand science, which is a human historical practice, in terms of its abstract 
metaphysical cousin, Ww also create the means to demote the role of philosophy as a 
way of thinking about science. To give people only the tools to think about science as 
a methodological procedure is to limit our ability to interpret it and to think in general. 
To put the question ‘what is science?’ ahead of ‘what does it mean to be scientific?’ 
limits the role philosophy can play and also gives us a metaphysical template by 
which to think about ourselves. The problem then amounts to an ethical and political 
one, where if we can only discuss science (and by proxy philosophy) as part of a 
methodological view, which then dominates what we can say about terms, such as, 
‘real’, ‘truth’, or ‘reason’, we have cut ourselves off from whole area of enquiry and 
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intellectual rigour. Thus to hold a view of reality that is not based upon the 
empiricist’s metaphysics, when put against this dominant methodological view, ends 
up appearing absurd or just wrong.
166
 
 
The philosophical notions we have dealt with so far such as truth, objectivity, and 
reason, are all things we would normally associate with science. What the historical 
perspective does is argue that these are all unquestioned assumptions we have 
conceptually built upon, by placing them as the basis for our methodological view. 
The historical approach will try and show that what the methodological view calls 
fundamental, is actually a regional ontology. Kuhn’s description of scientific change, 
when understood through a strong reading, presents the problems of what we assign 
the term ‘real’ to, or what ‘progress’ means, and indeed, ‘what’ science is progressing 
towards? For now most scientists in their normal state can just accept that science 
works and avoid the deep philosophical issues, which again, is fine for doing science, 
but I would say completely inadequate for understanding what it means to be 
scientific. The important point to be made here is that a public understanding of 
science (and philosophy) can be easily up-ended if science as a methodological 
abstraction is shown to be problematic. If we think this problem is a result of the 
methodological interpretation, and we have no other conceptual tools for thinking 
about science with, we then have to rely on science as a self-sustaining definition or 
give up on philosophy as a method. The developing and gathering of these 
‘conceptual tools’ is not part of the scientific process, but belongs to philosophy. 
 
In the next chapter, I will construct the weak reading of Kuhn, again looking at the 
same concepts, but doing so from the historical approach. Here the concepts laid out 
in chapter 6 will be more explicitly applied as this is the harder version to understand, 
if one is already coming to it as a strong reader. What I want to show is that 
interpretation is not just a matter of reading but it involves a philosophical 
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understanding. The weak reading is more useful for a PUoS than the strong reading, 
in that it protects the epistemic authority of science, and it also gives a role for 
philosophy as a part of public discourse in talking ‘about’ science. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
The Weak Reading 
 
8.1 - Kuhn and Structure – Recap of the Strong Reading 
  
In the last chapter it was argued, that without much effort, we could derive a reading 
of Kuhn that has him as a relativist, subjectivist, or irrationalist about science. It was 
understanding Kuhn through a methodological perspective, that I have called the 
‘strong’ reading, which situates epistemology in the reader’s mind as the driving force 
behind Kuhn’s take on science. As science is always ‘about’ something, we take this 
‘about’ as undifferentiating and universal.  Science is about making true or at least not 
false statements about the world. The strong reader understands this ‘about’ as 
fundamental to science. The ‘weak’ reader, on the other hand, understands this as a 
metaphysical belief about the organization of science. For in order to get to this stage 
where the ‘world’ or ‘reality’ is a universal entity that all scientists describe 
objectively, we have to have already engaged with a model of ‘reality’ that has 
knowledge, language and world hanging together in a particular way. Here our 
knowledge and language are always ‘about’ the world, that is sensible and intelligible 
to us, yet how we make knowledge or language about a particular thing is not 
contained within the ‘about’ language itself.   
   
As our language is always ‘about’ something, for the weak reader, what we see or 
understand that ‘something’ as is a historical question. In opposition to the ‘strong’ 
reading I will offer its weak counterpart, the ‘historical approach’. This reading will 
challenge the strong reader, but if they cannot accept the starting premise, it will 
appear to make the strong reading all the more credible. In doing so, it will also make 
the weak reading seem all the more unnecessary. That is, if we understand an 
essentially historical question or critique as being a methodological substitute, it 
produces highly counter-intuitive and nonsensical answers, which can then be 
projected back at the practice that created them, that is to say, philosophy. This 
produces such questions as how a second-order activity, like philosophy, could know 
more about the ‘world’ than a first-order activity, like science? If a philosopher or 
cultural theorist is understood as doing the same job as a scientist or their claims are 
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taken to be achieving the same sorts of thing, it is this issue that defenders of science 
have rallied against. Bricmont and Sokal highlight what they believe to be such claims 
from the humanities, where ‘the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the 
construction of scientific knowledge.’1 If we take such claims as read, what value is a 
subject that can suggest that, ‘what there is’ plays little or no role in science? 
Bricmont and Sokal state outright that their problem with such claims is one of 
epistemology and methodology, which is vindication for the strong reader that this is 
where the problems lie.
2
 Whether arguments in philosophy of science or sociology of 
scientific knowledge are meant as a means to more reliable knowledge than science, is 
why we should study such claims in depth and not accept received readings. Part of 
this confusion, I argue, comes from an understanding that is already based in terms 
and phenomena that are already interpreted for us. We come to a ‘text’ with pre-
critical ideas about how the world is, but those ideas and ways of understanding come 
to us already made meaningful by activities that pre-exist us. This pre-critical 
understanding is bound up in benign terms like ‘commonsense’, ‘reality’, or ‘literal’. 
Norris on Derrida makes a similar point. Concepts like those mentioned ‘will always 
have been ‘worked’ or elaborated in advance by the discourse of philosophic reason.’3  
 
It is the weak reading that will help problematize a ‘received view’ of Kuhn, and with 
it, expose the basis for producing such a view by inverting the elements of the ‘strong’ 
reading.     
 
8.2 - The Weak Reading 
 
The strong reader starts with regional ontology. Science is always already ‘about’ 
things. As paradigms tells us what the world is like, and knowledge/ language are the 
starting points for the strong reader, these then share an identity with the world. For if 
our theories, experiments, evidence, and observations are always ‘about’ the world, 
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and the paradigm dictates how we do this, they are then also ‘about’ the paradigm. If 
all we have is an ‘about’ language, in explaining the kind of problems that traditional 
philosophy of science throws up, we are left with only a few ways to interpret such 
problems. 
 
The weak reader can also begin with regional ontology or what our science is ‘about’, 
but they do so on the understanding that how we come to situate something as a 
proper scientific object is historical. For Newtonian theories to be about absolute 
space-time or constant mass, the ‘world’ had to allow such possibilities to exist for 
Newtonians. For the problems and issues of Newtonian physics to be experienced as a 
‘problem’, one has to be involved with the language ‘of’ Newtonain physics. This 
applies to how science was conducted and permitted those ‘abouts’ of Newtonian 
physics to be thought of as meaningful. This is to bring in extra-scientific factors such 
as theology, Ancient Greek metaphysics and so on. For the weak reading to be 
conducted something has to take place before regional ontology, before we can 
abstract and our theories and language as about something. The weak reader 
understands the conditions for making the methodological view as the basis for 
producing a historical account. This is achieved by placing, what I have called an 
‘about’ language, as either equivalent or prior to what I have called an ‘of’ language. 
An ‘of’ language is pre-theoretical and pre/ non-propositional. Any way of examining 
or describing something is necessarily ‘about’ something. Yet, the conditions for such 
a state of certainty to be achieved, one has to already be engaged in practices, made 
meaningful by the world, that do not originate in those discursive practices. For 
example, the rules of football are about football. The playing of football is football. 
The activity has to precede what our thoughts and language will be about. It is starting 
with the ‘about’ language, however, where most of philosophy and commonsense 
thinking finds itself. From which we try and recapture this ‘of’ non-discursive 
element. A way forward from here is that because our ‘about’ and ‘of’ languages 
cannot be the same, it is the role of philosophy to problematize our models of reality 
or language where these distinctions have been conflated. 
 
However, in order to write about an ‘of’ language I have to take up an ‘about’ 
language. That is to take up a methodological stance to articulate something that is 
non-methodological. Just because I have to go via an ‘about’ language to articulate 
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what an ‘of’ language is, does not make the ‘about’ language more fundamental or 
important.
4
 It is this same problem that I think occurs in talking about and 
understanding what science is. For any method for disclosing what there is is already 
dominated by the methodological interpretation of science. I have argued that this is 
what we see with the problem of demarcation (PoD). One cannot give a 
methodological account of what makes something a science. Yet, because an ‘of’ 
language is pre-theoretical and can only be expressed through an ‘about’ language, it 
is very hard to not re-interpret this in terms of other ‘about’ languages. So where the 
weak reader will want to say, that to see the world as ‘geo-centric’ is a statement 
about belonging to a world that allowed this way of seeing it to be meaningful, the 
strong reader still regards this as expressing something about psychology or language. 
As Dalston says, for example, ‘in the end even scientific ‘ways-of-seeing’ are 
ultimately, consciously or unconsciously, psychological’.5  
 
Whilst it might not be obvious that Structure can be understood as an argument for 
the primacy of ‘of’ languages, it is from taking ‘about’ languages or regional ontology 
as our starting point that the more pernicious readings can be sustained.
6
 By exposing 
the metaphysical basis of something like the ‘strong’ reading, we cannot only defend 
science from those ‘interest groups’ who may wish to hijack a certain reading of 
Kuhn, but also find a role for philosophy in recognizing ‘sloppy thinking’ and not 
promoting it. In looking to undermine or defend science, texts ‘lend themselves to 
strategies of reading whose intent is always part of a struggle for interpretative 
power.’7 Whoever can lay claim to the authentic meaning of Kuhn gets to say what he 
means. So when Kuhn writes, ‘though the world does not change with the change of a 
paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world. Nevertheless, I am 
convinced that we must learn to make sense of statements that at least resemble 
these’, we have to ask ‘how’ and ‘who’ is performing this interpretative service so we 
can already understand Kuhn as a relativist or not.
8
 What makes the weak reading 
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conducive to PUoS is that it understands the activities of scientists as historical and 
what it means to be scientific as a historical act.
9
 This can be directly related to the 
weak reading, in that, one could potentially trace the available possible interpretations 
of a philosopher by the surrounding historical debates. So, in giving the public 
another means to interpret science and opening up its possible meanings, they are not 
conceptually confined to only a methodological understanding. So when a project like 
demarcation is shown to be faulty by ‘alternative’ practices, the public have recourse 
to explain such failures, and not be led to the conclusion that there are no differences 
between science and non-science as epistemic enterprises. 
     
This approach from the historical angle is not new. Friedman has argued that science 
itself is tied to the historical context within which the surrounding debates of science 
contribute to those paradigmatic shifts.
10
 The PUoS and the historical approach, 
however, are both parts of thinking about science and not doing it. It is in thinking 
about science that we might find there is more than just one approach and indeed it 
might reveal why the methodological perspective is so dominant in the discourses on 
science. What-is-more, if we only identify ‘philosophical’ thinking with the ability to 
produce an abstract methodological account of science, we start to lose some of the 
more critical aspects of philosophy as a practice. In my attempt to give a polarized 
account of Kuhn, it may help to see where already existing attempts to deconstruct 
Kuhn have drawn their lines. Fuller, for example, identifies ‘relativistic’ and 
‘universalist’ readings of Structure.11 My point, however, is not to produce just 
another reading of Kuhn as a part of Kuhn scholarship, but that what is detectable in 
Kuhn is symptomatic of a tendency in the philosophy of science, its dialogue with the 
natural sciences and its implications for PUoS. That if we read Kuhn or certain 
critiques of science as only methodological suggestions, we begin to confuse how 
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philosophy relates to science and we end up with the relativism some readers accuse 
Kuhn of. The weak reader’s goal is to uncover the source of this confusion, and by 
doing so, removing the metaphysical basis for such interpretations, be they are 
positive or negative.  This at once dissolves any parasitism a pseudo-science might 
have in relation to genuine science, or reveal the inherent problems within something 
like the PoD, and show the value of philosophy in the process of doing so.  
 
The following reading will also try to problematize the ‘literal/ metaphor’ order in 
Kuhn. As an indication as to how philosophy may help us make sense of misplaced 
metaphor, or show us how we are committed to a metaphysical notion, I will briefly 
examine the notion of public ‘literacy’. For up until now I have been re-using the 
metaphor of ‘literacy’ for PUoS and philosophy. Yet it would seem problematic. To 
be literate, either grammatically or technologically, is to suggest one can do 
something proficiently by way of understanding rules and how those rules are applied. 
This metaphor has its source in the methodological way of thinking. Rather, ‘literacy’ 
or ‘rule application’ only means something because we are involved in the activities 
of communication.
12
 As Wittgenstein shows in his ‘rule following paradox’ there is 
no ‘rule’ for rule application. For whatever the rule is, any action can be brought into 
accord or conflict with it at the same time.
13
 A rule is what one does with it.
14
 Not to 
delve too deep, there is an internal contradiction to the metaphor if we consider 
‘literacy’ in its methodological guise. To be literate is to know how to apply the rules 
of written and spoken grammar. Once we are proficient at this the individual can 
continue to read and write in new contexts by applying those same rules, and we 
would say they are literate. To be literate is to be literate in a language whose main 
function is to be understood or communicate. By knowing the ‘rules’ we have a 
standardized way of achieving this. Yet, in English there are no ‘hard’ rules of 
grammar. There are general rules, but in each instance there will be an exception 
when they are broken. There is no rule for knowing when a rule is to be broken in 
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order to make sense.
15
 Part of language is that people will appropriate words, change 
spellings and give different pronunciations, but this is all part of living language. Yet 
there is no methodological imperative to say when we should break with tradition or 
the conventional rules in order for communication to occur. We say illiteracy is the 
ignorance of rule application or the illegitimate breaking of rules, but if the point of 
language is to communicate, we may need to break rules in order to be understood. 
Yet, if we take language to be part of some Austinian ‘speech-act’ performance, 
whatever obstructs communication is deviant to language.
16
 ‘Literacy’ is the learning 
of these communicative rules in performative speech acts yet, it also appears to be in 
antagonism with making oneself understood, which ‘literacy’ is supposed to aid. 
 
8.3 - Framing the Weak Reading 
 
The weak reading suggests that if Structure is understood as a theory of methodology, 
with its roots in either epistemology or linguistics, it produces either banal truisms or 
radical conclusions. Questions that are integral to the PUoS, such as ‘what is 
science?’, if taken as methodological question, end up either not being able to 
definitely say what science is (PoD) or we blame the tools by which the question 
came about (philosophy). Rather, the weak reading says that to start from a point of 
methodology is already to begin from a contrived position. To start from questions of 
epistemology or linguistics and how they make contact with the ‘world’, or to 
presuppose a commonsense realism which allows objects to be abstracted into ‘about’ 
languages, is for the weak reader, the end of a process not the beginning of inquiry. 
Admittedly, this is where scientific thinking begins but historically and 
philosophically we have had to come a long way to make this abstract situation appear 
routine.
17
 For it is science that establishes the ‘about’ in most investigative empirical 
questions, but when the ‘about’ is directed back on to science we find ourselves in an 
unhelpful loop where it then begins to deconstruct itself. Here philosophy is seen as 
doubly useless, as it not only has problematized what seems like a sensible and 
important question, but it allows for counter-intuitive responses to be taken seriously. 
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Terms such as ‘true’ or ‘reality’ are overlooked as not being methodologically 
necessary in science but act more as heuristics. Weinberg says, the reality of the laws 
of nature are as ‘real’ as rocks to him. He says this is ‘not a philosophical argument, 
but rather a personal report, that my experience of the laws of nature in my work as a 
physicist has the same qualities that in the case of rocks make me say that rocks are 
real.’18 What follows from this, for Weinberg, is that philosophers can help clarify 
terms such as ‘real’ and ‘true’, but ‘they have no business telling us [scientists] not to 
use them.’19 The weak reader would object to this on the grounds that it does not 
matter what we call something, be it ‘real’ or ‘true’, but it is the fact that we already 
know what these terms mean and apply them liberally that should puzzle us.
20
 To start 
with a debate about the use of a term, as Weinberg argues, is to begin at the end of a 
long process of inculcated philosophical thought. Part of what I will argue under the 
weak reading is that the methodological understanding of terms like ‘true’ or ‘real’ is 
the naturalized use of metaphor. Where we have confused a metaphysical abstraction 
for something more concrete.  
 
The weak reading starts with people and what they do. This means to be alive in an 
active culture and society. What will come to the fore in the weak reading is how, 
unlike the strong reader who starts with what our language/knowledge is ‘about’, they 
will begin with the ‘of’ language. An ‘of’ language is how we are in the world, it is 
our practices, and it is how we are involved with things. Without an ‘of’ language no 
‘about’ languages can be formed. Something like the PoD tries to reverse this by 
stating what science is in terms of what science is about. For science is about 
falsification, but it also about a number of other things that can be brought into 
conflict with any singular principle. Science, rather, is what scientists do, which 
frustratingly for philosophers of science, is not governed by a logo-centric idea of 
what science is. So in looking at what people have historically done ‘we are not 
studying an object, but a process’.21 This is where the weak reader finds themselves at 
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the beginning of Structure, in the difference between the traditional methodological 
conceptions of science and how science transforms as a historical process. It is only 
when the reality of objects postulated in theories, or the veracity of the theories 
themselves are highlighted as problematic (beyond puzzle-solving) through crisis, that 
the paradigm of normal science is revealed to be grounded in something other than its 
methodological principles. Feynman suggested a type of wisdom to know when to 
suspend any commitment to past-accepted explanations.
22
 In crisis, the regional 
ontology of normal science and its constituting paradigm become ‘visible’. The 
paradigm moves from its ‘of’ language in normal science to now being about the 
paradigm itself, through the new language ‘of’ revolutionary science. So the language 
of the Newtonian paradigm is ‘about’ Newtonian physics and objects. The language 
‘of’ the Newtonian paradigm is to practice physics in such a way that helps us 
generate the theories and objects it is about.
23
 This way of doing physics was highly 
successful, but eventually enough anomalies built up with what Newtonian physics 
was ‘about’ (i.e., faster than light speeds, infinite space-time, constant mass, and so 
on) that how physics was done began to change in order to resolve these problems. In 
order to do this, rather than continue within the ‘of’ language of Newtonian physics, 
we have to turn the search lights back onto the paradigm to see where we are 
potentially going wrong. We now have a new way of doing physics. Famously it was 
the Einsteinian paradigm that replaced the Newtonian one, and so it was from the 
language ‘of’ Einsteinian physics (i.e., doing physics in such a way that did not 
require those problematic Newtonian assumptions) that the ‘new physics’ is now 
about something different. Scientists, thus, take up a new perspective of re-
constituting the paradigm as an object of inquiry, where we can now attend to the 
shortcomings of whatever it is we are looking to replace. We learn from history that 
when paradigms are in a revolutionary or unstable state, knowledge is very difficult to 
produce. Yet, this difficulty hardly ever results in the raising of questions over 
fundamental as opposed to regional ontology. As science is a derived activity, 
scientists can ‘attend carefully to entities without having to inquire into their being’, 
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which is the preferred state for knowledge production.
24
 For it is precisely this 
questioning of being that is prominent in the revolutionary states of science.  
 
Just as ideas may already be interpreted for us, a Kuhnian term like ‘paradigm’ is now 
fairly common. It is used within fields such as business management, but they still 
seem to carry a particular understanding of what it is.
25
 Kuhn, does not write in the 
language of ‘about’ and ‘of’ languages, but terms like ‘paradigm’, ‘normal science’, 
‘revolutionary science’, ‘crisis’, and ‘incommensurability’, are all ways of doing 
science.
26
 They all reference an ‘of’ language from what they are ‘about’. The weak 
reader understands the nominal notion of ‘science’ as ‘textbook science’, which we 
might identify with ‘normal science’ as made possible through a paradigm. This 
science when investigated as a ‘thing’ can be typically broken down into 
methodological principles. Likewise, when we view ‘revolutionary science’, we view 
it from our current position, which more often than not, is during the ‘peace time’ of 
normal science. All of the current successful languages of science are ‘about’ 
something and how we get to that ‘something’ is re-told as part of the methodological 
story of science. Here our current paradigm partly instructs how that story goes, but 
this story is not binding. In order to progress and uncover the problems with our 
current paradigm, such as the incompatibility of relativistic and quantum physics, we 
need a new paradigm from which we can view the errors of our current ways of doing 
science. We need to turn it into an ‘about’, which requires some as yet unpracticed 
‘of’ language. I take this to be the problem that Stanford wishes to answer with his 
‘unconceived alternatives’.27  
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If we think of the periods of ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ science rather not as distinct 
methodological entities, but as comments on what it means to be acting scientifically 
at a given time, this will help reveal the depth available in Kuhn. Even when scientists 
engage with the humanities in their studies of science their conclusions and 
understanding are still comments on what it means to be scientific. This is the case, 
even when for the most part, their concerns do not extend past the epistemological or 
methodological.
28
 
 
8.4 - A General Structure of Structure 
 
Language and knowledge for Kuhn are essentially historical. Wherever one takes as 
their starting point in time concepts, ideas and values are presupposed. The 
importance of history for Kuhn is shown in the ‘Introduction’ and first chapter, where 
he outlines ‘A Role for History’.29 The periods of history Kuhn wants to take as his 
exemplars for scientific change are the ‘Copernican Revolution’, the development of 
the theories of oxygen and electricity, the instrumental application of x-rays, and the 
superseding of Newtonian by Einsteinian physics. In looking at the historical 
activities of scientists, Kuhn is attempting a re-evaluation of the historical 
development of science. By spelling out the different stages of scientific revolution 
and what is necessary for scientific crisis, the weak reader understands that science is 
more than just its methodology. The strong reader wants to account for this ‘more 
than’ by methodological means, be it through cognitive science or the structures of 
theories. The weak reader wants to understand this as a problem of how those ‘about’ 
languages are grounded in an ‘of’ language. So what precedes the establishment of 
knowledge are activities that allow for ways of talking and doing science to be 
meaningful. Kuhn, however, never explicitly states the resolution to his problem, only 
a number of ways it may be tackled.  
 
For the weak reader ‘paradigms’ are not things, but are what structure our experiences 
or what might be a system of relations. They are discursive attempts at describing the 
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‘literal’ world, but they are only possible due to being grounded in the ‘non-literal’ 
world with which we are tacitly engaged. Paradigms tell scientists what their activities 
are ‘about’, but it is the strong reader who then collapses this distinction on to the 
world, as if the paradigm and world were the same thing. 
  
Paradigms can be thought of as the meanings and interpretations that are possible or 
available to us in interpreting and giving an account of the ‘literal’ world. What is 
crucial to the weak reading is that paradigms are not the world, they are what enable 
us to see something ‘as’ something.30 So both Aristotle and Newton ‘saw’ falling 
objects, but they saw them ‘as’ different phenomena due to their paradigms, which are 
intrinsically connected to the time in which they lived. In periods of normal science 
paradigms can stand in for the world, as they are so good at telling us what ‘reality’ is 
like or what to expect. However, because they are not the world and it is in times of 
crisis that this becomes apparent, research can still be conducted in the absence of a 
ruling paradigm.
31
 As we are first and foremost always already in and part of the 
‘non-literal’ world, we have a tacit understanding of it that guides our practices in 
trying to express it in a ‘literal’ sense. Paradigms legitimize certain ways of acting or 
ideas as possible, which is what regulates the methodological content. So only certain 
things can count as evidence, observation, theory, justification, explanation and so on, 
but what the history of science shows us is that these do change. What we must note is 
that just because a paradigm provides the possible interpretations for a phenomenon 
that does not mean ‘any’ interpretation is possible or equally likely. Strictly speaking, 
I do not experience the world ‘as’ rotating, but that does not mean I can live my life as 
a 21
st
 century geo-centrist. Of course I am free to believe the earth is not rotating, but 
that belief is in no way meaningful for the time I happen to be living in. I cannot 
override the possibilities given to me by my culture and history.
32
 It is this that 
worries the opponents of relativism, that if truth is not grounded in simple one-to-one 
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correspondence what is to stop the astrologer’s ‘truth’ being equivalent to the 
astronomer’s ‘truth’? What is to stop infinite interpretations of texts or continual 
underdetermination by evidence? This observation also applies to the strong-weak 
reading, that any particular interpretation of Kuhn is itself a product of history, which 
is why I argue for the presence of philosophy as a type of constructive self-
undermining practice.
33
  
    
Kuhn sees the historical dimension to the development of thought as crucial for 
understanding how thought changes. He suggests that the popular ‘textbook’ picture 
of science is ‘the piecemeal process by which these items have been added, singly and 
in combination, to the ever growing stockpile that constitutes scientific technique and 
knowledge’.34 And that this view is only tenable on the grounds that one is unaware of 
how science develops. If we regard Kuhn as presenting a theory for scientific change, 
in the sense that he is providing some overarching philosophy of science so that we 
might investigate how science is ‘really’ done, is to concentrate on the normative, 
prescriptive aspects of Kuhn’s writing. If this becomes what is important to Kuhn he 
then suffers from a need to explain why scientific revolutions and paradigms change, 
rather than just show that they do.
35
 For example, he determines there to be three foci 
for normal factual scientific investigation so that, there are in principle three types of 
phenomena about which a new theory maybe developed or how all crisis will close in 
one of three ways, all of which seems arbitrary.
36
 Rather, if we read Kuhn as trying to 
undermine the traditional, normative, grand philosophical approach to science by 
taking the pre-theoretical aspects more seriously, such as, paradigms as meaning 
fixing, tacit understanding, or the ontological character of his general description, the 
normative interpretation seems less problematic. This pre-theoretical element is part 
of what I have called an ‘of’ language.  
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8.5 - Paradigm  
 
Kuhn notes in the ‘postscript’ to Structure that ‘several of the key difficulties of my 
original text cluster about the concept of paradigm’. He then tries to give a separation 
of paradigm from scientific community.
37
 He suggests that this may be done by 
thinking of paradigms in two ways, that ‘on the one hand, it stands for the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a 
given community’, Kuhn identifies this with the sociological interpretation.38 On the 
other hand, paradigm can be thought of as ‘one sort of element in that constellation, 
the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace 
explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.’39 
With these two distinctions Kuhn tries to pin point the location for much of the early 
confusion over his text.
40
 Definition one is paradigm as a definite set of objects, 
beliefs, techniques and values in which people share. These are open to inspection via 
historical, sociological or psychological study. By ‘scrutinizing the behavior of a 
given community’s members’ one may be able to identify the paradigm at work.41 
This could be viewed as paradigm writ large. Kuhn gives definition two as 
‘exemplary past achievements’ or ‘shared example’.42 This can be viewed as 
paradigm writ small. Kuhn, then says, ‘philosophically, at least, this second sense of 
‘paradigm’ is the deeper of the two’.43 Pulling Kuhn’s two definitions apart, the first 
definition can be taken as just that, where it is the ‘entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community’.44 By 
looking at what people do, say and believe, we can study the paradigm under which 
they practiced. Unfortunately for Kuhn, in giving his second definition he says by 
focusing on ‘one sort of element in that constellation’ namely, ‘exemplary past 
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achievements’ ‘exemplars’, or ‘shared examples’ as replacing the rules for puzzle-
solutions, he then wants to redefine paradigm as a ‘disciplinary matrix.’45 This has the 
effect of throwing attention back onto paradigm as understood through the first 
definition. Where if we look at what scientists do, say and believe we can work out 
what the structure of the paradigm is.
46
 The weak reader will realize that paradigms as 
‘exemplar’ is the way out of our circular definition of paradigm. Where a paradigm is 
what people practice and what people practice is the paradigm.
47
 What we have to 
reflect on is why a specific period of scientific activity is significant. Paradigms do 
not command full consent, but they provide enough structure that something like 
normal science can occur.
48
 Yet, there is enough room for debate, doubt and challenge 
that means the paradigm is never fully secure. Zammito says that because of a 
paradigm’s tie to normal science, something only becomes paradigmatic if it allows 
‘ongoing, and fruitful practice; hence, it is a historical concept’.49 When scientists 
receive their training it will always be through a paradigm, otherwise there would be 
nothing to train for. The paradigm will have already picked out what is significant for 
the scientist to study and how it should be done. The empirical content of theory and 
explanation are given meaning by the paradigm.
50
 In this respect the paradigm tells 
the scientist what the (literal) world and their science is ‘about’. Yet whilst this 
‘about’ language would make it seem that we literally experience the world, we 
always experience it as something. In the sciences this is normally as ‘nature’. The 
world in the ‘non-literal’ sense (system of relations – ‘of’ language) is what allows us 
to entertain notions such as the ‘literal’ world in the abstract. Any paradigm is rooted 
in this sense of the world through our ‘of’ languages, which we may call the practices 
of scientists.  
 
Science represented as a combination of Baconian or Popperian principles is a 
caricature of what science is, by eliding over what it is that scientists actually do. The 
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standard strong interpretation says we have to learn to disregard our inclination to 
make sense of the world, to overlook the world as it appears to us. Science has done 
such a good job at isolating properties and abstracting the world into equations, laws 
and theories, we now take what is ‘everyday’ to us, such as meaning or values, to not 
be part of the ‘real’ world but ‘literally’ in our heads. The world as described by 
science is made up of matter in various stages of motion and entropy. Again this 
interpretation would be a problem if it were the only available one. What the strong 
reader takes to be fundamental, such as the paradigm of elementary particle physics, 
is actually a regional ontology, an ‘about’ language that tells us what the aggregate 
parts of atoms are about. This, however, is rooted in the ‘of’ language of those people 
that practice science. It is the strong reader who sees the ‘about’ language (science as 
knowledge) as being more fundamental to reality than our ‘of’ language (science as 
process). In placing the ‘about’ language as being more fundamental than the ‘of’ 
language, we mistake a metaphysical conception of science for a lived activity. This is 
akin to Heidegger’s complaint of misplacing regional ontology as fundamental 
ontology.
51
 Whilst this is not so much a problem for scientists, as they will have a 
tacit understanding of what science is, it does however, severely limit a public 
understanding of science for non-scientists, as they will only be presented with its 
methodological interpretation.   
 
As noted above I am using the term ‘world’ in two senses, ‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’. 
Just to clarify his distinction. We can all agree that we share the same planet (literal), 
but the ‘non-literal’ world of an Amazonian tribal chief is different to the world of a 
Hong-Kong business executive. If we understand this distinction as both pertaining to 
the ‘literal’ world, such that Hong-Kong and the Amazon are different geographical 
places, containing two different peoples, this observation seems trivial. Going the 
other way, if we understand ‘world change’, not as the change in the ‘non-literal’ 
world, where new meanings and possibilities for interpretation and ways of practicing 
science open up. Rather, ‘world change’ here is understood as the morphing of the 
‘literal’ world, where we literally see different objects. From this we get the kind of 
strong incommensurability that troubles the opponents of relativism. Strong 
incommensurability is to confuse the first situation for the second. The difference 
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between these two types of ‘world change’ can be found in Kuhn, when he says 
‘though the world does not change with the change of a paradigm, the scientist 
afterward works in a different world. Nevertheless, I am convinced that we must learn 
to make sense of statements that at least resemble these.’52 The strong and the weak 
reading both make sense of this statement, but it is the weak reading that I will argue 
is more the useful. For science to ‘work’, which for me means to bring about a state of 
normal science, the paradigm has to remain hidden or invisible. It is only when the 
paradigm goes into crisis do we see that our core concepts as being contingent and our 
assumptions as opaque. What the paradigm tells us should be methodologically 
fundamental to explanation (quantum or relativistic reality) is actually exposed as 
deficient for such a task. When Kuhn says ‘none of these crisis-promoting subjects 
has yet produced a viable alternate to the traditional epistemological paradigm’ the 
strong reader understands this as inevitable.
53
 There can be no viable alternatives, for 
what would we ground that knowledge on? The weak reader understands that to 
achieve the methodological abstract version of science, we first have to understand 
science in its ‘of’ form.  
 
We do not normally deal in ‘knowledge’, but as this is what science does the scientist 
has to take up different modes of relating to the world. Methodologically it is useful to 
have science only as an ‘about’ language. Here we break science down into ‘things’, 
such as, testing, falsification, observation, prediction and so on. Yet, historically we 
find that this is not all there is to what scientists do and in those episodes of 
paradigmatic crisis our methodological notion of ‘knowledge’ becomes challenged. 
Here we then start to scrutinize what our concepts and terms are actually ‘about’? Are 
they real? Are they true as long as they are useful? This is where the average 
philosopher of science joins the debate. Yet despite the recurrent crises that science 
undergoes this is not enough for scientists to challenge the epistemological paradigm 
through which knowledge discovery and justification are framed. The strong reader 
wants to maintain this separation where as the weak reader will want to say such a 
division is a product of the methodological understanding. So, just because a 
historical reading of methodology problematizes ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’, is not 
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to say, ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ do not occur. Shimony, however, conflates this 
historical rendering of methodology for methodology itself when he says Kuhn denies 
science the possibility for ‘ultimate justification’ in its practices or results.54 
 
A paradigm is a particularly potent interpretation of ‘reality’. Its potency, 
paradoxically, is felt by how absent it is. Paradigms, like being for Heidegger, are at 
their most effective when they are invisible. Here we look straight through the 
paradigm and just see objective ‘reality’. We do not question ‘reality’. We just get on 
with things. The language ‘of’ the paradigm helps it remain invisible and so we only 
see what our theories and observations are ‘about’, yet we know that these can and do 
change. It is this sense of scepticism in how knowledge is challenged that scientists 
retain the term ‘theory’ for all scientific statements. For example, whilst the effect of 
gravity is very real, what gravity ‘is’ is still unknown and so we only have theories 
about gravity. Gravity used to be ‘about’ mechanical forces, waves, vortices, but is 
now ‘about’ grooves in space-time, or possibly tightly bundled strings.55 Feynman 
states the relationship of the epistemic fecundity (‘about’) of a subject to its practices 
(‘of’) in a letter about a quantum gravity conference, where he wrote, ‘I am learning 
nothing. Because there are no experiments, this field is not an active one, so few of 
the best men are doing work in it’.56 It is this idea that where a field becomes inactive 
because people do not know how to proceed, is for the weak reader, the difference 
between a science operating under a paradigm and one without. Unlike the strong 
reader, the weak reader understands that a paradigm is an articulation of the world not 
the world itself. Thus where our ‘about’ languages change in relation to how science 
is conducted Kuhn expresses this ability of the scientist to strike a balance between 
tradition and innovation in science or what he calls an ‘essential tension’.57 Feynman 
expresses this as the ability to, 
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[p]ass on the accumulated wisdom, plus the wisdom that it might not 
be wisdom […] to teach both to accept and reject the past with a kind 
of balance that takes considerable skill.
58
    
 
It is this skill that one learns from being part of the ‘non-literal’ world of the scientist. 
It is the tacit understanding one obtains from being involved in a practice. 
Understanding, in the ‘tacit’ sense, is not possessing knowledge, but is a way of 
acting. Again, we could express this difference as, knowledge is always about 
something, so it is explicit, whereas tacit understanding is part of the language of 
knowledge. These would be practices which fore-structure knowledge that come with 
being in the world. Kuhn’s own inclusion of tacit knowledge and intuition in 
Structure appears to be aimed at overcoming the location of epistemology as the 
source of scientific change.
59
  
 
To call what is tacit in some sense ‘knowledge’ means it must be explicable, which 
appears to be an oxymoron.
60
 Just as one learns to swim or ride a bicycle without 
recourse to a general theory of what one is doing, we acquire our ideals and beliefs 
about science by being socialized into them and not by learning general theories or 
forming beliefs about them. The way we are with regards to science, politics, eating 
rituals or whatever, embody a whole cultural interpretation of what it means to be a 
human being. There is a cultural self-interpretation implicit within our shared 
practices and paradigms. Our interpretation here is very close to Dreyfus, when he 
writes, ‘this inherited background of practices cannot be spelled out in a theory 
because (1) the background is so pervasive we cannot make it an object of analysis, 
and (2) the practices involve skills.’61 In the same way, Kuhn argues that the cognitive 
content of science is not to be found in theories or facts, but in acquiring a ‘way of 
seeing’.62 If one understands this as a type of Austinian performative act it can then be 
traceable to how beliefs and language tie up. Understanding, for the weak reader, 
however, is not something we possess in our heads (facts, beliefs, propositions) but 
something we do (meaningful activity). Just as the student learns how to apply 
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exemplars to new situations he reveals his understanding of it, not by what 
propositions he believes to be true or false about a class of problems, but by acting in 
accordance with the accepted rules of the paradigm.  
 
Most, if not all, non-scientists do not occupy such a rigorous framework as a 
paradigm.
63
  The looser sense of paradigm is ‘worldview’, but worldviews do not tend 
to go into crisis, they have no such analogous practice or aim as ‘normal science’. As 
scientific worldviews are parasitic on scientific paradigms the perceived clashes can 
be re-interpreted through the methodological approach.
64
 For example, Intelligent 
Design Creationist (IDC) scientists interpret the lack of intermediate fossils ‘as’ 
evidence for the falsity of evolutionary theory.
65
 They do not see it ‘as’ evidence that 
fossils are hard to preserve.
66
 As IDC requires a number of negative observations to 
be true, such that there are no intermediate fossils, or the breeding of one kind will 
never produce another kind, it meets with general observation. As there is little or no 
application for these observations, a part from trivially re-describing what we see, it 
allows us to hold these beliefs without ever having to change them. As Helga 
Nowotny says, ‘the pseudo-sciences aspire to become scientific’, but in its aspiration 
the IDC worldview gets its meaning from the veracity of the evolutionary paradigm it 
seeks to replace.
67
 There are no IDC scientists busy trying to disprove Egyptian 
creation myths. Similarly we see with episodes such as the Lysenko affair or the Nazi 
rejection of ‘Jewish physics’ that their actions only become meaningful due to the 
paradigmatic presence they are looking to overcome.
68
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In Structure, the scientist’s engagement with exemplars provides the examples of the 
paradigm, however, they come to the exemplars in a world where they are already 
meaningful. They do not have to establish its meaning as a new phenomenon but only 
integrate it into further articulations of the paradigm. Kuhn gives three exemplars of 
eighteenth century mechanics. He says if the student has understood they will be able 
to see a family resemblance to a singular principle of ‘vis viva’ or ‘actual descent 
equals potential ascent’.69 Kuhn makes the point that such a principle only makes 
sense if one can recognize what the problems or applications are, which means 
knowing ‘something, prior to the law, about the situations that nature does and does 
not present.’70 This knowing something ‘prior to the law’ with reference to which the 
law can make sense appears to be more than knowledge produced by the paradigm, 
but a tacit understanding. This can also be understood in how he criticizes the 
traditional models of learning, such as the presentation of words and nature together.
71
 
It is the privileging of the methodological approach that tells us that Aristotle, Newton 
and Einstein all just saw objects fall (‘about’ language). Yet, as we always see an 
object ‘as’ something, that ‘as’ comes from our lived relationship (‘of’ language) with 
the world. This privileging allows for objective statements to be made, so we can be 
confident when we say Aristotle, Einstein, as well as myself, all see objects fall. Why 
‘falling’ is significant in each case is different however. For Aristotle objects falling 
are ‘about’ natural dispositions, for Newton they are ‘about’ mechanical forces, for 
Einstein they are ‘about’ the curvature of space-time warped by mass. Going back a 
step further, why they should want to explain falling objects is more different still. 
The methodological stance likes to speak of ‘observation’, but in this word is an 
implied normative sense of light, vision and optics. All three were markedly different 
in the ‘Ancient world’, so what it was to ‘observe’, let alone what they were 
observing, has little continuity with its modern scientific use.
72
 
 
Paradigms are synonymous with the normal science that they allow. They work most 
effectively when no one is questioning its fundamental assumptions, as paradigms at 
their best appear to be the same as the ‘literal’ world. Once we no longer see the 
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paradigm, but just objective reality we can get to work as a normal scientist. The 
precise sort of work a paradigm allows is a direct result of the scientist working 
fluently in the language of the paradigm. Another term for language of the paradigm 
is normal science or ‘puzzle-solving’. Whatever those puzzles might be are what the 
paradigm is ‘about’. However, remembering that the ‘about’ is founded in and 
preceded by the ‘of’ language, is how we get change in science. In times of normal 
science a paradigm is concretely ‘about’ something that we investigate. Here 
epistemology is explicit. How we investigate and situate what our investigations are 
about is through the languages of normal science. This will be whatever is agreed as 
standard normal scientific practice at the time. In times of crisis, where we begin to 
doubt what it is that we are investigating or the objects that the paradigm allows to 
meaningfully exist, the ‘about/ of’ relationship becomes re-structured. Once we have 
suitable reason to doubt the veracity of the paradigm, we can re-cast our ways of 
doing science. So now our investigations are ‘about’ the paradigm itself. We can do 
this because the paradigm and normal science are not ‘science’ itself, for this takes 
place in a world even in the absence of a paradigm. Science does not cease to occur, 
but is just practiced differently from how it once was. With the dissolving of a 
paradigm we lose its normal science, but not science altogether for science is not its 
‘about’ language. Normally this displacement is not so violent and unsettling, for if a 
rival paradigm offers new insights, we can quickly resume normal science.
73
 It is in 
the cases where there are no rival theories, or too many to choose from, that we 
experience the absence of a paradigm. This is marked by highly conflicting views 
about how to proceed with research or what exactly needs investigating. This may 
lead to people abandoning the project or it being carried on, but as a softer or pseudo-
science, that finds less and less application to the world. If, like the strong reader, we 
equate paradigm with the world in both its ‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’ sense, all disputes 
are settled epistemologically or linguistically. How do we know the objects as 
described under one paradigm are the same as the objects described under another 
paradigm? If Kuhn is understood as presenting a theory of scientific change, where 
we cannot appeal to some meta-paradigm for methodological rules, the challenge then 
is leveled straight at epistemology or language. The consequences of this being a form 
of radical meaning variance, relativism, or ultra scepticism about our ability to 
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discover facts which, depending on your religious or political outlook, may be a 
desirable thing.
74
      
 
The weak view of paradigms makes a distinction between ‘puzzles’ and ‘problems’. 
Paradigms inform us of what are or are not legitimate puzzles to be solved. 
‘Problems’ are deficiencies with the paradigm that come about by anomaly 
accumulation. Unlike a puzzle, ‘problems’ have no solutions from within the 
paradigm. They would need to be re-articulated through another paradigm so they can 
be converted into a puzzle. Here they are given meaning by being in relation to all 
other puzzles. This tends to be a retrospective activity, for at the time it is hard to 
know what phenomena are connected. For example, prior to the Big-Bang paradigm 
the hiss of static on radios was not regarded as a problem or puzzle for steady-state 
theorists. Gribbin notes that papers published as early as 1948 posited a background 
radiation signal of a Big Bang, but no radio astronomers saw it worthy of attention.
75
 
This theoretical prediction was completely forgotten until the 1960’s, where Penzias 
and Wilson picked up an unexplainable hiss on their radio telescope.
76
 Even here 
neither was looking for this radiation signal. Given the potential enormity of the 
discovery, as we understand it now, maybe we can assume this prediction of cosmic 
background radiation was just not a legitimate puzzle for radio astronomers. 
  
The idea that scientific knowledge is gained from a repeated exposure to problems 
that then allow the scientist to apply those rules and theories, is for Kuhn, to misplace 
‘the cognitive content of science.’77 That working out of solutions to puzzles is 
through analogical reasoning, rather than deducing from general principles.
78
 General 
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principles, as Rouse puts it, ‘are useful as relatively compact expressions, but the 
understanding they express is embedded within the disaggregated ability to grasp 
various situations in those terms.’79 The weak reader appreciates how history and 
paradigms are linked in such a way that controversies of one age are re-told as a 
teleology of scientific progression. Exemplars, as models for the paradigm, are given 
to students who are taught to see similarities between puzzles where it is known that 
those exemplars are applicable. We view exemplars through normal science, which 
means, it has been distilled from its original ‘about/of’ relationship where it was less a 
puzzle and more a problem. It would seem more than chance that two people would 
independently come up with infinitesimal calculus or a theory of evolution if old 
paradigms were not under threat forcing people to conceive of alternatives.
80
 What the 
science student experiences, however, is not a world where we are being pushed to 
consider alternatives. So taking something like ‘Newtonian forces’ these are already a 
part of our world, but with their Einsteinian modifications. Through experimentation 
students are taught how to ‘see’ forces in action. Yet, for Newton and those prior to 
him the world did not contain forces, as the movement of objects could be explained 
in terms of natural dispositions. The way that modern students of science come to 
know about ‘forces’ is not the same way that Newton did, as they do not occupy the 
same ‘non-literal’ world. The ‘of/ about’ relationship is different to Newton’s. The 
language of science for pre-Newtonians was conducted in such a way that its ‘about’ 
content could include things like God, faster-than-light actions, mechanistic forces 
through aether and so on. Whist we still might be able to say they are statements 
‘about’ reality, there is no way of conducting science that would allow us to preserve 
these as part of our ‘about’ language and still be acting scientifically in the modern 
sense. This, for Fuller, is displayed in the idea of internal/ external histories of 
science.
81
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The facts and knowledge, internal to science, are separate from the social and cultural 
factors that made the work originally meaningful. So today one does not need to know 
about Newton’s theological or metaphysical beliefs in order to study his mechanics. 
External history is closer to what sociologists and historians of science study, but for 
me they still contain strong and weak readings of events by what ‘events’ we deem as 
relevant. For Fuller, this is evidenced by the fact that after a period scientific work 
becomes ‘canonized’ as being integral to a paradigm. Scientists can then relax and 
forget about the social and cultural implications by which the problems were first 
posed.
82
 For example, prior to the establishment of quantum mechanics philosophy 
played a large role in debates about the ‘reality’ of tiny events, but once we have 
‘good reason’ to accept the reality of such claims, the actuality of the event about 
which the philosophizing occurred seems unimportant. We see this attitude in 
contemporary scientists, for example, Steven Weinberg skates over the issue by 
saying, ‘the choice of scientific question and the method of approach may depend on 
all sorts of extrascientific influences, but the correct answer when we find it is what it 
is because that is the way the world is.’83 He has also criticized Werner Heisenberg 
over his ‘philosophical’ pronouncements in obscuring scientific claims. He then backs 
up this accusation of sloppy thinking by picking out technical mistakes of 
Heisenberg’s in the German Nuclear weapons programme.84 
 
Kuhn tells us that puzzles always exist within normal science because a paradigm is 
never fully able to resolve all its research problems. ‘The very few that have ever 
seem to do so (e.g., geometric optics) have shortly ceased to yield research problems 
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at all and have instead become tools for engineering.’85 It is when we can engage with 
the paradigm or a part of the paradigm in this way that normal science gets going. I 
think there is room for useful analogy here between a law (f =ma) as a tool and the 
tool as a physical object (hammer).
86
 A hammer becomes a hammer in its use, but it is 
also in its use that the hammer removes itself from our attention.
87
 It is only when 
something goes wrong with the hammer or our situation of hammering changes that 
we are forced to look at it again. We then cease to see it as a hammer, but as an object 
with properties and qualities. Similarly, for the engineer, laws like f = ma are 
completely functional for all macro and sub-luminal phenomena. Just as a carpenter 
may pick up a hammer for a specific job, so an engineer may call upon a specific law 
of motion for completing a task. It is only in situations where forces are not obvious, 
such as in the dynamics of non-Newtonian liquids, that we may be forced to reflect 
upon the situation in which we are using it. Is the situation at fault? Is my application 
incorrect? Or have we found an exception to the law? In times of ‘normal science’ we 
may overlook the anomaly if it persists, but when conflict between the world and 
paradigm is unavoidable and is preventing further research we may have to take up 
the challenge of re-writing those laws.
88
 The ‘law’ like the ‘hammer’ reveals 
understanding in the way that it is used. If a research scientists were trying to 
determine current resistance with f = ma it would soon be pointed out that it is the 
scientist who is at fault, and not the equation. Likewise, a carpenter who was trying to 
saw a piece of wood in half with a hammer would be picked up on their 
craftsmanship. A hammer only has only so many possibilities ‘as’ a hammer due to 
the world we live in. The same is true of ‘evidence’ and ‘observation’ in that the 
paradigm situates certain possibilities as meaningful. Just because there are possible 
scientific alternatives that we now know about, does not mean that people in the past 
were free to choose between them or whatever the unthinkable alternative is for us 
now. We are not free to understand the world in anyway we choose, no more than we 
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are free to see a hammer any other way than a hammer, due to the immersion in the 
‘non-literal’ world, that structures how we experience ‘reality’.  
 
The ‘group-licensed way of seeing’ that Kuhn talks about, as an explanation of the 
paradigm, is for the weak reader a comment on the ‘non-literal’ world, and has 
nothing to do with psychology or linguistics.
89
 Paradigms are spaces for meaning. 
They allow certain thoughts, ideas and actions to be meaningful in respect to the 
‘literal’ world and give meaning to practices that look to say things about the ‘literal’ 
world. Paradigms are not just a gathering of beliefs or methods, but they are what 
allow those beliefs and methods to be exercised as intelligible and rational. A 
paradigm is not just an exemplar, but it comes to be illuminated by the success of 
exemplars. A paradigm is not just that which can be in crisis, although its potential for 
crisis is what gives revolutions their axis.
90
 As Rouse comments, ‘scientists use 
paradigms rather than believing them’ and that paradigms ‘should not be understood 
as beliefs (even tacit beliefs) agreed upon by community members’, but rather as 
ways of acting.
91
 It appears hard to justify actions, as Rouse has done, if the person 
does not believe what they are doing, is in some way correct. This can be hard to 
accept where the truth or certainty of our actions does not come from the truth of our 
beliefs or the certainty of our knowledge. What this points to is that we already know 
how to act in the world, even in the absence of certain knowledge, which most our 
knowledge is anyway. As Wittgenstein says, the truth of a statement is the test of my 
understanding of that statement, which is, how we act in the world given what is 
allowed to be said.
92
   
 
Due to the paradigm (about) being non-identical with the world (of) science can be 
practiced in the absence of a total description. Science here may not continue as 
‘normal science’, but takes up a different way of being practiced. Typically when we 
discuss science and the sort of science portrayed in PUoS we are illustrating ‘normal 
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science’. ‘Normal science’ is synonymous with the language of the paradigm. It is 
also ‘about’ the paradigm to the extent that it generates research puzzles. The more 
powerful the paradigm the more diminished the distinction between the ‘about/of’ 
becomes. So where a paradigm is at its most totalizing, the normal science and 
puzzles generated appear to be ‘about’ the ‘literal’ world, if not identical to it. From 
this the scientist pushes further to expand the identity between paradigm and the 
‘literal’ world. In so doing, we start to accumulate anomalies. The sort of precise 
levels of inquiry the paradigms promise and allow eventually bring about their own 
demise. Here, it starts to become apparent that what we had been calling ‘forces’, 
‘aether’, or meaningless ‘static hiss’, actually belong to the paradigm and are not 
natural categories of the world. So our ways of practicing science bring about a 
change in what we think the ‘literal’ world is about, for it is not what our paradigms 
say it is about. ‘Crisis’ is the point where ‘normal science’ and ‘puzzles’, as defined 
by the paradigm, cease to be legitimate and we move from speaking about the world, 
through the language of the paradigm, to turning science onto the paradigm itself. The 
objects that we thought were in the world cease to generate puzzles. Instead we get 
problems which directly illuminate the paradigm, whereas puzzles are only seen 
through the paradigm. Metaphysically, we move from the commitment that we are 
investigating the world through the language of the paradigm to investigating the 
paradigm itself – we realize that it is not the world that our science is ‘about’ but the 
paradigm itself.  
 
Up until now the examples for paradigmatic shifts have been rather large universal 
ones, such as the movement from Ptolemaic to Copernican planetary systems. In 
Structure Kuhn tells us they do not need to be that dramatic and might only concern a 
small field or tiny shift in application. The revolution in our understanding of x-rays 
demanded a new look at the regional ontology of electromagnetism and radiation, but 
it added very little to fields that did not utilize x-rays.
93
 So it could be thought of as 
new piece of knowledge or instrumental application, but not something that requires 
people to address the fundamentals of their field, which governs how they practice 
science. Practices that cannot agree about the regional ontology of their subject will 
never get to a stage of normal science through which a paradigm may enter into crisis. 
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The inability to agree on the regional ontology of a subject is also connected to the 
subject’s ability to produce research puzzles. At the heart of the social sciences, there 
is a disagreement about whether the prime methodology should be quantitative or 
qualitative. Both aim to make valid scientific inferences, but what constitutes a valid 
inference changes depending on whether one is dealing with general causal inferences 
or how meaning is structured or negotiated in social actions.
94
 We find that there is an 
underdetermination of possible meanings when there is no dominant paradigm, such 
as in sociology, psychology or economics, and its overdetermination when there is 
only one possible means of interpreting phenomena. For example, prior to the agreed 
theory of combustion there were many competing theories as the evidence 
underdetermined the phenomenon. Once the oxygen theory of combustion gained 
ascendance we find it hard to interpret combustion in any other way. To give the 
reverse of this situation, prior to the development of non-Euclidean geometry, all 
phenomena could be treated as objects described by Euclidean geometry. So much so, 
that Kant developed his categories of mind on this assumption.
95
 Now we know that 
whatever geometry we choose to describe the world through is not dictated to us by 
what we see. The paradigm of Euclidean geometry no longer overdetermines the 
actions of objects or the structure or reality.  
         
When we say things like how we describe the world is not dependent on what we see 
it can be easy to lapse into the strong position, concluding that we cannot make true 
statements about the world. Kuhn resists talk of ‘Truth’ when dealing with paradigm 
change. Revolutionary, as opposed to normal science, is just a different way of 
producing an ‘about’ language, by having a different ‘of’ language. To have these two 
views of science such that the historical/ weak view concentrates on the ‘of’ language, 
whereas the methodological/ strong view concentrates on the ‘about’ language, is not 
itself incorrect. What is incorrect is to prioritize these interpretations, so that the weak 
follows from the strong, or devalue the process that gives meaning to these 
distinctions. Of course we can say sensible objective things about the world through 
this methodological mode, but what the weak reader takes this to mean is that the 
highly accurate abstractions we get from this mode are the product of a world that is 
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already articulated by a paradigm. The ‘non literal’ world situates phenomena as 
already meaningful so we can just get on with the business of investigating it, ‘as if’ it 
were the ‘literal’ world.96 By taking the view that the world has only one mode of 
presentation through the methodological stance, this can result in interpreting human 
beings as just another object in a world of objects. The ability to reflect and interpret 
oneself as an object is necessary to science and knowledge production. We refer to 
this perspective as being ‘objective’, but there is nothing necessary about it. For the 
scientific attitude of objectivity is still only an attitude. No doubt the attitude of mind 
by which one sees the objects in the world as objective has to be the best attitude for 
doing science, but it is not necessarily the best attitude for thinking about science.  
 
As a paradigm is not the world it allows room for creativity and change. Once the 
paradigm has gone from being the language of the science to being just another thing 
science is about, the scientist can begin new work. In the absence of the paradigm to 
guide research, where certain possibilities had been ruled out, previously 
unimaginable meanings become viable. Here, though, there has to be historical 
continuity. New meanings can only be considered because knowledge and scientists 
are historical and their commitments to the (metaphysical) ‘literal’ world are bound to 
the (historical) ‘non-literal’ world. We are not free to consider any meaning we want. 
For example, Aristotle could not have considered quantum mechanics any more than 
we can consider whatever the alternative to all our best theories of gravity or quantum 
mechanics are.
97
 As Kuhn writes, ‘scientists can agree that Newton, Lavoisier, 
Maxwell, or Einstein has produced an apparently permanent solution to a group of 
outstanding problems and still disagree, sometimes without being aware of it, about 
the particular abstract characteristics that make those solutions permanent.’98 The 
nature of this disagreement might be about how we moved from the ‘about’ of crisis 
solution to the more robust and transparent ‘of’ language of normal science. The 
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asymmetry between a paradigm and the world means scientists ‘can agree in their 
identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full 
interpretation or rationalization of it.
99
 Lack of a standard interpretation or of an 
agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research’.100 There 
has been a large weight of significance attached to the word ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ 
in academia, at least since the publication of Structure. The implication being, that if 
we cannot provide a full and explicit account of what it is to act scientifically, we then 
have no justifiable grounds for certain actions or beliefs. As the strong reader has 
Kuhn challenging the rational enterprise of science, due to a dogmatic obedience to 
paradigms or inability to compare the contents of its paradigms, we are stuck for a 
justification of its activities. The problem with ‘rationality’ is two-fold: like ‘truth’ its 
definition is self-referring, since we arrive at what is ‘rational’ via a process that is 
itself rational. The term presupposes the method by which we will arrive at our 
conclusion. Secondly, if we use a metaphysics that has action stemming from belief 
then this is the equivalent of putting knowledge prior to tacit-understanding or an 
‘about’ before an ‘of’. If we could articulate what makes beliefs true and how 
knowledge refers to the world, we would then have concrete grounds for the actions 
and beliefs we form. Yet we do not just see the world or reality and make beliefs 
about it. We always see it ‘as’ something. We find the world has already been 
rationalized for us by a paradigm so we can make sense of statements that appear to 
refer to a ‘literal’ world. Similarly, we can just talk and argue about ‘truth’ and 
‘rationality’ as if they were sensible things.  
 
Due to theories extending to ever more unobservable phenomena, philosophers and 
scientists have had to take up a more considered position, since we are using 
representations of what we believe there is. Here, mathematicians and theoretical 
physicists are split. Some have no commitment to the reality of the equation outside 
of its ability to predict and control phenomena, whereas others take mathematics to be 
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‘literally’ the language of nature.101 The success of mathematical predictions, such as 
the Higgs Boson, seems to give us good reason to think that there is some deep 
connection between reality and mathematics, but this is an imposition of the 
methodological ideal.
102
 The history of science shows how we not only re-tell the 
aesthetics of a practice (i.e., what scientists regarded as a beautiful or simple 
explanation), but current mathematical predictions, such as ‘string theory’, seem to 
run counter to what was acceptable as a decent mathematical explanation. Rather than 
being led by an aesthetic sense of mathematical truth, such that we should seek 
simplicity in our explanations, we are fleshing out all sorts of theories as the paradigm 
for fundamental reality is weakening.
103
 Where epistemology has progressed, moving 
from categorical statements to more probabilistic ones, this has not dampened the 
philosophical debates over the existence of scientific objects. Probabilistic arguments, 
however, are statements about our paradigms. For what is probable can only be 
conceived by what is possible, and that is limited by how we are allowed to interpret 
the world. 
 
8.6 - Normal and Revolutionary Science 
 
History, for Kuhn, enables us to understand what science is and how it proceeds. 
Kuhn suggests that the science we ordinarily speak about is ‘normal science’ and it is 
part of the job of the paradigm to tell the story of that science, in the light of present 
knowledge.
104
 This has come to be known as Whig history. Fuller express at least 
three types of history in the history of science, as ‘Whig,’ ‘Prig’ and ‘Tory’.105 All of 
which have to do with how we regard our current position and how we got here. All 
of these come with teleology, history as told by the winners, losers, or the neutral 
historian. The weak reader is aware of this, but also that however we think about 
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ourselves or the subjects and activities we are engaged with is itself historical. As this 
has to do with thinking about science and not doing it, it leaves the actual practice 
relatively free to proceed. As non-scientists however we want to re-describe past 
events will not affect what science is now. What would affect current science is by 
scientists working off a historical interpretation of an assumed phenomenon, such as 
what ‘consciousness’ or ‘intelligence’ is.    
 
Yet as PUoS is involved with thinking about science, not doing it, it is crucial that this 
element be highlighted as part of interpreting science. For example, if we understand 
science only in its methodological guise we can re-tell the story of science as shifts in 
knowledge, as achieved by great white European men. By adhering to a few simple 
methodological principles debates were settled by looking at the evidence. Equally we 
can re-tell the story of those achievements by philosophers, as contributions to current 
disciplines, but arguably we can only do that because of how they contributed to the 
way we think about practices and their relationship to metaphysics. For example, 
Quine writes about how Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 
and Kant were all ‘actually’ scientists, even when it was called ‘natural philosophy’. 
‘All these luminaries and others whom we revere as great philosophers were scientists 
in search of an organized conception of reality.’106 This is to re-tell the story of past 
thinkers ‘as if’ they were sharing something in common with current philosophers, 
scientists, or our commonsense notions about ‘reality’. The bits that were ‘true’ stuck 
it out and found their way into productive discourses and all the unusable speculative 
stuff is now what we call philosophy. We could say this is to get the situation 
precisely the wrong way around. Thinkers of the past do not think like current day 
scientists because they were engaged in some unified ‘search of an organized 
conception of reality’. Rather, people today, including scientists, think like they do, 
can entertain a notion about what it means to be involved in a search for an organized 
conception of reality because of what philosophers of the past did. In the first 
instance, our current state is inevitable. In the second instance, our current state is 
contingent. Had Descartes been Buddhist would modern epistemology be saturated 
with the mind/body problem? Would the Cartesian ‘I’ be so problematic? The very 
possibilities about how we relate to history are tied up in our philosophy and 
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metaphysics. Take Gardner’s ‘worldmaking’ which extends Goodman’s ‘many-
worlds’ idea.107 He argues that some of us are blessed with the ability to look past our 
current state of knowledge and intuit a completely new conception of the world, such 
as Newton or Einstein. Yet at the same time he is forced to say how they are still 
products of their time. Einstein sought a unified picture of reality which was argued 
against by Gödel, Bohr, and Heisenberg, amongst others.
108
 So, contra Quine, it was 
an organized conception of reality inherited from Aristotle, that the world should be 
knowable or unified in any deep sense, rather than Einstein having any greater insight 
into the structure of reality. Gardner wants to place this ‘worldmaking’ ability at the 
level of psychology. That some how these select few were ‘“pretuned” to make telling 
discoveries’.109 Firstly, we are not free to make any world because we are born into a 
world that pre-exists us, with a history, culture, society, language that fixes a notion of 
reality for us. So as great as Newton was his thoughts on alchemy tend to be 
forgotten, along with the connection his physics had to theology. Secondly, Goodman 
and Gardner worked together at Harvard.
110
 There, Gardner was exposed to ideas 
from Goodman and Piaget, that then allowed him to make sense of ‘multiple 
intelligence theories’. Thirdly, if the world can only be described a number of ways, if 
enough people produce total descriptions, there would be left a collection of 
descriptions that ‘work’. This is part of an evolutionary epistemology, but gives the 
illusion of individuals being deeply connected to reality. Fourthly, developmental 
psychology is part of an unstable paradigm. The same observations (depending what 
you count as an observation) have multiple explanations. We take it that we know 
what competence or intelligence at mathematics or music is, yet both develop and 
change along with what it is to be good at them because the ‘non-literal’ world in 
which their meaning is situated changes. What ‘music’ and ‘maths’ were ‘about’ 
changed and these changes were preceded by how those disciplines were practiced.  
The above examples are to show the affect of how we construe metaphysical ideas 
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such as, history, knowledge, or world, which then effect what becomes sensible or 
reasonable to assume.   
 
For normal science to take place, its fundamental principles cannot be questioned. It is 
not that it is impossible to question them, but more that there is no need to when 
normal science is functioning correctly. Here we have a ‘stable horizon of 
expectations, anticipations, and orientation in the research process.’111 The point of 
normal science is that it guides research by highlighting puzzles pertinant to that 
paradigm, but it also produces anomalies when the puzzles cannot be totally solved. 
The coherence and consistency of nature do not need to be re-examined every time an 
anomaly occurs but can be ignored. A strong interpretation of normal science is that 
all those taking part are in agreement over the fundamentals of their field. They are 
blinded by the paradigm to which normal science is a slave.
112
 Kuhn says that those 
doing normal science do not engage with controversy over the fundamentals nor look 
for new phenomena or novel theories. A lack of controversy or novelty seeking 
activity, however, is not inconsistent with disagreement. Whether in agreement or 
disagreement normal science is not directed towards scrutinizing the fundamentals of 
the field, but is more a ‘mop-up’ job.113  
 
In the chapters ‘The Nature of Normal Science’ and ‘Normal Science as Puzzle-
solving’, Kuhn attempts to describe the sort of person that would engage with normal 
science or devote their life to a puzzle.
114
 Normal science, for Kuhn, presupposes the 
disposition of scientist as puzzle-solver. That they attend only to the formal concepts 
and theories of a given paradigm. Normal science also presupposes the willingness of 
the puzzle-solver to give up a host of possible puzzles, for interest in a particular set 
of questions. Whatever ‘puzzle’ a scientist occupies themselves with, they have to 
believe that whatever the solution, it will actually tells them something about reality. 
The strong reader takes the term ‘puzzle’ as the metaphor, whereas, for the weak 
reader any talk of interrogating nature or investigating things as they ‘really’ are is the 
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metaphor.
115
 Equally, any sense that world might be of our own construction, as with 
Goodman, or we are somehow involved with proving the existence of the external 
world, is also a metaphor. Puzzles are a part of normal science, but because paradigms 
are not identical with the world, puzzles cannot be either. The puzzles tell us 
something about the paradigm, which in turn tells us something about the ‘non-literal’ 
world that makes them possible. It is in working to make these metaphors ‘literal’ that 
we uncover their instability. For the strong reader, a term like ‘puzzle’ in Structure is 
a metaphor, that science or philosophy of science has to use metaphorical language in 
order to express what science is really doing. For the weak reader, any expression of 
what there ‘really is’ is the metaphor.116 Derrida is probably one the finest exponents 
of this point through his essays ‘Supplement of the Copula’ and ‘White Mythology’ 
he presents the argument that any term that appears to denote categorical states 
always has to start off as a metaphor.
117
 As Norris remarks,  
 
[T]here could be no accounting either for science or for the history and 
philosophy of science, were it not for (1) the existence of a real-world, 
mind independent domain of which knowledge is none the less 
attainable; (2) the capacity to ‘rectify’ naïve or hitherto unnoticed 
metaphors, analogies, anthropomorphisms, etc; and (3) the resultant 
possibility of advancing ‘from an inefficient trope-concept that is 
poorly constructed, to an operative tropic-concept that is more refined 
and more powerful in a given field and at a determined phase of the 
scientific process’ (‘White Mythology’, p.264).118  
 
For the weak reader, expressions or ambitions of stating what reality is really like are 
based on a realist model. This model is so intuitive it would appear to be a 
prerequisite for truth or objectivity. Instead, the weak reader understands that the 
realist model is an equally contrived metaphysics that allows statements such as there 
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‘really is’ to seem like commonsense. To talk about what there ‘really is’ is to have 
some sense of the ‘literal’ in term-object correspondence. It is this quest to make 
paradigms and world literally the same thing that spurs most scientists on. In doing so, 
what one is trying to achieve is a paradigmatic description that is so totalizing we are 
unable to interpret it any other way. However, because ‘literal’ requires a certain 
model of truth, language and world as being already meaningful before we can apply 
it, we have to presuppose ‘what there is’. It would seem that the metaphor of 
‘literalism’ is self-supporting. This is what enables the weak reader to say that there is 
no literal meaning but the ‘literal’ is meaningful.119 As long as these sorts of terms 
have meaning science will ‘always [be] directed ahead toward possibilities it cannot 
yet fully grasp or articulate’.120 As long as metaphors such as ‘Truth’ or ‘Reality’ are 
what guide practice, any attempt to prove what there ‘really’ is or how we really know 
something, will always throws up more problems and puzzles. Which luckily for 
scientists is what they do.    
 
Normal and revolutionary sciences are ways of doing science. What is scientifically 
meaningful in either case is also historical. For example, grounded in a pre-scientific 
world, stargazing could be astrological. Those same objective actions of looking up 
and ‘observing’ in a post-Einsteinian world are still meaningful. The western world 
still supports an astrological interpretation, but as with IDC it is now dependent on 
modern paradigms for its meaning where new information may alter practices, give 
more accurate planetary orbits or demote planets to dwarf planets. Now, unlike 
ancient Babylon, legal disclaimers have to be given in acting on astrologer’s 
advice.
121
 It would seem any practice that is anachronistic receives its meaning from 
the dominant paradigm that it appears to be challenging. The reason for Kuhn why 
practices like astronomy and cosmology have flourished and astrology is all but dead 
as a ‘science’, is that in the absence of a dominant paradigm no new normal science 
can be established and so it stops producing puzzles. From here there is no way of 
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knowing how research should proceed.
122
 Astrology has a regional ontology, but it is 
in no way fixed or agreed upon and so multiple theories, explanations, ways of doing 
astrology prevail. It does not have the same chance of going into crisis as a practice 
that has developed a normal science. This process of stability, crisis and re-
formulation of what there is ontologically, is a potential point of departure between 
Kuhn and Heidegger’s take on science. Rouse points out, ‘where Kuhn and Heidegger 
diverged was that Kuhn endorsed this closing off of ontological inquiry, whereas 
Heidegger did not’.123 The weak reader will not be so quick to conclude this. Kuhn 
states that paradigms are not only constitutive of science but of nature also.
124
 The 
fact that we always see reality ‘as’ something that is open to change and that change 
alters our worlds does not mean the ‘literal’ world changes. ‘World change’ is not 
located in epistemology as this is what goes into crisis. ‘[A] pendulum is not a falling 
stone, nor is oxygen dephlogisticated air’.125 Interpretation ‘can only articulate a 
paradigm, not correct it.’126 Kuhn’s rejection of the ‘methodological stereotype of 
falsification’ does not mean scientists do not reject theories. As he writes, the ‘act of 
judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always based 
upon more than a comparison of that theory with the world.’127 Naïve falsification 
relies on the literalism of the ‘world’ metaphor. Where we take an observation and 
compare it to reality. Rather we only see something as a worthy observation and know 
what to compare it to because of the world as framed by a paradigm. As the scientists 
will gain a tacit understanding of how their practice relates to the world they start to 
exercise professional judgement about when to relax the methodological rules for 
doing science. Feynman described this as the ability to ‘pass on the accumulated 
wisdom, plus the wisdom that it might not be wisdom’.128 
 
One of the worries the strong reader has with Kuhn’s stance on paradigm, normal 
science and anomaly is that, any anomaly is potentially a counter instance to the 
paradigm.
129
 What this means for the strong reader is that any failure to meet the 
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expectations of the paradigm is another reason to doubt it. The scientist may then be 
at liberty to rethink the paradigm to explain why these anomalies occurred. What this 
can lead to is the Duhem-Quine underdetermination by evidence thesis. Where any 
‘observation’ is for or against an infinite amount of competing explanations.130 If this 
were the case, normal science and paradigm formation would be impossible and 
science would not happen. Yet what this perspective misses out, which the weak 
reader takes on board, is the historical and cultural aspect. For the weak reader, there 
are not infinite competing interpretations of ‘anomaly’, but a selection that are 
historically possible and meaningful. For example, Aristotle could not have posed 
gravitational field equations for explaining why objects fall for in his ‘non-literal’ 
world this option was not a meaningful possibility. The fact is we can reflect on what 
Aristotle did and believed because gravitational field equations are now a meaningful 
part of our present ‘of’ languages, where we are free to re-interpret his beliefs into a 
current ‘about’ language. That is, we can re-state his ‘about/of’ relationship in terms 
of current ‘about/of’ languages in modern science. As Rouse says, ‘philosophical 
preoccupation with testing and evaluating hypotheses betrays a retrospective 
emphasis upon the certification of knowledge. That emphasis contrasts with the 
prospective orientation of scientific research toward the extension of 
understanding.’131 The aim of science is always forward looking, but it can only make 
sense of itself by where it has come from. From the present we can guess at the 
trajectory of technology or research, as we can see where it came from and where it 
could possibly go, but we do this as a part of normal science. Whilst some are firmly 
as a result of previous research, such as there was no hope of Aristotle or Newton 
posing the question of the Higgs boson, some are more esoteric and vague. The 
importance of historical continuity is to ask whether the puzzle meant the same thing 
to them? As much as the Higgs boson was not a meaningful possibility for Aristotle, 
so too, we find it hard, if not impossible, to imagine what the alternatives to our 
current best theories might be.
132
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Normal scientific anomalies remain at the level of epistemology. They are puzzles 
that are unsolved, but the rules for puzzle solutions remain unquestioned. Data that is 
unclear or vague is not a counter instance of the paradigm, but is partly an articulation 
of the paradigm. This is where the ability to contextualize a claim or anomaly 
meaningfully comes in. Collecting and recognizing evidence counter to a paradigm 
presupposes a deep understanding of the paradigm in question. Anomaly recognition, 
as opposed to counter-paradigm evidence, involves the more general skill of noticing 
that something somewhere is not yet adequately understood or has been dealt with in 
an improper manner.
133
 To understand what the problem is, rather than just that there 
is one, is to have already gone a long way toward resolving it. Of this situation Kuhn 
says, ‘assimilating a new sort of fact demands a more than additive adjustment of 
theory, and until that adjustment is completed – until the scientist has learned to see 
nature in a different way - the new fact is not quite a scientific fact at all.’134 A larger 
more pervasive anomaly suggests not merely that this particular phenomenon is not 
understood, but that whatever causes it, and whichever situations it might manifest 
itself, are not reliably understood either. Under these circumstances, a science may 
enter a state of crisis, in which the intelligibility, reliability, and significance of its 
practices and achievements come into question.
135
 Heidegger himself cites these very 
conditions as the basis for science.
136
 
 
A further distinction must be made that crisis and uncertainty in the paradigm are not 
the same thing. Scientists frequently accommodate uncertainty into their work, 
because either the phenomenon they are working with is too complex or any variable 
that produces uncertainty will hopefully be resolved by further articulation of the 
paradigm. Crisis results only when scientists become uncertain about how to advance, 
which theories and models are reliable, which background assumptions need to be 
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checked or indeed what the problem is?
137
 Take for example the debate between 
‘inflationary’ and ‘steady-state’ models of the universe. Everyone could agree that 
certain observations had been made. What those observations meant, however, was 
what had to be fought over. For Hoyle, to imply that the universe had a beginning was 
not scientific and echoed religious ideals which he was strongly against.
138
 We now 
know the universe had a beginning, but what this means is still contentious. Was it 
preceded by other ‘Big Bangs’ or is it part of a multiverse where each act of creation 
is unique? The now observed accelerated expansion of the universe forces scientists to 
posit things like dark matter and energy, but these are place-holder names in the 
absence of an explanation.
139
 Taking the example of ‘inflationary’ and ‘steady-state’ 
universe models we might say ‘crisis’ is when communication ‘of’ the paradigm 
breaks down and communication ‘about’ the paradigm takes off. To speak as a 
‘steady-state’ proponent, I speak and think in the language ‘of’ my paradigm. This 
includes philosophical, aesthetic, social and scientific reasons why a ‘steady-state’ 
universe is preferable to an ‘inflationary’ one. Perfectly within the rules of science, 
Hoyle invented a theoretical field that could create matter in line with the laws of 
energy conservation (C-Fields), this model being called quasi steady-state (QSS) 
cosmology.
140
 He would thus talk in terms of C-Fields which were not accepted as 
legitimate phenomena by opposing cosmologists. He died never changing his views. 
Those however that were ‘converts’ moved from talking and thinking in the language 
of their paradigm to reflecting, thinking and talking about the paradigm. They take up 
a new relationship with it, a kind of shift from first to third-person, where the regional 
ontology of the paradigm is now apparent to them.
141
 Whilst Hoyle and his 
contemporaries were at odds over whether the universe was expanding or not they 
both could agree it was science they were doing which is ‘about’ making true 
statements about ‘reality’. A difference between the weak and strong reader is that a 
                                                 
137
 Fuller’s reading of Kuhn has ‘normal science’ as the most desirable state of science. Fuller, ‘Being 
There’, p.257 
138
 Jane Gregory, Fred Hoyle’s Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.70-71 
139
 As NASA say, ‘Theorists still don't know what the correct explanation is, but they have given the 
solution a name. It is called dark energy.’ ‘Dark Energy, Dark Matter’, NASA Science: Astrophysics, 
<http://science.nasa.gov/astrophysics/focus-areas/what-is-dark-energy/> [accessed 14 Jan 2013]  
140
 Gregory, Fred Hoyle’s Universe, p.334 
141
 Michael Friedman developed a similar idea that science works with a single common tradition of 
cultural exchange that is not trapped to anyone Carnapian framework. This allows the new possibilities 
of paradigm articulation to take place before the revolution. Friedman, Dynamics of Reason, p.60  
236  
weak reader understands that the ‘about’ language is secondary to the ‘of’ whereas the 
strong reader understands the opposite. 
  
Though we tend to think in big, bold examples, as they are easier to picture, crisis and 
paradigm shifts for Kuhn could be any size.
142
 McMullin draws the distinction 
between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep revolutions’.143 Shallow revolutions leave much of the 
theory and supporting concepts intact, such as Kuhn’s example of x-rays, which only 
applied to the use of equipment, whereas, something like space-time geometry was a 
deep revolution, as fundamental ideas were challenged. McMullin argues that it was 
in the ‘deep’ sense of paradigm change, that most philosophers of science based their 
critiques of Kuhn’s account of paradigm change. Kuhn himself states that revolutions 
in one tradition will not necessarily extend to others.
144
 One of the main problems was 
seen to be how proponents of different paradigms could proceed with research if both 
were committed to fundamentally different accounts of the ‘literal’ world. How could 
they agree between themselves which experimental data or theoretical models to 
consider? What background assumptions to test, or which methodologies to use if 
there was no objective third position from which to assess those things. Agreement 
and rational discussion occur because the paradigm and our discourses are not the 
‘literal’ world. Communication and discussion shifts from the language ‘of’ the 
paradigm to discussion ‘about’ the paradigm. 
 
Kuhn’s distinctions between normal science, crisis, and revolution are often translated 
as definite episodes of the development of scientific disciplines. Instead normal and 
revolutionary science can be thought of as ways of doing science, rather than stages of 
a linear process. That would involve having a particular model of time, history and 
knowledge change in mind. In relation to what this means for the ‘methodological 
view’ of science, we are forced to question the philosophical notions of ‘Progress,’ 
‘Truth,’ and ‘Reality’. If paradigms do not aim ‘towards’ anything they cannot share a 
common direction and so in this sense cannot be linear.
145
 There is the metaphor of 
‘revolution’ as something that ‘revolves’, as opposed to something that ‘revolts’, 
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where we may get discursively stuck.
146
 Potentially this is another useful metaphor in 
how we understand whether revolutions ‘progress’ towards anything or not. Rather, if 
we understand science always has to be a ‘normal science’ before it can descend into 
crisis we are always, philosophically, starting from the same spot in scientific 
advances. This is what sets the potential for the next ‘spin’ to then ultimately return to 
the same stage of normal science and anomaly accumulation. Another possible 
problem with the ‘revolution’ metaphor is that we tend to think of revolutions as 
being sudden, violent upheavals of norms and power relationships. As Kuhn writes, 
‘these transitions to maturity have seldom been so sudden or so unequivocal as my 
necessarily schematic discussion may have implied.’147 Indeed, the linear order of the 
chapters in Structure adds to the understanding that revolutionary progression is 
incremental and orderly with a kind of implied motion forward. If we use rotation as 
our metaphor the implied motion becomes circular, which does not intuit notions of 
progression but rather change or reoccurrence. Again one may be free to imply a 
notion of mythic time on to this schema, such that patterns of science repeat 
themselves throughout history. For the weak reader, however, this is to only highlight 
the metaphysics we bring to bear on interpreting a practice. To give ‘time’ any sense 
of teleology, be it linearity or cyclicality, is to be working with a notion of time or 
history already interpreted for us.        
 
The ‘invisibility’ of revolutions comes by way of the various ways we can relate and 
re-tell history.
148
 If told completely through the replacing paradigm revolutions and 
controversies can be forgotten altogether by what makes it into science textbooks, 
courses, and how philosophy of science tells its own stories.
149
 For example, Feynman 
not only being a ‘literal’ visionary in the field of quantum electrodynamics (he 
invented diagrams with which to visualize quantum interactions) he is heralded as 
being the father of nano-technlogy.  In two transcribed lectures by Feynman he is 
cited as supposedly predicting or anticipating the nanotechnology age. In the editor’s 
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preamble he calls Feynman the ‘father of nanotechnology’150 The second talk the 
editor declares Feynman a ‘Nostradamus of computer science’ and him being 
responsible for the ‘current revolution in nanotechnology.’151 A comprehensive 
biography of Feynman calls him the ‘intellectual father’ for nanotechnologists.152 
However much of the work conducted in nanotechnology does not attribute or cite 
Feynman as an influence before or during the 1980’s. Renewed interest in his talks, 
however, occurred in the 1990’s due to the currency the term ‘nano-technology’ was 
gaining. Toumey argues that Feynman’s association with the birth of nanotechnology 
fifty years ahead of its time is a retroactive account that gives nanotechnology an 
already written history that uses the prestige of Feynman’s name to give it greater 
legitimacy.
153
 
 
The choice of normal or revolutionary science may occupy the history books, in that, 
great lengthy periods of equilibrium in science are punctuated with these violent 
upheavals of foundational knowledge, but the weak reader does not see this as a 
choice of either/ or. They can coexist. Some scientists may start with the 
fundamentals of their field, explicitly formulating the background postulates, and 
altering or removing long held principles. Others will continue with the humdrum 
laboratory procedures as part of larger research projects, setting and solving puzzles 
in the ways that are familiar. This mundane work tends to get overlooked, as it does 
not fit the heroic narratives so well, nor capture the public imagination as much. We 
like to deal in singular instances of great scientific achievements, rather than whole 
research communities of very ordinary and slight achievements. For example, the 
solving of ‘Fermat’s Last Theorem’ can be told as the lone 6 years of work Andrew 
Wiles completed.
154
 Equally it could be told as the collective 358 years worth of 
mathematical development it took for Wiles to have the tools to solve it. McMullin’s 
has argued that many commentators of Kuhn have associated paradigm change with 
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large-scale theory change. Bechtel and Rheinberger argue that within biology the 
movement from cytology to modern cell biology came about, not due to theory 
change, but improvements in technology, allowing scientist to ask different 
questions.
155
 It was the technology that allowed cell biologists to go about their work 
differently, to ask different questions, to explore new possibilities. This is completely 
within the boundaries of Kuhn’s description of science as he gives four possible levels 
for normal scientific commitment, anomaly and crisis.
156
 Again, one cannot foresee 
ahead of time how a new piece of technology will affect any one field, so whether a 
revolution goes from ‘shallow’ to ‘deep’ or vice-versa is uncertain. This uncertainty 
though is what was at stake in the policy issues of pure versus applied science 
funding. From the esoteric equation of Einstein’s matter-energy equivalence and 
Rutherford’s internal workings of the atom we have the kernel for sustainable energy, 
which is one of the main applied research paradigms of today’s science. Neither had 
power stations in mind but this is where it has led us.  
 
What is thus taken to be a ‘revolution’ or ‘paradigm shift’ is always a matter of 
retrospective interpretation. Whether a new discovery, theory or application amounts 
to a revolutionary science rather than a new expression of the paradigm is one of the 
things a PUoS would get people to think about. For instance, many great scientific 
breakthroughs occur as the unintentional result of an earlier project. So how could one 
know ahead of time whether a current ordinary piece of research, that fits normal 
science perfectly, does not have revolutionary applications elsewhere?  
 
Philosophically, the hermeneutics someone applies to a discovery can create greater 
or lesser impact than others depending, again, where in time someone is viewing it 
from. Kuhn explicitly expresses the importance of hermeneutics to his philosophy of 
science, after Structure was written.
157
 The standard mathematical-physicist’s 
interpretation is that the special theory of relativity is a very successful attempt to 
work out the implications of Maxwell’s electrodynamics. This was only accomplished 
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through previous work done by Poincaré and Lorentz, which again was only part of a 
long series of investigations into light and electromagnetism, whereas many popular 
accounts regard Einstein’s work as a revolutionary reconstruction of classical physics 
in a Goliath one-man effort.
158
 Using Feynman again, he shared his Nobel-Prize with 
two other physicists. The short biopic that introduces many of his books states that ‘he 
all but rebuilt the theory of quantum electrodynamics.’159 This is rephrased elsewhere 
as ‘rebuilt the theory of quantum electrodynamics and high-energy physics.’160 This 
seems to downplay the shared aspect of his achievements. Co-Nobel Prize winner 
Julian Swinger criticized Feynman’s methods, such as Feynman diagrams, which he 
believed inhibited understanding of field equations. He thought they seduced students 
into pictographic representations of particles, rather than dealing with the paradoxes 
of the field equations. It was Sin-Itiro Tomonaga, along with his students, who 
discovered the ‘renormalization’ method for canceling out infinities in QED theory, 
the thing that Feynman is famous for.
161
 Even Feynman himself recognized how the 
story of science is told with a kind of censored history. In his preamble to a lecture, in 
which he describes the theory that won him the Nobel-Prize, he gives an abridged 
version of scientific discoveries leading up to the problem he solved. He says, 
 
What I have just outlined is what I call a “physicist’s history of 
physics,” which is never correct. What I am telling you is a sort of 
conventionalized myth-story that the physicists tell to their students, 
and those students tell to their students, and it is not necessarily related 
to actual historical development, which I do not really know!
162
 
 
When methodological advancements are being understood in separation from their 
historical context, which allowed them to take place, we start to get problems with our 
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interpretations. For example, one of Einstein’s contributions to modern physics was to 
change Newtonian mass from a constant quantity to a relative quantity. As the term 
‘mass’ is retained, but its meaning altered, we get possible ambiguities in paradigm 
articulation. The interpretive question then becomes whether one emphasizes the 
similarities and continuities or the differences and discontinuities? For the history of 
science can equally be told as episodes of discontinuity, which for some this is more 
preferable.
163
 This is compatible with the weak reading as discontinuity is leveled at 
either epistemology or regional ontology. The strong understanding of this would be 
to mistake metaphorical world for paradigm, or impose a particular metaphysics of 
time, in that scientific ideas can be discontinuous with their own culture or history, 
giving them a kind of transcendental truth.
164
 In reality, physicists do not struggle to 
talk meaningfully about Newtonian or Einsteinian masses. What would be a problem 
is if one could only converse in the language ‘of’ either paradigm. Currently in the 
Einsteinian paradigm we know what the Newtonian mass means and as we can never 
return to a period pre-Einstein it does not make sense to talk about what mass means 
the other way around. We can perform thought experiments given assumptions x, y, 
and z in a Newtonian world, but this mode of thought would not even be possible 
without the prior paradigm shift. Currently, due to the dominance of relativistic 
physics Newtonian problems have now become part of the ‘about’ language of 
Einsteinian physics. By this I mean Newtonian descriptions are now just regarded as 
rough approximation of Einstein’s equations.165   
 
Breakthroughs in science are not the result of dogmatically following ‘falsification’ or 
any other methodological principle but by a scientific attitude, expressed by Kuhn as 
the ‘essential tension’.166 Kuhn also notes that those who have contributed paradigm-
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defining work either tend to be very young or very new to the field.
167
 Being very new 
to the field is almost a truism, for whilst a science is still in its premature phase, it is 
easier to make fundamental contributions than when a science is fully mature and in 
its normal science phase. Jones and Weinberg note that scientific creativity is not so 
much dependent on age, but the level of maturity the science is at.
168
 These types of 
studies are difficult to derive anything concrete from as they rely of inductive 
inferences. Who is to say how future sciences are going to be practiced or even which 
sciences will persist?  
    
The ‘tension’ referred to by Kuhn as a prerequisite for paradigm shifts is a tension 
between a commitment to a tradition and the potential for the tradition to undermine 
itself.
169
 We can restate this as our ‘about’ languages not being fixed by our ‘of’ 
languages. It is, however, in thinking that what our sciences are about determines how 
we do science or that paradigm and world are identical, thus lead the strong reader to 
some unwanted conclusions about the possibility for scientific change. To which I 
turn next. 
  
8.7 - Incommensurability 
 
For the strong reader squaring the idea that scientific progress is possible given that 
scientists can literally live in different worlds is a tricky one. It is this ‘world change’ 
that had led many to accuse Kuhn of being a relativist, subjectivist or irrationalist 
about science. ‘Incommensurability’ as an idea was not original to Kuhn, its form and 
use by Lewis and Feyerabend predate Kuhn’s.170 For Popper ‘incommensurability’ 
was linked to total political regimes where one could not judge the standards of 
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claims. Kuhn does not help himself by using political metaphors or Orwellian remarks 
in his discussion.
171
  Hollinger argues that the threat of incommensurability was born 
of the paranoia of Cold War America and the threat of totalitarian Marxism.
172
 Others 
have argued a meta-incommensurability between terminology, philosophy and 
language in the development of Kuhn’s own ideas due to them being borrowed 
ideas.
173
 While some take the incommensurability of ‘worlds’ to be ‘plainly 
metaphorical,’ others have argued against a Whorfian style literalism in how words 
change what we perceive.
174
 Yet ‘incommensurablity’s’ origin is in mathematics. 
Gattei says that ‘incommensurability’ is seldom discussed in its mathematical form.175 
Most attempts to resolve ‘incommensurability’ either aim at semantic variance or try 
to show why literal ‘world change’ is either self-defeating or disastrous for any 
coherent notion of truth or realism.
176
 These critiques are epistemological, linguistic 
or psychological. The weak reader, on the contrary, understands that any talk of 
‘world change’ is part of the activities of scientists and how they apply their trade.177 
If there is confusion, it partly results from taking Kuhn’s analogies and metaphors 
literally, such as religious conversion, political revolution, Gestalt switches, or visual 
field experiments.
178
 As Kuhn himself says,  
 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, particularly chap.10, I 
repeatedly insist that members of different scientific communities live 
in different worlds and that scientific revolutions change the worlds in 
which scientists work. I would now want to say that members of 
different communities are presented with different data by the same 
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stimuli. Notice, however, that that change does not make phrases like 
“a different world” inappropriate. The given world, whether everyday 
or scientific, is not a world of stimuli.
179
 
 
The strong reader understands Kuhn as forwarding a ‘literal’ change in the world, 
such that we are talking about different realities. It is this understanding that is the 
challenge to realism, truth and the authority of science, which gives a certain 
interpretation of Kuhn political currency.
180
 Yet, the weak reader takes this 
description as suggesting a change in our ‘of’ languages or the change of our ‘non-
literal’ worlds. Similar to my ‘of’ language or ‘non-literal’ world, Rouse introduces 
the concept of ‘work-world’.181 This is to explain differences in worldviews, in that, 
scientists ‘see’ things differently in regard to the things they do. By ‘work-world’ 
Rouse means the forms of life we refer to when someone refers to the ‘financial’ or 
‘academic’ world. The members will more than likely hold different beliefs, but the 
crucial differences are in how they act in their worlds.
182
 A paradigm that is stable 
enough to produce a normal science or consensual normative practices makes it easier 
to distinguish between a good and bad practitioner. So a builder whose houses kept 
collapsing would be deemed a bad builder, but a conceptual artist whose job is to 
break conventions would challenge the idea of demarcation in art. ‘World change’ 
through the ‘strong-weak’ distinction is also a good example of the literal-metaphor 
inversion that might be at work in our understanding. What would it mean to take the 
term ‘world change’ as literal and what would the consequence of it be? For the 
strong reader, the literal world and paradigm are identical and so when the paradigm 
changes scientists are literally working in different worlds.
183
 Since we live in those 
worlds some of us would live in world a and some of us in world b, the puzzle is then, 
how can we communicate with each other or produce reliable knowledge if our 
language and knowledge is representational of the different worlds around us? The 
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weak reading suggests this way of talking is the metaphor. To understand the world 
‘literally’ as a planet and how we experience that planet changes with paradigm 
articulation is useful for science, but it is an abstraction or metaphor based along a 
string of notions that are metaphysical. Rather, it is what allows such talk of ‘possible 
worlds’ or object-language relationships to be meaningful and make it seem like a 
genuine problem. 
 
Instead, the weak reader understands the ‘non-literal’ world as changing, which refers 
to how people adapt and change their practices for constituting the ‘literal’ world. 
What we think our practices are ‘about’ is tied to our ‘of’ language. So the language 
of geo-centric astronomy is different to the language of helio-centric astronomy. This 
will inform what their observations are about, so one person will ‘see’ circular orbits 
and the other will ‘see’ elliptical orbits (this does not mean ‘things’ will literally 
change in the sky above them). The problem occurs if one thinks that our ‘of’ 
languages (historical practices) come from our ‘about’ languages (methodological 
view). Here it is easy to think that because science is always about ‘reality’ and 
making true statements that this must guide our practices. Just as Quine re-told what 
philosophers were doing in terms of the statements current practices hold to be 
meaningful, the weak reader understands that to casually use a term such as ‘reality’ 
is a statement about the practices from where those ideas come from.
184
 To place an 
‘about’ language before an ‘of’ is part of traditional philosophy. Such that we might 
ask ‘what is a chair?’ and list all those things chairs are about and then try and see 
what is common to them all. Transcendentally, we might think that they are all 
‘about’ an ideal form of chair. Yet to start with ‘chair’ is to already understand the 
thing you are interrogating. ‘Chair’ comes to us through our ‘of’ languages of sitting 
down, in a culture where sitting down is significant. If we did not sit down ‘chairs’ 
would not be meaningful to us as they are now. They would not be about sitting down 
but something else.       
 
If ‘paradigm’ and ‘world’ or ‘about’ and ‘of’ languages were identical, 
methodological incommensurability would be a real problem. People would not 
understand each other and the relativism of truth claims would halt the practice of 
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science. For the weak reader ‘incommensurability’ is a matter of not being able to 
appreciate or see the point of what another person is doing, rather than saying there is 
no truth at all.
185
 The strong version is to think that the ‘of/about’ are the same or that 
the ‘about’ precedes the ‘of’. This means that some notion of objective reality informs 
how we investigate it. Here we simply ‘observe’ or compare the evidence. Yet, 
because someone else’s paradigm tells them that the world is another way their 
science is ‘about’ something completely different. To have incommensurability at the 
level of knowledge content or indeterminacy of language translation is to make either 
epistemology or linguistics the focus of incommensurability.  
 
Feyerabend took this to be the most uninteresting version of the problem as it reflects 
a philosopher’s problem and does not address how objects are constituted in 
knowledge.
186
 Old ideas can be re-articulated through a modern paradigm so as to 
either look irrational, stupid or profoundly deep and relevant. Either way, both are a 
rationalization of past events through a modern understanding of the world. To read 
Aristotle as if he were trying to accomplish the same sorts of activities as a modern 
physicist is to not appreciate Aristotle on his own terms. Likewise, to read Newton as 
if he had Einsteinian approximations in mind is to not read him fairly either. As 
Newtonian physics holds more-or-less true for our world and Aristotelian physics 
does not, we can then interpret one as being mistaken and the other as pointing 
towards a ‘timeless’ or transcendental ‘Truth’. The ‘Truth’ that this understanding is 
referring to is that of our about languages, in that we can objectively say, planets 
travel in ellipses or that matter and energy are equivalent. Incommensurability comes 
from the belief that our tacit understanding of ‘of’ languages is derived from the 
objective sphere of ‘about’ languages. The weak reader understands the reverse to be 
true. In order to have an objective notion of what there ‘really’ is has to come from 
practices that make sense of those ways of talking and acting.  
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It is said Newton gave the first expression of the theory of relativity as a corollary of 
his second law, but the significance this has for modern physics as opposed to 
eighteenth century scientists is that the possible meanings it had for them was limited 
by their ‘non-literal’ world.187 It would not have been news to seamen or train 
passengers that unless one looked at a fixed point outside the ship/train one could not 
tell if they were moving (as long as it was a uniform straight line). Yet this only 
became significant when investigations into the phenomena of electricity, 
electromagnetism and light picked up and the assumptions of Newtonian mechanics 
started producing ‘nonsensical’ answers, such as the earth’s rotation as having zero 
velocity.
188
 Feynman makes a similar point about why philosophers in Newton’s time 
were not making a fuss about such claims, unlike ‘cocktail-party philosophers’ who 
argue all is relative.
189
 His answers is that those Newtonian claims were not 
significantly meaningful, because until Maxwell had developed his equations it was 
not thought that one could measure velocity without reference to some stationary 
‘outside’ object.190 The ‘work-world’ of Newton did not take issue with mass 
invariance or relative motion, rather it is the later developments that then reinterpret 
Newton’s work-world in terms of more modern problems that make these 
observations significant. The methodological habit though is to represent such claims 
as being ‘about’ the same thing, ‘reality’. If, however, one does not do the 
philosophical work, as with the strong reader, we find seemingly relativistic or anti-
realist claims in Kuhn. This task is even easier given the ‘received view’ of the 
radicals such as Feyerabend or Heidegger. As Heidegger writes, 
 
[We cannot] say that the Galilean doctrine of freely falling bodies is 
true and that Aristotle’s teachings, that light bodies strive upward, is 
false; for the Greek understanding of the essence of body and place and 
of the relation between the two rests upon a different interpretation of 
entities and hence conditions a correspondingly different kind of 
seeing and questioning of natural events. No one would presume to 
                                                                                                                                            
186
 Paul Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction Versus the Richness of Being 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999a), p.268   
187
 Feynman, Six Not-So-Easy Pieces, p.50 
188
 Ibid., p.53 
189
 Ibid., p.73 
248  
maintain that Shakespeare’s poetry is more advanced than that of 
Aeschylus. It is still more impossible to say that the modern 
understanding of whatever is, is more correct than the Greeks.
191
   
 
The weak reader understands that both Italians and the Greeks saw the same objective 
‘fact’ (a falling object) but that ‘fact’ had different significance within their non-literal 
worldviews. Worldviews (‘of’ language) cannot be judged by merely looking at the 
literal-world and its contents, as what the literal-world (‘about’) is is determined in 
advance.
192
 
  
The distinction I have been making so far through the methodological/ historical or 
‘about’/‘of’ languages, I take to be similar to a distinction made by Michael 
Friedman. He argues one should give due significance to the parallel developments in 
philosophy of science alongside the advancements in scientific knowledge. One can 
remove any sense of incommensurability between the Newtonian and Einsteinian 
paradigms if one considers not only the ‘about’ debates but also the ‘of’ languages 
that made those debates meaningful.
193
 He develops this idea in Dynamics of Reason 
where he says there are two levels of language in scientific progress, the first level is 
internal to science, a part of the process of normal science and which constitute the 
rules of a given linguistic framework within which scientists proceed. The second is 
external to science and come to the fore when normal science undergoes a revolution 
and the previously agreed rules for its linguistic framework come under question. 
Here we are involved in the process of replacing one linguistic system with another, 
and it is this activity that is not wholly based within the methodological view. 
Friedman argues that this second language that supports the transition of paradigms 
and helps to establish them, is of a mainly philosophical nature. Thus, the mechanical 
natural philosophy of the seventeenth century was not based upon its empirical 
success or mathematical prowess ‘but by the inspiring philosophical vision of a 
radically new approach to the understanding of nature self-consciously crafted by 
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Descartes and Galileo against the backdrop of medieval Scholasticism.’194  For 
Einstein’s theory of special relativity was mathematically and empirically equivalent 
to the Lorenz-Fitzgerald theory of aether, yet fundamentally different in that one 
preserves the classical Euclidean space-time geometry and aether and the other does 
not.
195
 Friedman argues that Einstein’s main contribution was a conceptual one, in 
that, what space-time geometry we chose to describe an event with is of our own free 
choice and neither nature nor our minds forces us to chose. Yet, this only became a 
possibility because of nineteenth century debates between Kantianism and empiricism 
in the philosophy of geometry.
196
 
  
If, however, we ignore the historical context, and deal solely in an ‘about’ language 
we can look at causal theories of reference. These are a derivative of practical 
normative uses of language in that they locate common causes.
197
 Understood this 
way language becomes an ‘interaction with the world rather than as a formal structure 
of meanings connected to the world only indirectly.’198 From the strong position, it 
seems almost impossible how something like science could even get started 
considering the methodological problems with induction, scepticism or 
incommensurability. The weak reader does not dismiss methodological problems but 
recognizes them as problems of philosophy in the guise of scientific prescriptions. As 
Rouse writes, ‘the greatest danger in science was not error, which is more readily 
correctable by further inquiry, but the emptiness of assertions closed off from genuine 
accountability to entities.’199 If we place the activities of our ‘of’ languages as 
belonging to what our descriptive languages are ‘about’ something like radical 
meaning variance (RMV) can become a real issue. 
 
A general observation and criticism of the strong reading is why do we not get the 
sorts of incommensurability the strong reading proposes? 
200
 Why can we 
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communicate across paradigms or convert to different worldviews? I argue it was 
Kuhn’s ‘linguistic turn’ in focusing on lexicon content and language learning that has 
made ‘incommensurability’ in its strong guise more natural in reading Kuhn.201 The 
problems that Kordig and Newton-Smith addressed in RMV hinge around the 
meaning of terms and how they change. The strong account of Kuhn’s 
incommensurability may arise by making all knowledge and understanding a problem 
about epistemological. Where understanding another person is just a question of 
theoretical knowledge.
202
 The linguistic and psychological ‘turns’ of Kuhn, as read by 
philosophers such as Rorty, Quine, or Bird, also make a strong reading easier to 
locate. One of the problems with the linguistic interpretation is that we then can be 
drawn on philosophical issues such as ‘indeterminacy’ versus ‘non-determinacy’ of 
language.
203
 A stronger result still of placing incommensurability at the level of 
language is that we can make all truth claims the result of formal expressions of 
grammatical and syntactic structures, which can be analyzed as just another ‘kind of 
writing’.204 Here we are forced to look for explanations of meaning variance, how we 
know what people mean, and how this relates to an external reality. At the level of 
regional ontology with which these questions deal, we can get into further problems 
by asking about whether objects, that were once believed to exist, now suddenly do 
not.
205
 Was ‘phlogiston’ true as long as it was maintained within the dominant 
theories and beliefs? The problem is that if meanings are not fixed to objects then 
both can change with no necessary connection or dependence on one another. The 
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mistake is to think about meanings as if they were ‘facts’ as if it is something you can 
be right or wrong about. As if ‘meanings’ were some how in the world connected to 
objects. 
 
As most would want to defend science from irrationalism or relativism the strong 
reader tries to make sense of this situation. This forces someone like Putnam to posit 
the ‘No Miracles’ argument or when Quine writes, ‘science is itself a continuation of 
commonsense […] the scientist is indistinguishable from the common man in his 
sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more careful.’ 206 It is this kind of liberal 
notion of ‘commonsense’ that I would want philosophy to complicate in a PUoS. For 
appealing to commonsense tells us nothing, as ‘commonsense’ is what limits our 
ability to interpret phenomena in both the real and abstract. Not only did every 
scientist and natural philosopher use their commonsense to infer or deduce what was 
true or reasonable in their time, but what phenomena that now exist, such as electrons, 
are completely counter to our notions of commonsense. Other ideas that appear 
commonsense to us are ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. Not only is there an intellectual payoff in 
understanding how terms like ‘true’ or ‘real’ are not encapsulated within scientific 
methodology, but that there is an ethical, political element to understanding how these 
terms can be appropriated by particular ‘interest groups’. For it is commonsense that 
we do not ‘see’ evolution happening, but in what sense would it matter if we could for 
we always see the world ‘as’ something. It is in understanding how we ground such 
claims that we can find a source of resistance, even if one were not scientifically 
trained.  
 
To sum up, the weak reader’s ‘incommensurability’ is not a product of epistemology 
or linguistics but how we act in the world. To make incommensurability a product of 
knowledge or language is to, either make us prisoners of our languages, or realize the 
absurdity of the claim and make philosophy as a practice redundant. Another result of 
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the strong reading of incommensurability is the sort of metaphysics one is using to 
support such a claim. This is tricky enough when it is conducted at the level of 
observable claims, such as falling objects, but when we discuss the provisionality of 
terms ascribed to unobservable entities, the problem escalates. It would appear that if 
one is for the incommensurability of objects, in what our languages are ‘about’, then 
one is against realism. Similarly, one must also be against a correspondence theory of 
truth, which leaves science wide open to attack. For the sake of space I have decided 
not to develop a strong/weak analysis of the possibility of realism/ anti-realism in 
Kuhn and what the alternatives might be. Needless to say, due to ‘realism’ being the 
commonsense, default position, it is only through self-reflection of the process of 
writing this thesis that this assumed commonsense may not necessarily be a good 
thing. For it is by positing a pre-critical idea that we can elide over any subtle 
difference between a methodological and historical point of view, which ultimately 
may be the source of our problems and not in trying to give proof of realism over anti-
realism. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 – Concluding Remarks 
 
Part of the reasoning behind producing a strong and weak version of the same text is 
to show that what one understands philosophy to be, is itself based on a prior 
understanding of how one comes to philosophy. This may range from a firm belief 
that philosophy of science contributes nothing and only further obfuscates matters to 
trying to uncover the meta-conditions by which we call one thing a science and 
another not. My position is that philosophy is neither of these, though it can be about 
them. I do not want to fall into the same trap of trying to define what philosophy is, 
but I think it should be understandable, practical and do this by problematizing the 
‘everyday’. It should not be an extension of commonsense, but should take such ideas 
as the basis for generating discussion and debate, for there is a lot of political weight 
in terms such as ‘commonsense’, ‘truth’, and ‘real’. Philosophy, as I see it in PUoS, 
would not just be limited to thinking about science, but would be a skill applicable to 
any area where we are asked to think about something. I have argued that this skill 
can be misunderstood by a number of means. The question may not make sense, it 
may be poorly practiced, or certain ‘interest groups’ have a stake in limiting 
philosophy’s scope to either a dominant interpretation of texts or even philosophy 
itself. From this, we can then either blame philosophy as a practice for creating such 
problems, or limit its use by way of recycled interpretations or as Weinberg suggests 
to help define terms such as ‘true’ or ‘real’.1  
 
I doubt the average member of the public struggles to use these terms. What is more 
interesting is finding out why we do not. What I have tried to show with my strong-
weak reading is that on a surface reading of Kuhn, which is supported by the 
surrounding literature, we can derive a Kuhn that is relativist, subjectivist, irrationalist 
or anti-science. For some this is just what Kuhn is and has become the dominant 
reading of him. Others less philosophically trained will follow in the wake of such 
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readings and assimilate this as the meaning of the text. This I take to be equivalent to 
unproblematically using words like ‘true’ and ‘real’. The weak reading was designed 
to challenge such a ‘commonsense’ understanding and in doing so open up 
‘philosophy’ and ‘science’ to a more productive dialogue, in relation to public 
understanding. This tradition of taking opposing views, such as understanding the 
generative forces of the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ readings, can really only achieve an 
effect by taking on board those ‘same professionally motivated conflict of interests’ 
that motivate debates such as the ‘science wars’.2 Here my project echoes those such 
as Koyré’s, in attempting to present a way forward outside of those benign exchanges 
between philosophy and science.   
 
Whether one agrees or not with my method, analysis or interpretation, is part of the 
point, because to do so is to be thinking philosophically, but to be aware of this is as 
important as to be doing it. The lack of awareness of what makes interpretations 
possible is something I am equally guilty of. Prior to my reading of the ‘Continental’ 
and post-positivistic philosophers of science I was firmly in the strong camp 
understanding Kuhn as a relativist. It was the realization that I was thinking about an 
historical question in a methodological way that was the inspiration behind this thesis.  
 
 
Another difficult conceptual point that I take to be a decent example of the themes 
addressed in this section is the metaphor-literal inversion. Firstly, as someone who 
came from the strong camp, I think in retrospect, if I had read such a claim elsewhere 
I would have taken this as another reason why philosophy is useless. How can 
something not be literally true or not the case? I was not only troubled by this fact, but 
I problematized this proposition myself, where I started to find myself agreeing with 
philosophers I had been told were bad, obtuse, or hard-to-read. It was in reading 
Heidegger and seeing a similarity with Kuhn or a way to understand him that seemed 
to be more in the spirit of philosophy than writing another thesis on what Heidegger 
or Kuhn ‘meant’. Another philosopher I struggled with as a member of the strong 
camp was Derrida, yet I found myself not only agreeing with his analysis of the 
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metaphor-truth inversion, but also discovered that my thinking was Derridean in 
challenging the received interpretation of a text. My main source of ammunition for 
challenging the methodological interpretation of science is the history of science, 
which also suffers from the same problem. It is in trying to get out of the habit of 
looking for the ‘correct’ account that philosophy teaches its lessons, but it also has to 
be understood that not just any account will do. So take the commonly understood 
purveyor of the ‘anything goes’ ethic, Paul Feyerbend. It was he who emphasized the 
role rhetoric played in the historical development of science. His analysis of Galileo’s 
use of rhetoric to hide the gaps in his argument implies, however, that Feyerabend 
aligns himself closer to the positivists than he is normally portrayed in the literature. 
The inquisitors were the ones who used methodical analytical criticisms and it was 
Galileo who fudged the issue. However, in the end, Galileo seems to come into 
agreement more with modern physics than the Church. So the ‘Feyerabendian moral, 
then, is that the positivists mistake rhetoric for method, but method doesn’t win, 
either: reality does – and that’s something that transcends both crafty rhetoric and 
rigorous method.’3 There does have to be a certain type of rigor to philosophical 
analysis, but such that we can understand a subject not by what it is, but by what it 
means. It is for this reason that I think that a question like the PoD can never succeed 
on purely methodological grounds. We have to answer the question what does it mean 
to be scientific before we get to the question what is science? 
 
What I have called the strong and weak readings can be also be thought about as the 
difference between the methodological and historical stance. I have argued that these 
are two possible ways people could interpret a text and come away with two very 
different understandings. One shows Kuhn to be a relativist, subjectivist, irrationalist 
about science, the upshot of which makes scientists an insular, ad-hoc modifying 
community who are not interested in the correctness of ideas or describing reality, but 
in protecting their theories from falsification. This would appear to clash with our 
everyday notion of science as experienced through technology or modern medicine 
and so would feel justified in ignoring any discipline where this is considered a 
sensible option. Likewise, if our aim is to undermine scientific authority we can use 
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the academic weight of Kuhn and Structure to ‘show’ that science is a paradigm 
relative practice and therefore the knowledge it elicits is relative too. ‘Interest groups’ 
that may wish to bring about scepticism over global warming, vaccination or 
evolution can do so by appealing to the strong Kuhn. When we compare philosophy 
to science the picture looks even bleaker. Philosophy is stuck on the same questions, 
making no progress, whereas science has constructed Internet forums for these ivory 
tower debates to be played out in. There appears to be almost an absurdity to 
discussing realism or truth, in that, we have to presuppose what it is we are going to 
be sceptical over. A debate about truth or the existence of an external reality would 
make no sense unless we already in some way tacitly understood what those terms 
meant. Just as there is bad science there is also bad philosophy. I am not advocating 
that any philosophical tradition is better than none, but where philosophy appears to 
be absent we are at liberty to do the most work, for this is where the tyranny of 
thought creeps in.
4
 As previously stated, I am not so much concerned for the activity 
of science as that takes care of itself, but how we think about science. The problem I 
originally started with is what I take to be central to a PUoS, ‘what is science?’ The 
implication of this question is that we can also tell what science is not. Depending on 
how we understand this question, whether it is a matter of methodology or history, 
comes from a prior understanding, which either exposes or hides its philosophical 
content. I tried to parallel this with two readings of Kuhn and in doing so, illustrate a 
type of methodology. 
 
To demonstrate what I meant by how the philosophical component of a text either 
exposes or hides itself, I used the central concepts found in Structure. For example, 
‘incommensurability’ for the strong reader will either highlight epistemology, 
linguistics or regional ontology as being the source of incommensurability. For them, 
the ‘literal’ world and ‘paradigm’ are the same thing and the difficulty then becomes 
how do we understand scientific advances, if paradigm shifts literally change the 
world we live in? This, coupled with the apparent denial of scientific progression, can 
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lead to either a rather bleak outlook for science as an epistemic authority, or we 
passover Kuhn as an episode in the philosophy of science as another reason why we 
do not consider philosophy as a useful enterprise.
5
 Again, it is the strong reader who 
thinks that if we are denying the metaphysical possibility of attaining ultimate ‘Truth’ 
we are also denying ‘truth’, or that all interpretations become equal. What we might 
want to say is that ‘truth’ is a by-product of activities, which once organized 
meaningfully, we can then abstract to some philosophical notion of ‘Truth’. Weinberg 
commenting on Kuhn’s remark about the difficulty in stating a phrase such as ‘closer 
and closer to the truth’ says, ‘all this is woodworm to scientists like myself, who think 
the task of science is to bring us closer and closer to objective truth.’6 I too wish to 
defend science, but this dismissal is too easy and ultimately not in keeping with the 
scientific ethos. Rather, very good arguments can be made why such statements are 
problematic, which do not just apply to science but any discipline or pseudo-science 
wishing to fill its shoes. It is in those periods of revolutionary science when the 
paradigm goes from ‘of’ to the ‘about’, that the metaphysics of ‘truth’ can come up 
for argument, which was not uncommon to the likes of Bohr, Einstein and 
Heisenberg. ‘Truth’ as a metaphysical idea, however, is not a requirement for doing 
science, since we do not know how or what reality is, or if it means anything at all. 
‘Truth’ might be a functional ideal that enables scientists to practice, but as Feynman 
said we have to balance this with an understanding that we might be wrong. Here, 
again, we may feel inclined to let the methodological incarnation of ‘Truth’ trump the 
historical notions of ‘truth’, but alas we have to consider the direction of influence. If 
discourse and reality mapped perfectly we could have a sense of ‘Truth’, but as 
Wittgenstein says, it is only facts and statements that can be true or false not the world 
itself as it is not a thing or object.
7
 We always view the world ‘as’ something, as a 
collection of certain ‘facts’ or ‘states of affairs’, which come to us as an 
understanding predetermined by the world. Heidegger, like Kuhn, argues that the 
views of Aristotle and Galileo cannot be compared point for point, which is the 
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mathematical meaning of incommensurability. If one accepts that Aristotle and 
Galileo inhabited different worlds in the sense that their ‘of’ languages were different 
then this allows for different possibilities for interpretation. If, however, we think that 
they both occupied the same ‘literal world’ where their ‘about’ language was aimed at 
the same reality we can assess Aristotle as wrong and Galileo as more correct. 
 
 
When we read the great natural philosophers, such as Plato, Bacon, Newton or Kant 
there is a distinct modern feel to their problems and ways of talking about them. The 
strong reader wishes to say this is because they think like us, whereas the weak reader 
wants to say, it is because of them we think like we do. It is through the 
methodological stance that Newton comes to us first and foremost as a physicist. It is 
the historical stance that also raises the importance of theology, alchemy and 
philosophy in his thinking. The stuff Newton did that has relevance to our modern 
world, such as his work on optics or laws of motion, get distilled from the theological 
and philosophical reasons for why he came to the conclusions he did. This seems to 
be most critical in science education where we do not hear of Newton the philosopher, 
theologian or alchemist, or if we do it is passed off as non-scientific. If we go back to 
when science and philosophy were both covered by the term ‘natural philosophy’, 
there was no distinction between what Leibniz, Descartes or Newton were doing, it 
was at the same time science, philosophy and theology. Hadot goes back even further 
by making a distinction between modern and ancient philosophy. His distinction 
seems to complements my ‘about/ of’ languages. He says that modern philosophy is 
‘first and foremost a discourse’. It is about discourse development and exegesis.8 
Ancient philosophy on the other hand is, ‘a way of life’, ‘form of life’, ‘the art of 
living’, ‘an exercised practised’.9 It seems to be the aim of the methodological 
understanding to keep the ‘about’ language as primary, where as the historical view is 
concerned with the conditions for bringing such a view about. Tracking the history of 
philosophy, we see from the end of the eighteenth century onwards philosophy 
became the preserve of the university, which gave rise to the professional philosopher. 
There were exceptional cases where philosophy grew outside of the University, such 
as with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but in the main, Universities remained places of 
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instruction for Kantianism or Hegelianism.
10
 Schopenhauer, as well as Hadot, points 
out the dangers of Universities being thought of as having ownership over 
philosophical discourse and practice.
11
    
 
It was in the early twentieth century that science and professional philosophy became 
distinct. The logical positivists, who were made up of scientists, philosophers and 
mathematicians, seeing the success of Einstein and the new physics, wanted to unify 
the sciences in a uniquely philosophical task, by looking at what was special about 
scientific knowledge. The blurring of what was pertinent to philosophy or to science 
can be seen in the responses to Carnap’s original dissertation proposal where Max 
Wien believed the topic to be too philosophical and Bruno Bauch thought it to be pure 
physics.
12
 Science and philosophy, however, have never been totally separated. The 
re-telling of ‘controversy’ as part of the normal scientific method, rather than any 
deep unresolved philosophical issues, can be seen in episodes of history. For example, 
when potentially unnerving claims were being made about the compatibility of causal 
determinism with quantum indeterminacy, this did not move many scientists to 
ponder the metaphysical implications behind freewill. The Kuhnian explanation for 
this would be that such questions are too fundamental and so remain philosophical, as 
opposed to workable, in a normal scientific arena. In order for neat mathematical 
formalisms to be made one has to remain agnostic on the deeper implications of what 
one is doing. At the time of the logical positivists, biology was being dismissed as an 
immature science and unable to achieve the unity of physics due to fundamental 
disputes between ‘mechanism’ and ‘vitalism’.13 If we accept that science is comprised 
of normal and revolutionary science, we can see that normal science has no need of 
philosophical questions whereas revolutionary science is over-run with them. 
 
The importance of philosophy to thinking about science as a socio-cultural product is 
an ethical, as well as political concern. Where the effects of a poor economy or the 
marketization of education have pushed people to equate knowledge with ‘capital’, it 
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appears natural that this should fit in with thinking about science. This ‘about’ domain 
though is what philosophy does, and further still, it tries to problematize it by asking 
for the conditions by which such thinking can come about. However, if we do not 
want people to think ‘about’ thinking we can wheel out a certain representation of 
Kuhn or Feynman in order to stigmatize any such attempt.  
 
Yet, as history shows, even scientists cannot escape their own culture, where language 
and ideas are inherited. It is by looking at the episodes in history, where the practiced 
notion of science seems to grate with the methodological ideal. Where trained 
scientists have entertained the notion of ‘Aryan physics,’ ‘lysenkoism,’ or ‘Creationist 
science’ as geuine possibilities. Here it seems to be more than just a matter of looking 
at the evidence. Yet how one understands this is open to abuse by forwarding one 
interpretation as ‘commonsense’ over another. This was my aim with Kuhn, in 
producing two contradictory readings of the same text. The ‘strong’ reading produces 
problems from which a certain way of thinking gives us an ‘out’. Here relativism, 
scepticism, irrationalism or the uselessness of philosophy can be easy to accept, if it is 
only the ‘strong’ interpretation that is made known to us. It was the ‘weak’ reading 
and philosophy that act as a kind of therapy or exercise that does not seek to solve 
these problems, but show us how they come to exist by virtue of our understanding. It 
is when philosophy appears useless or absent that ‘thought’ is in the greatest danger. 
To understand philosophy as only an academic pursuit is to create a gap in public 
discourse in which a market of competing ideologies will eagerly take its place.
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